From: Greg KH <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
To: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com>
Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, linux-arch@vger.kernel.org,
akpm@linux-foundation.org, kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com,
Hideaki YOSHIFUJI <yoshfuji@linux-ipv6.org>,
netdev@vger.kernel.org, Alexey Kuznetsov <kuznet@ms2.inr.ac.ru>,
tglx@linutronix.de, torvalds@linux-foundation.org,
"David S. Miller" <davem@davemloft.net>,
Elena Reshetova <elena.reshetova@intel.com>,
alan@linux.intel.com
Subject: Re: [PATCH v2 10/19] ipv4: prevent bounds-check bypass via speculative execution
Date: Fri, 12 Jan 2018 08:59:07 +0100 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20180112075907.GA3391@kroah.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <151571803884.27429.7578279171286065970.stgit@dwillia2-desk3.amr.corp.intel.com>
On Thu, Jan 11, 2018 at 04:47:18PM -0800, Dan Williams wrote:
> Static analysis reports that 'offset' may be a user controlled value
> that is used as a data dependency reading from a raw_frag_vec buffer.
> In order to avoid potential leaks of kernel memory values, block
> speculative execution of the instruction stream that could issue further
> reads based on an invalid '*(rfv->c + offset)' value.
>
> Based on an original patch by Elena Reshetova.
There is the "Co-Developed-by:" tag now, if you want to use it...
> Cc: "David S. Miller" <davem@davemloft.net>
> Cc: Alexey Kuznetsov <kuznet@ms2.inr.ac.ru>
> Cc: Hideaki YOSHIFUJI <yoshfuji@linux-ipv6.org>
> Cc: netdev@vger.kernel.org
> Signed-off-by: Elena Reshetova <elena.reshetova@intel.com>
> Signed-off-by: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com>
> ---
> net/ipv4/raw.c | 10 ++++++----
> 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
Ugh, what is this, the 4th time I've said "I don't think this is an
issue, so why are you changing this code." to this patch. To be
followed by a "oh yeah, you are right, I'll drop it", only to see it
show back up in the next time this patch series is sent out?
Same for the other patches in this series that I have reviewed 4, maybe
5, times already. The "v2" is not very true here...
thanks,
greg k-h
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2018-01-12 7:59 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 103+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2018-01-12 0:46 [PATCH v2 00/19] prevent bounds-check bypass via speculative execution Dan Williams
2018-01-12 0:46 ` Dan Williams
2018-01-12 0:46 ` [PATCH v2 01/19] Documentation: document array_ptr Dan Williams
2018-01-12 0:46 ` Dan Williams
2018-01-12 10:38 ` Geert Uytterhoeven
2018-01-12 10:38 ` Geert Uytterhoeven
2018-01-16 21:01 ` Kees Cook
2018-01-16 21:01 ` Kees Cook
2018-01-12 0:46 ` [PATCH v2 02/19] arm64: implement ifence_array_ptr() Dan Williams
2018-01-12 0:46 ` Dan Williams
2018-01-12 0:46 ` [PATCH v2 03/19] arm: " Dan Williams
2018-01-12 0:46 ` [PATCH v2 04/19] x86: implement ifence() Dan Williams
2018-01-12 0:46 ` Dan Williams
2018-01-12 2:27 ` Eric W. Biederman
2018-01-12 2:27 ` Eric W. Biederman
2018-01-12 3:39 ` Dan Williams
2018-01-12 0:46 ` [PATCH v2 05/19] x86: implement ifence_array_ptr() and array_ptr_mask() Dan Williams
2018-01-12 0:46 ` Dan Williams
2018-01-12 0:46 ` [PATCH v2 06/19] asm-generic/barrier: mask speculative execution flows Dan Williams
