From: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
To: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com>
Cc: tglx@linutronix.de, linux-arch@vger.kernel.org,
Cyril Novikov <cnovikov@lynx.com>,
kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com,
Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>,
Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>,
x86@kernel.org, Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>,
Russell King <linux@armlinux.org.uk>,
Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>,
gregkh@linuxfoundation.org, "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>,
torvalds@linux-foundation.org, alan@linux.intel.com,
linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH v5 02/12] array_idx: sanitize speculative array de-references
Date: Sun, 28 Jan 2018 09:55:00 +0100 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20180128085500.djlm5rlbhjlpfj4i@gmail.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <151703972396.26578.7326612698912543866.stgit@dwillia2-desk3.amr.corp.intel.com>
Firstly, I only got a few patches of this series so I couldn't review all of them
- please Cc: me to all future Meltdown and Spectre related patches!
* Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com> wrote:
> 'array_idx' is proposed as a generic mechanism to mitigate against
> Spectre-variant-1 attacks, i.e. an attack that bypasses boundary checks
> via speculative execution). The 'array_idx' implementation is expected
> to be safe for current generation cpus across multiple architectures
> (ARM, x86).
nit: Stray closing parenthesis
s/cpus/CPUs
> Based on an original implementation by Linus Torvalds, tweaked to remove
> speculative flows by Alexei Starovoitov, and tweaked again by Linus to
> introduce an x86 assembly implementation for the mask generation.
>
> Co-developed-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
> Co-developed-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
> Suggested-by: Cyril Novikov <cnovikov@lynx.com>
> Cc: Russell King <linux@armlinux.org.uk>
> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
> Cc: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
> Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
> Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>
> Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>
> Cc: x86@kernel.org
> Signed-off-by: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com>
> ---
> include/linux/nospec.h | 64 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
> 1 file changed, 64 insertions(+)
> create mode 100644 include/linux/nospec.h
>
> diff --git a/include/linux/nospec.h b/include/linux/nospec.h
> new file mode 100644
> index 000000000000..f59f81889ba3
> --- /dev/null
> +++ b/include/linux/nospec.h
> @@ -0,0 +1,64 @@
> +// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
> +// Copyright(c) 2018 Intel Corporation. All rights reserved.
Given the close similarity of Linus's array_access() prototype pseudocode there
should probably also be:
Copyright (C) 2018 Linus Torvalds
in that file?
> +
> +#ifndef __NOSPEC_H__
> +#define __NOSPEC_H__
> +
> +/*
> + * When idx is out of bounds (idx >= sz), the sign bit will be set.
> + * Extend the sign bit to all bits and invert, giving a result of zero
> + * for an out of bounds idx, or ~0UL if within bounds [0, sz).
> + */
> +#ifndef array_idx_mask
> +static inline unsigned long array_idx_mask(unsigned long idx, unsigned long sz)
> +{
> + /*
> + * Warn developers about inappropriate array_idx usage.
> + *
> + * Even if the cpu speculates past the WARN_ONCE branch, the
s/cpu/CPU
> + * sign bit of idx is taken into account when generating the
> + * mask.
> + *
> + * This warning is compiled out when the compiler can infer that
> + * idx and sz are less than LONG_MAX.
Please use 'idx' and 'sz' in quotes, to make sure they stand out more in free
flowing comment text. Also please use '()' to denote functions/methods.
I.e. something like:
* Warn developers about inappropriate array_idx() usage.
*
* Even if the CPU speculates past the WARN_ONCE() branch, the
* sign bit of 'idx' is taken into account when generating the
* mask.
*
* This warning is compiled out when the compiler can infer that
* 'idx' and 'sz' are less than LONG_MAX.
That's just one example - please apply it to all comments consistently.
> + */
> + if (WARN_ONCE(idx > LONG_MAX || sz > LONG_MAX,
> + "array_idx limited to range of [0, LONG_MAX]\n"))
Same in user facing messages:
"array_idx() limited to range of [0, LONG_MAX]\n"))
> + * For a code sequence like:
> + *
> + * if (idx < sz) {
> + * idx = array_idx(idx, sz);
> + * val = array[idx];
> + * }
> + *
> + * ...if the cpu speculates past the bounds check then array_idx() will
> + * clamp the index within the range of [0, sz).
s/cpu/CPU
> + */
> +#define array_idx(idx, sz) \
> +({ \
> + typeof(idx) _i = (idx); \
> + typeof(sz) _s = (sz); \
> + unsigned long _mask = array_idx_mask(_i, _s); \
> + \
> + BUILD_BUG_ON(sizeof(_i) > sizeof(long)); \
> + BUILD_BUG_ON(sizeof(_s) > sizeof(long)); \
> + \
> + _i &= _mask; \
> + _i; \
> +})
> +#endif /* __NOSPEC_H__ */
For heaven's sake, please name a size variable as 'size', not 'sz'. We don't have
a shortage of characters and can deobfuscate common primitives, can we?
