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From: Al Viro <viro@ZenIV.linux.org.uk>
To: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com>
Cc: "torvalds@linux-foundation.org" <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>,
	"linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org" <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>,
	"peterz@infradead.org" <peterz@infradead.org>,
	"tglx@linutronix.de" <tglx@linutronix.de>,
	"alan@linux.intel.com" <alan@linux.intel.com>,
	"Reshetova, Elena" <elena.reshetova@intel.com>,
	"mark.rutland@arm.com" <mark.rutland@arm.com>,
	"gnomes@lxorguk.ukuu.org.uk" <gnomes@lxorguk.ukuu.org.uk>,
	"gregkh@linuxfoundation.org" <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>,
	"jikos@kernel.org" <jikos@kernel.org>,
	"linux-arch@vger.kernel.org" <linux-arch@vger.kernel.org>
Subject: Re: [RFC PATCH] asm/generic: introduce if_nospec and nospec_barrier
Date: Thu, 4 Jan 2018 05:50:12 +0000	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20180104055012.GD21978@ZenIV.linux.org.uk> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <CAPcyv4gKQD68dCCD-Nz78ZQ9ttung5yMzG3f+JRmGUxuKhK4Pw@mail.gmail.com>

On Wed, Jan 03, 2018 at 09:44:33PM -0800, Dan Williams wrote:
> On Wed, Jan 3, 2018 at 8:44 PM, Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk> wrote:
> > On Thu, Jan 04, 2018 at 03:10:51AM +0000, Williams, Dan J wrote:
> >
> >> diff --git a/include/linux/fdtable.h b/include/linux/fdtable.h
> >> index 1c65817673db..dbc12007da51 100644
> >> --- a/include/linux/fdtable.h
> >> +++ b/include/linux/fdtable.h
> >> @@ -82,8 +82,10 @@ static inline struct file *__fcheck_files(struct files_struct *files, unsigned i
> >>  {
> >>       struct fdtable *fdt = rcu_dereference_raw(files->fdt);
> >>
> >> -     if (fd < fdt->max_fds)
> >> +     if (fd < fdt->max_fds) {
> >> +             osb();
> >>               return rcu_dereference_raw(fdt->fd[fd]);
> >> +     }
> >>       return NULL;
> >>  }
> >
> > ... and the point of that would be?  Possibly revealing the value of files->fdt?
> > Why would that be a threat, assuming you manage to extract the information in
> > question in the first place?
> 
> No, the concern is that an fd value >= fdt->max_fds may cause the cpu
> to read arbitrary memory addresses relative to files->fdt and
> userspace can observe that it got loaded.

Yes.  And all that might reveal is the value of files->fdt.  Who cares?

  parent reply	other threads:[~2018-01-04  5:50 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 82+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2018-01-03 22:38 [RFC PATCH 0/4] API for inhibiting speculative arbitrary read primitives Mark Rutland
2018-01-03 22:38 ` [RFC PATCH 1/4] asm-generic/barrier: add generic nospec helpers Mark Rutland
2018-01-03 22:38   ` Mark Rutland
2018-01-04 12:00   ` Mark Rutland
2018-01-05  4:21     ` Dan Williams
2018-01-05  9:15       ` Mark Rutland
2018-01-03 22:38 ` [RFC PATCH 2/4] Documentation: document " Mark Rutland
2018-01-03 22:38   ` Mark Rutland
2018-01-03 22:38 ` [RFC PATCH 3/4] arm64: implement nospec_{load,ptr}() Mark Rutland
2018-01-03 22:38   ` Mark Rutland
2018-01-03 22:38 ` [RFC PATCH 4/4] bpf: inhibit speculated out-of-bounds pointers Mark Rutland
2018-01-03 22:38   ` Mark Rutland
2018-01-03 23:45   ` Peter Zijlstra
2018-01-03 23:45     ` Peter Zijlstra
2018-01-04 10:59     ` Mark Rutland
2018-01-04  0:15 ` [RFC PATCH] asm/generic: introduce if_nospec and nospec_barrier Dan Williams
2018-01-04  0:15   ` Dan Williams
2018-01-04  0:39   ` Linus Torvalds
2018-01-04  1:07     ` Alan Cox
2018-01-04  1:13       ` Dan Williams
2018-01-04  1:13         ` Dan Williams
2018-01-04  6:28         ` Julia Lawall
2018-01-04 17:58           ` Dan Williams
2018-01-04 19:26             ` Pavel Machek
2018-01-04 19:26               ` Pavel Machek
2018-01-04 21:43               ` Dan Williams
2018-01-04 22:20                 ` Linus Torvalds
2018-01-04 22:23                   ` Linus Torvalds
2018-01-04 22:55                   ` Alan Cox
2018-01-04 23:06                     ` Linus Torvalds
2018-01-04 23:11                       ` Alan Cox
2018-01-04 23:11                         ` Alan Cox
2018-01-05  0:24                       ` Dan Williams
2018-01-04 22:44                 ` Pavel Machek
2018-01-04 23:12                   ` Dan Williams
2018-01-04 23:12                     ` Dan Williams
2018-01-04 23:21                     ` Alan Cox
2018-01-04 23:33                     ` Pavel Machek
2018-01-05  8:11                       ` Julia Lawall
2018-01-04  1:27       ` Jiri Kosina
2018-01-04  1:27         ` Jiri Kosina
2018-01-04  1:41         ` Alan Cox
2018-01-04  1:47           ` Jiri Kosina
2018-01-04  1:47             ` Jiri Kosina
2018-01-04 19:39             ` Pavel Machek
2018-01-04 20:32               ` Alan Cox
2018-01-04 20:32                 ` Alan Cox
2018-01-04 20:39                 ` Jiri Kosina
2018-01-04 21:23                   ` Alan Cox
2018-01-04 21:23                     ` Alan Cox
2018-01-04 21:48                     ` Pavel Machek
2018-01-04  1:51         ` Dan Williams
2018-01-04  1:51           ` Dan Williams
2018-01-04  1:54           ` Linus Torvalds
2018-01-04  1:54             ` Linus Torvalds
2018-01-04  3:10             ` Williams, Dan J
2018-01-04  4:44               ` Al Viro
2018-01-04  5:44                 ` Dan Williams
2018-01-04  5:49                   ` Dave Hansen
2018-01-04  5:49                     ` Dave Hansen
2018-01-04  5:50                   ` Al Viro [this message]
2018-01-04  5:55                     ` Al Viro
2018-01-04  6:42                       ` Dan Williams
2018-01-04  5:01               ` Eric W. Biederman
2018-01-04  6:32                 ` Dan Williams
2018-01-04 14:54                   ` Eric W. Biederman
2018-01-04 16:39                     ` Mark Rutland
2018-01-04 20:56                     ` Pavel Machek
2018-01-04 20:56                       ` Pavel Machek
2018-01-04 11:47               ` Mark Rutland
2018-01-04 11:47                 ` Mark Rutland
2018-01-04 22:09                 ` Dan Williams
2018-01-05 14:40                   ` Mark Rutland
2018-01-05 16:44                     ` Dan Williams
2018-01-05 18:05                       ` Dan Williams
2018-01-04  1:59           ` Jiri Kosina
2018-01-04  1:59             ` Jiri Kosina
2018-01-04  2:15             ` Alan Cox
2018-01-04  3:12               ` Alexei Starovoitov
2018-01-04  9:16                 ` Reshetova, Elena
2018-01-04  9:16                   ` Reshetova, Elena
2018-01-04 20:40             ` Pavel Machek

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