From: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>
To: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Cc: linux-arch@vger.kernel.org, Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>
Subject: [RFC PATCH 0/4] API for inhibiting speculative arbitrary read primitives
Date: Wed, 3 Jan 2018 22:38:23 +0000 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20180103223827.39601-1-mark.rutland@arm.com> (raw)
Recently, Google Project Zero discovered several classes of attack
against speculative execution. One of these, known as variant-1, allows
explicit bounds checks to be bypassed under speculation, providing an
arbitrary read gadget. Further details can be found on the GPZ blog [1]
and the Documentation patch in this series.
There are a number of potential gadgets in the Linux codebase, and
mitigations for these are architecture-specific.
This RFC attempts to provide a cross-architecture API for inhibiting
these primitives. Hopefully, architecture-specific mitigations can be
unified behind this. An arm64 implementation is provided following the
architecturally recommended sequence laid out in the Arm whitepaper [2].
The API is based on a proposed compiler intrinsic [3].
I've provided a patch to BPF as an example use of the API. I know that
this is incomplete and less than optimal. I'd appreciate feedback from
other affected architectures as to whether this API is suitable for
their required mitigation.
I've pushed the series to my kernel.org repo [4].
[1] https://googleprojectzero.blogspot.co.uk/2018/01/reading-privileged-memory-with-side.html
[2] https://developer.arm.com/support/security-update
[3] https://developer.arm.com/support/security-update/compiler-support-for-mitigations
[4] git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/mark/linux.git core/nospec
Thanks,
Mark.
Mark Rutland (4):
asm-generic/barrier: add generic nospec helpers
Documentation: document nospec helpers
arm64: implement nospec_{load,ptr}()
bpf: inhibit speculated out-of-bounds pointers
Documentation/speculation.txt | 99 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
arch/arm64/include/asm/barrier.h | 61 +++++++++++++++++++++++++
include/asm-generic/barrier.h | 76 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
kernel/bpf/arraymap.c | 21 ++++++---
kernel/bpf/cpumap.c | 8 ++--
kernel/bpf/devmap.c | 6 ++-
kernel/bpf/sockmap.c | 6 ++-
7 files changed, 265 insertions(+), 12 deletions(-)
create mode 100644 Documentation/speculation.txt
--
2.11.0
next reply other threads:[~2018-01-03 22:38 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 82+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2018-01-03 22:38 Mark Rutland [this message]
2018-01-03 22:38 ` [RFC PATCH 1/4] asm-generic/barrier: add generic nospec helpers Mark Rutland
2018-01-03 22:38 ` Mark Rutland
2018-01-04 12:00 ` Mark Rutland
2018-01-05 4:21 ` Dan Williams
2018-01-05 9:15 ` Mark Rutland
2018-01-03 22:38 ` [RFC PATCH 2/4] Documentation: document " Mark Rutland
2018-01-03 22:38 ` Mark Rutland
2018-01-03 22:38 ` [RFC PATCH 3/4] arm64: implement nospec_{load,ptr}() Mark Rutland
2018-01-03 22:38 ` Mark Rutland
2018-01-03 22:38 ` [RFC PATCH 4/4] bpf: inhibit speculated out-of-bounds pointers Mark Rutland
2018-01-03 22:38 ` Mark Rutland
2018-01-03 23:45 ` Peter Zijlstra