2018-01-12 2:42 ` Eric W. Biederman
2018-01-12 9:12 ` Peter Zijlstra
2018-01-13 0:41 ` Dan Williams
2018-01-15 8:46 ` Peter Zijlstra
2018-01-12 0:47 ` [PATCH v2 07/19] x86: introduce __uaccess_begin_nospec and ASM_IFENCE Dan Williams
2018-01-12 0:47 ` Dan Williams
2018-01-12 17:51 ` Josh Poimboeuf
2018-01-12 18:21 ` Dan Williams
2018-01-12 18:58 ` Josh Poimboeuf
2018-01-12 18:58 ` Josh Poimboeuf
2018-01-12 19:26 ` Dan Williams
2018-01-12 19:26 ` Dan Williams
2018-01-12 20:01 ` Linus Torvalds
2018-01-12 20:01 ` Linus Torvalds
2018-01-12 20:41 ` Josh Poimboeuf
2018-01-12 20:41 ` Josh Poimboeuf
2018-01-12 0:47 ` [PATCH v2 08/19] x86: use __uaccess_begin_nospec and ASM_IFENCE in get_user paths Dan Williams
2018-01-12 0:47 ` Dan Williams
2018-01-12 1:11 ` Linus Torvalds
2018-01-12 1:14 ` Dan Williams
2018-01-12 1:14 ` Dan Williams
2018-01-12 0:47 ` [PATCH v2 09/19] ipv6: prevent bounds-check bypass via speculative execution Dan Williams
2018-01-12 0:47 ` Dan Williams
2018-01-12 0:47 ` [PATCH v2 10/19] ipv4: " Dan Williams
2018-01-12 0:47 ` Dan Williams
2018-01-12 7:59 ` Greg KH [this message]
2018-01-12 7:59 ` Greg KH
2018-01-12 18:47 ` Dan Williams
2018-01-12 18:47 ` Dan Williams
2018-01-13 8:56 ` Greg KH
2018-01-13 8:56 ` Greg KH
2018-01-12 0:47 ` [PATCH v2 11/19] vfs, fdtable: " Dan Williams
2018-01-12 0:47 ` Dan Williams
2018-01-12 0:47 ` [PATCH v2 12/19] userns: " Dan Williams
2018-01-12 0:47 ` Dan Williams
2018-01-12 0:47 ` [PATCH v2 13/19] udf: " Dan Williams
2018-01-12 0:47 ` Dan Williams
2018-01-15 10:32 ` Jan Kara
2018-01-15 17:49 ` Dan Williams
2018-01-12 0:47 ` [PATCH v2 14/19] [media] uvcvideo: " Dan Williams
2018-01-12 0:47 ` Dan Williams
2018-08-06 21:40 ` Laurent Pinchart
2018-08-06 21:40 ` Laurent Pinchart
2018-01-12 0:47 ` [PATCH v2 15/19] carl9170: " Dan Williams
2018-01-12 0:47 ` Dan Williams
2018-01-12 14:42 ` Christian Lamparter
2018-01-12 14:42 ` Christian Lamparter
2018-01-12 18:39 ` Dan Williams
2018-01-12 20:01 ` Christian Lamparter
2018-01-12 20:01 ` Christian Lamparter
2018-01-12 23:05 ` Dan Williams
2018-01-12 23:05 ` Dan Williams
2018-01-12 0:47 ` [PATCH v2 16/19] p54: " Dan Williams
2018-01-12 0:47 ` [PATCH v2 17/19] qla2xxx: " Dan Williams
2018-01-12 0:47 ` Dan Williams
2018-01-12 1:19 ` James Bottomley
2018-01-12 1:19 ` James Bottomley
2018-01-12 5:38 ` Dan Williams
2018-01-12 5:38 ` Dan Williams
2018-01-12 6:05 ` James Bottomley
2018-01-12 0:48 ` [PATCH v2 18/19] cw1200: " Dan Williams
2018-01-12 0:48 ` Dan Williams
2018-01-12 0:48 ` [PATCH v2 19/19] net: mpls: " Dan Williams
2018-01-12 0:48 ` Dan Williams
2018-01-12 1:19 ` [PATCH v2 00/19] " Linus Torvalds
2018-01-12 1:19 ` Linus Torvalds
2018-01-12 1:41 ` Dan Williams
2018-01-12 1:41 ` Dan Williams
2018-01-18 13:18 ` Will Deacon
2018-01-18 13:18 ` Will Deacon
2018-01-18 16:58 ` Dan Williams
2018-01-18 16:58 ` Dan Williams
2018-01-18 17:05 ` Will Deacon
2018-01-18 17:05 ` Will Deacon
2018-01-18 21:41 ` Laurent Pinchart
2018-01-18 21:41 ` Laurent Pinchart
2018-01-13 0:15 ` Tony Luck
2018-01-13 0:15 ` Tony Luck
2018-01-13 18:51 ` Linus Torvalds
2018-01-13 18:51 ` Linus Torvalds
2018-01-16 19:21 ` Tony Luck
2018-01-16 19:21 ` Tony Luck
2018-01-12 10:02 ` Russell King - ARM Linux
2018-01-12 10:02 ` Russell King - ARM Linux
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