public inbox for linux-arch@vger.kernel.org
 help / color / mirror / Atom feed
From: Davidlohr Bueso <dave@stgolabs.net>
To: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
	Christoph Hellwig <hch@infradead.org>,
	Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>,
	"Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>,
	Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>,
	Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>,
	PaX Team <pageexec@freemail.hu>, Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>,
	Eric Biggers <ebiggers3@gmail.com>,
	Elena Reshetova <elena.reshetova@intel.com>,
	Hans Liljestrand <ishkamiel@gmail.com>,
	David Windsor <dwindsor@gmail.com>,
	Greg KH <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>,
	Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>,
	Alexey Dobriyan <adobriyan@gmail.com>,
	"Serge E. Hallyn" <serge@hallyn.com>,
	arozansk@redhat.com, Manfred Spraul <manfred@colorfullife.com>,
	"axboe@kernel.dk" <axboe@kernel.dk>,
	James Bottomley <James.Bottomley@hansenpartnership.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v5 0/3] Implement fast refcount overflow protection
Date: Wed, 31 May 2017 05:27:32 -0700	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20170531122732.GA24923@linux-80c1.suse> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <1496180392-98718-1-git-send-email-keescook@chromium.org>

On Tue, 30 May 2017, Kees Cook wrote:

>A new patch has been added at the start of this series to make the default
>refcount_t implementation just use an unchecked atomic_t implementation,
>since many kernel subsystems want to be able to opt out of the full
>validation, since it includes a small performance overhead. When enabling
>CONFIG_REFCOUNT_FULL, the full validation is used.
>
>The other two patches provide overflow protection on x86 without incurring
>a performance penalty. The changelog for patch 3 is reproduced here for
>details:

To be sure I'm getting this right, after this all archs with the exception
of x86 will use the regular atomic_t ("unsecure") flavor, right?

Thanks,
Davidlohr

WARNING: multiple messages have this Message-ID (diff)
From: Davidlohr Bueso <dave@stgolabs.net>
To: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
	Christoph Hellwig <hch@infradead.org>,
	Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>,
	"Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>,
	Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>,
	Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>,
	PaX Team <pageexec@freemail.hu>, Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>,
	Eric Biggers <ebiggers3@gmail.com>,
	Elena Reshetova <elena.reshetova@intel.com>,
	Hans Liljestrand <ishkamiel@gmail.com>,
	David Windsor <dwindsor@gmail.com>,
	Greg KH <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>,
	Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>,
	Alexey Dobriyan <adobriyan@gmail.com>,
	"Serge E. Hallyn" <serge@hallyn.com>,
	arozansk@redhat.com, Manfred Spraul <manfred@colorfullife.com>,
	"axboe@kernel.dk" <axboe@kernel.dk>,
	James Bottomley <James.Bottomley@hansenpartnership.com>,
	"x86@kernel.org" <x86@kernel.org>, Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>,
	Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>,
	"David S. Miller" <davem@davemloft.net>,
	Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com>,
	linux-arch <linux-arch@vger.kernel.org>,
	"kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com"
	<kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v5 0/3] Implement fast refcount overflow protection
Date: Wed, 31 May 2017 05:27:32 -0700	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20170531122732.GA24923@linux-80c1.suse> (raw)
Message-ID: <20170531122732.Rqsji3NMCszjbNfCUu2l1qrkWlJye115MpORNvZPihY@z> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <1496180392-98718-1-git-send-email-keescook@chromium.org>

On Tue, 30 May 2017, Kees Cook wrote:

>A new patch has been added at the start of this series to make the default
>refcount_t implementation just use an unchecked atomic_t implementation,
>since many kernel subsystems want to be able to opt out of the full
>validation, since it includes a small performance overhead. When enabling
>CONFIG_REFCOUNT_FULL, the full validation is used.
>
>The other two patches provide overflow protection on x86 without incurring
>a performance penalty. The changelog for patch 3 is reproduced here for
>details:

To be sure I'm getting this right, after this all archs with the exception
of x86 will use the regular atomic_t ("unsecure") flavor, right?

