From: Dave Martin <Dave.Martin@arm.com>
To: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>
Cc: linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org, linux-arch@vger.kernel.org,
arnd@arndb.de, jiong.wang@arm.com, marc.zyngier@arm.com,
catalin.marinas@arm.com, yao.qi@arm.com, suzuki.poulose@arm.com,
will.deacon@arm.com, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com,
kvmarm@lists.cs.columbia.edu, christoffer.dall@linaro.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH 06/11] arm64: Don't trap host pointer auth use to EL2
Date: Mon, 24 Jul 2017 11:37:24 +0100 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20170724103648.GA6321@e103592.cambridge.arm.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <1500480092-28480-7-git-send-email-mark.rutland@arm.com>
On Wed, Jul 19, 2017 at 05:01:27PM +0100, Mark Rutland wrote:
> To allow EL0 (and/or EL1) to use pointer authentication functionality,
> we must ensure that pointer authentication instructions and accesses to
> pointer authentication keys are not trapped to EL2 (where we will not be
> able to handle them).
>
> This patch ensures that HCR_EL2 is configured appropriately when the
> kernel is booted at EL2. For non-VHE kernels we set HCR_EL2.{API,APK},
> ensuring that EL1 can access keys and permit EL0 use of instructions.
> For VHE kernels, EL2 access is controlled by EL3, and we need not set
> anything.
>
> This does not enable support for KVM guests, since KVM manages HCR_EL2
> itself.
>
> Signed-off-by: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>
> Cc: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
> Cc: Christoffer Dall <christoffer.dall@linaro.org>
> Cc: Marc Zyngier <marc.zyngier@arm.com>
> Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
> Cc: kvmarm@lists.cs.columbia.edu
> ---
> arch/arm64/include/asm/kvm_arm.h | 2 ++
> arch/arm64/kernel/head.S | 19 +++++++++++++++++--
> 2 files changed, 19 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
>
> diff --git a/arch/arm64/include/asm/kvm_arm.h b/arch/arm64/include/asm/kvm_arm.h
> index 61d694c..c1267e8 100644
> --- a/arch/arm64/include/asm/kvm_arm.h
> +++ b/arch/arm64/include/asm/kvm_arm.h
> @@ -23,6 +23,8 @@
> #include <asm/types.h>
>
> /* Hyp Configuration Register (HCR) bits */
> +#define HCR_API (UL(1) << 41)
> +#define HCR_APK (UL(1) << 40)
> #define HCR_E2H (UL(1) << 34)
> #define HCR_ID (UL(1) << 33)
> #define HCR_CD (UL(1) << 32)
> diff --git a/arch/arm64/kernel/head.S b/arch/arm64/kernel/head.S
> index 973df7d..8b8e8d7 100644
> --- a/arch/arm64/kernel/head.S
> +++ b/arch/arm64/kernel/head.S
> @@ -412,10 +412,25 @@ CPU_LE( bic x0, x0, #(1 << 25) ) // Clear the EE bit for EL2
>
> /* Hyp configuration. */
> mov x0, #HCR_RW // 64-bit EL1
> - cbz x2, set_hcr
> + cbz x2, 1f
Can we keep the label name here? It still seems appropriate.
> orr x0, x0, #HCR_TGE // Enable Host Extensions
> orr x0, x0, #HCR_E2H
> -set_hcr:
> +1:
> +#ifdef CONFIG_ARM64_POINTER_AUTHENTICATION
> + /*
> + * Disable pointer authentication traps to EL2. The HCR_EL2.{APK,API}
> + * bits exist iff at least one authentication mechanism is implemented.
> + */
> + mrs x1, id_aa64isar1_el1
> + mov_q x3, ((0xf << ID_AA64ISAR1_GPI_SHIFT) | \
> + (0xf << ID_AA64ISAR1_GPA_SHIFT) | \
> + (0xf << ID_AA64ISAR1_API_SHIFT) | \
> + (0xf << ID_AA64ISAR1_APA_SHIFT))
Redundant outer (), I think -- mov_q protects its argument.
> + and x1, x1, x3
> + cbz x1, 1f
tst + b.eq?