2018-01-03 23:45 ` Peter Zijlstra
2018-01-04 10:59 ` Mark Rutland
2018-01-04 0:15 ` [RFC PATCH] asm/generic: introduce if_nospec and nospec_barrier Dan Williams
2018-01-04 0:15 ` Dan Williams
2018-01-04 0:39 ` Linus Torvalds
2018-01-04 1:07 ` Alan Cox
2018-01-04 1:13 ` Dan Williams
2018-01-04 1:13 ` Dan Williams
2018-01-04 6:28 ` Julia Lawall
2018-01-04 17:58 ` Dan Williams
2018-01-04 19:26 ` Pavel Machek
2018-01-04 19:26 ` Pavel Machek
2018-01-04 21:43 ` Dan Williams
2018-01-04 22:20 ` Linus Torvalds
2018-01-04 22:23 ` Linus Torvalds
2018-01-04 22:55 ` Alan Cox
2018-01-04 23:06 ` Linus Torvalds
2018-01-04 23:11 ` Alan Cox
2018-01-04 23:11 ` Alan Cox
2018-01-05 0:24 ` Dan Williams
2018-01-04 22:44 ` Pavel Machek
2018-01-04 23:12 ` Dan Williams
2018-01-04 23:12 ` Dan Williams
2018-01-04 23:21 ` Alan Cox
2018-01-04 23:33 ` Pavel Machek
2018-01-05 8:11 ` Julia Lawall
2018-01-04 1:27 ` Jiri Kosina
2018-01-04 1:27 ` Jiri Kosina
2018-01-04 1:41 ` Alan Cox
2018-01-04 1:47 ` Jiri Kosina
2018-01-04 1:47 ` Jiri Kosina
2018-01-04 19:39 ` Pavel Machek
2018-01-04 20:32 ` Alan Cox
2018-01-04 20:32 ` Alan Cox
2018-01-04 20:39 ` Jiri Kosina
2018-01-04 21:23 ` Alan Cox
2018-01-04 21:23 ` Alan Cox
2018-01-04 21:48 ` Pavel Machek
2018-01-04 1:51 ` Dan Williams
2018-01-04 1:51 ` Dan Williams
2018-01-04 1:54 ` Linus Torvalds
2018-01-04 1:54 ` Linus Torvalds
2018-01-04 3:10 ` Williams, Dan J
2018-01-04 4:44 ` Al Viro
2018-01-04 5:44 ` Dan Williams
2018-01-04 5:49 ` Dave Hansen
2018-01-04 5:49 ` Dave Hansen
2018-01-04 5:50 ` Al Viro
2018-01-04 5:55 ` Al Viro
2018-01-04 6:42 ` Dan Williams
2018-01-04 5:01 ` Eric W. Biederman
2018-01-04 6:32 ` Dan Williams
2018-01-04 14:54 ` Eric W. Biederman
2018-01-04 16:39 ` Mark Rutland
2018-01-04 20:56 ` Pavel Machek
2018-01-04 20:56 ` Pavel Machek
2018-01-04 11:47 ` Mark Rutland
2018-01-04 11:47 ` Mark Rutland
2018-01-04 22:09 ` Dan Williams
2018-01-05 14:40 ` Mark Rutland
2018-01-05 16:44 ` Dan Williams
2018-01-05 18:05 ` Dan Williams
2018-01-04 1:59 ` Jiri Kosina
2018-01-04 1:59 ` Jiri Kosina
2018-01-04 2:15 ` Alan Cox
2018-01-04 3:12 ` Alexei Starovoitov
2018-01-04 9:16 ` Reshetova, Elena
2018-01-04 9:16 ` Reshetova, Elena
2018-01-04 20:40 ` Pavel Machek
Reply instructions:
You may reply publicly to this message via plain-text email
using any one of the following methods:
* Save the following mbox file, import it into your mail client,
and reply-to-all from there: mbox
Avoid top-posting and favor interleaved quoting:
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Posting_style#Interleaved_style
* Reply using the --to, --cc, and --in-reply-to
switches of git-send-email(1):
git send-email \
--in-reply-to=20180103223827.39601-1-mark.rutland@arm.com \
--to=mark.rutland@arm.com \
--cc=linux-arch@vger.kernel.org \
--cc=linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org \
/path/to/YOUR_REPLY
https://kernel.org/pub/software/scm/git/docs/git-send-email.html
* If your mail client supports setting the In-Reply-To header
via mailto: links, try the mailto: link
Be sure your reply has a Subject: header at the top and a blank line
before the message body.
This is a public inbox, see mirroring instructions
for how to clone and mirror all data and code used for this inbox;
as well as URLs for NNTP newsgroup(s).