Thanks,
Davidlohr

  parent reply	other threads:[~2017-05-31 12:27 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 34+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2017-05-30 21:39 [PATCH v5 0/3] Implement fast refcount overflow protection Kees Cook
2017-05-30 21:39 ` Kees Cook
2017-05-30 21:39 ` [PATCH v5 1/3] refcount: Create unchecked atomic_t implementation Kees Cook
2017-05-30 21:39   ` Kees Cook
2017-05-31 10:45   ` Reshetova, Elena
2017-05-31 10:45     ` Reshetova, Elena
2017-05-31 11:09     ` Peter Zijlstra
2017-05-31 11:09       ` Peter Zijlstra
2017-06-01 14:43       ` Kees Cook
2017-06-01 14:43         ` Kees Cook
2017-05-30 21:39 ` [PATCH v5 2/3] x86/asm: Add suffix macro for GEN_*_RMWcc() Kees Cook
2017-05-30 21:39   ` Kees Cook
2017-05-31 11:13   ` Peter Zijlstra
2017-05-31 11:13     ` Peter Zijlstra
2017-05-31 13:17     ` Kees Cook
2017-05-31 13:17       ` Kees Cook
2017-05-31 14:03       ` Peter Zijlstra
2017-05-31 14:03         ` Peter Zijlstra
2017-05-31 16:09         ` Kees Cook
2017-05-31 16:09           ` Kees Cook
2017-05-30 21:39 ` [PATCH v5 3/3] x86/refcount: Implement fast refcount overflow protection Kees Cook
2017-05-30 21:39   ` Kees Cook
2017-06-29  4:13   ` [kernel-hardening] " Li Kun
2017-06-29  4:13     ` Li Kun
2017-06-29 22:05     ` Kees Cook
2017-06-29 22:05       ` [kernel-hardening] " Kees Cook
2017-06-30  2:42       ` Li Kun
2017-06-30  2:42         ` [kernel-hardening] " Li Kun
2017-06-30  3:58         ` Kees Cook
2017-06-30  3:58           ` Kees Cook
2017-05-31 12:27 ` Davidlohr Bueso [this message]
2017-05-31 12:27   ` [PATCH v5 0/3] " Davidlohr Bueso
2017-05-31 13:20   ` Kees Cook
2017-05-31 13:20     ` Kees Cook

Reply instructions:

You may reply publicly to this message via plain-text email
using any one of the following methods:

* Save the following mbox file, import it into your mail client,
  and reply-to-all from there: mbox

  Avoid top-posting and favor interleaved quoting:
  https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Posting_style#Interleaved_style

* Reply using the --to, --cc, and --in-reply-to
  switches of git-send-email(1):

  git send-email \
    --in-reply-to=20170531122732.GA24923@linux-80c1.suse \
    --to=dave@stgolabs.net \
    --cc=James.Bottomley@hansenpartnership.com \
    --cc=adobriyan@gmail.com \
    --cc=akpm@linux-foundation.org \
    --cc=arozansk@redhat.com \
    --cc=axboe@kernel.dk \
    --cc=dwindsor@gmail.com \
    --cc=ebiederm@xmission.com \
    --cc=ebiggers3@gmail.com \
    --cc=elena.reshetova@intel.com \
    --cc=gregkh@linuxfoundation.org \
    --cc=hch@infradead.org \
    --cc=ishkamiel@gmail.com \
    --cc=jannh@google.com \
    --cc=jpoimboe@redhat.com \
    --cc=keescook@chromium.org \
    --cc=linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org \
    --cc=manfred@colorfullife.com \
    --cc=mingo@redhat.com \
    --cc=pageexec@freemail.hu \
    --cc=peterz@infradead.org \
    --cc=serge@hallyn.com \
    /path/to/YOUR_REPLY

  https://kernel.org/pub/software/scm/git/docs/git-send-email.html

* If your mail client supports setting the In-Reply-To header
  via mailto: links, try the mailto: link
Be sure your reply has a Subject: header at the top and a blank line before the message body. 
This is a public inbox, see mirroring instructions
for how to clone and mirror all data and code used for this inbox