> + orr x0, x0, #(HCR_APK | HCR_API)
> +1:
> +#endif
> msr hcr_el2, x0
> isb
Cheers
---Dave
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2017-07-24 10:37 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 58+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2017-07-19 16:01 [PATCH 00/11] ARMv8.3 pointer authentication userspace support Mark Rutland
2017-07-19 16:01 ` Mark Rutland
2017-07-19 16:01 ` [PATCH 01/11] arm64: docs: describe ELF hwcaps Mark Rutland
2017-07-19 16:01 ` Mark Rutland
2017-07-21 17:05 ` Dave Martin
2017-07-21 17:05 ` Dave Martin
2017-07-24 10:47 ` Suzuki K Poulose
2017-08-03 14:49 ` Catalin Marinas
2017-08-03 14:49 ` Catalin Marinas
2017-08-03 17:57 ` Kees Cook
2017-08-03 17:57 ` Kees Cook
2017-07-19 16:01 ` [PATCH 02/11] asm-generic: mm_hooks: allow hooks to be overridden individually Mark Rutland
2017-07-19 16:01 ` Mark Rutland
2017-07-19 16:01 ` [PATCH 03/11] arm64: add pointer authentication register bits Mark Rutland
2017-07-19 16:01 ` Mark Rutland
2017-07-19 16:01 ` [PATCH 04/11] arm64/cpufeature: add ARMv8.3 id_aa64isar1 bits Mark Rutland
2017-07-19 16:01 ` Mark Rutland
2017-07-24 10:54 ` Suzuki K Poulose
2017-07-19 16:01 ` [PATCH 05/11] arm64/cpufeature: detect pointer authentication Mark Rutland
2017-07-19 16:01 ` [PATCH 06/11] arm64: Don't trap host pointer auth use to EL2 Mark Rutland
2017-07-19 16:01 ` Mark Rutland
2017-07-24 10:37 ` Dave Martin [this message]
2017-07-19 16:01 ` [PATCH 07/11] arm64: add basic pointer authentication support Mark Rutland
2017-07-19 16:01 ` Mark Rutland
2017-07-25 15:26 ` Dave Martin
2017-07-25 15:26 ` Dave Martin
2017-08-11 7:46 ` Yao Qi
2017-08-11 8:45 ` Dave Martin
2017-08-11 8:45 ` Dave Martin
2017-07-19 16:01 ` [PATCH 08/11] arm64: expose user PAC bit positions via ptrace Mark Rutland
2017-07-19 16:01 ` Mark Rutland
2017-07-19 16:01 ` [PATCH 09/11] arm64/kvm: preserve host HCR_EL2 value Mark Rutland
2017-07-19 16:01 ` Mark Rutland
2017-08-01 11:00 ` Christoffer Dall
2017-08-01 11:00 ` Christoffer Dall
2017-07-19 16:01 ` [PATCH 10/11] arm64/kvm: context-switch ptrauth registers Mark Rutland
2017-07-19 16:01 ` Mark Rutland
2017-08-01 11:00 ` Christoffer Dall
2017-08-01 11:00 ` Christoffer Dall
2017-08-01 14:26 ` Mark Rutland
2017-08-01 14:32 ` Will Deacon
2017-08-01 17:02 ` Christoffer Dall
2017-07-19 16:01 ` [PATCH 11/11] arm64: docs: document pointer authentication Mark Rutland
2017-07-19 16:01 ` Mark Rutland
2017-07-21 17:05 ` [PATCH 00/11] ARMv8.3 pointer authentication userspace support Dave Martin
2017-07-21 17:05 ` Dave Martin
2017-07-25 12:06 ` Mark Rutland
2017-07-25 12:06 ` Mark Rutland
2017-07-25 14:00 ` Jiong Wang
2017-08-11 11:29 ` Mark Rutland
2017-07-24 11:52 ` Yao Qi
2017-07-25 11:32 ` Yao Qi
2017-07-25 11:32 ` Yao Qi
2017-07-25 16:01 ` Mark Rutland
2017-07-25 14:12 ` [kernel-hardening] " Li Kun
2017-07-25 14:12 ` Li Kun
2017-07-25 15:12 ` Mark Rutland
2017-07-25 15:12 ` Mark Rutland
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