Also, beyond the nits, I also hate the namespace here. We have a new generic
header providing two new methods:
#include <linux/nospec.h>
array_idx_mask()
array_idx()
which is then optimized for x86 in asm/barrier.h. That's already a non-sequitor.
Then we introduce uaccess API variants with a _nospec() postfix.
Then we add ifence() to x86.
There's no naming coherency to this.
A better approach would be to signal the 'no speculation' aspect of the
array_idx() methods already: naming it array_idx_nospec() would be a solution,
as it clearly avoids speculation beyond the array boundaries.
Also, without seeing the full series it's hard to tell, whether the introduction
of linux/nospec.h is justified, but it feels somewhat suspect.
Thanks,
Ingo
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2018-01-28 8:55 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 58+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2018-01-27 7:55 [PATCH v5 00/12] spectre variant1 mitigations for tip/x86/pti Dan Williams
2018-01-27 7:55 ` Dan Williams
2018-01-27 7:55 ` [PATCH v5 01/12] Documentation: document array_idx Dan Williams
2018-01-27 7:55 ` [PATCH v5 02/12] array_idx: sanitize speculative array de-references Dan Williams
2018-01-27 7:55 ` Dan Williams
2018-01-28 8:55 ` Ingo Molnar [this message]
2018-01-28 11:36 ` Thomas Gleixner
2018-01-28 11:36 ` Thomas Gleixner
2018-01-28 16:28 ` Dan Williams
2018-01-28 18:33 ` Ingo Molnar
2018-01-29 16:45 ` Dan Williams
2018-01-29 16:45 ` Dan Williams
2018-01-28 18:36 ` Thomas Gleixner
2018-01-28 18:36 ` Thomas Gleixner
2018-01-30 6:29 ` Dan Williams
2018-01-30 6:29 ` Dan Williams
2018-01-30 19:38 ` Linus Torvalds
2018-01-30 20:13 ` Dan Williams
2018-01-30 20:27 ` Van De Ven, Arjan
2018-01-31 8:03 ` Ingo Molnar
2018-01-31 14:13 ` Van De Ven, Arjan
2018-01-31 14:21 ` Greg KH
2018-01-27 7:55 ` [PATCH v5 03/12] x86: implement array_idx_mask Dan Williams
2018-01-28 9:02 ` Ingo Molnar
2018-01-27 7:55 ` [PATCH v5 04/12] x86: introduce __uaccess_begin_nospec and ifence Dan Williams
2018-01-28 9:06 ` Ingo Molnar
2018-01-28 9:14 ` Ingo Molnar
2018-01-29 20:41 ` Dan Williams
2018-01-29 20:41 ` Dan Williams
2018-01-30 6:56 ` Ingo Molnar
2018-01-27 7:55 ` [PATCH v5 05/12] x86, __get_user: use __uaccess_begin_nospec Dan Williams
2018-01-28 9:19 ` Ingo Molnar
2018-01-28 9:19 ` Ingo Molnar
2018-01-27 7:55 ` [PATCH v5 06/12] x86, get_user: use pointer masking to limit speculation Dan Williams
2018-01-27 7:55 ` Dan Williams
2018-01-28 9:25 ` Ingo Molnar
2018-01-28 9:25 ` Ingo Molnar
2018-01-27 7:55 ` [PATCH v5 07/12] x86: remove the syscall_64 fast-path Dan Williams
2018-01-28 9:29 ` Ingo Molnar
2018-01-28 9:29 ` Ingo Molnar
2018-01-28 15:22 ` Andy Lutomirski
2018-01-28 15:22 ` Andy Lutomirski
2018-01-27 7:55 ` [PATCH v5 08/12] x86: sanitize sycall table de-references under speculation Dan Williams
2018-01-28 9:36 ` Ingo Molnar
2018-01-27 7:56 ` [PATCH v5 09/12] vfs, fdtable: prevent bounds-check bypass via speculative execution Dan Williams
2018-01-27 7:56 ` [PATCH v5 10/12] kvm, x86: update spectre-v1 mitigation Dan Williams
[not found] ` <151703971300.26578.1185595719337719486.stgit-p8uTFz9XbKj2zm6wflaqv1nYeNYlB/vhral2JQCrhuEAvxtiuMwx3w@public.gmane.org>
2018-01-27 7:56 ` [PATCH v5 11/12] nl80211: sanitize array index in parse_txq_params Dan Williams
2018-01-27 7:56 ` Dan Williams
2018-01-27 7:56 ` [PATCH v5 12/12] x86/spectre: report get_user mitigation for spectre_v1 Dan Williams
2018-01-28 9:50 ` Ingo Molnar
2018-01-29 22:05 ` Dan Williams
2018-01-31 8:07 ` Ingo Molnar
2018-02-01 20:23 ` Dan Williams
2018-02-01 20:23 ` Dan Williams
2018-01-27 18:52 ` [PATCH v5 00/12] spectre variant1 mitigations for tip/x86/pti Linus Torvalds
2018-01-27 18:52 ` Linus Torvalds
2018-01-27 19:26 ` Dan Williams
2018-01-27 19:26 ` Dan Williams
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