From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 From: Ingo Molnar Subject: Re: [PATCH v5 12/12] x86/spectre: report get_user mitigation for spectre_v1 Date: Sun, 28 Jan 2018 10:50:28 +0100 Message-ID: <20180128095027.hqrcpnholsvukdzd@gmail.com> References: <151703971300.26578.1185595719337719486.stgit@dwillia2-desk3.amr.corp.intel.com> <151703977742.26578.8362387033092864423.stgit@dwillia2-desk3.amr.corp.intel.com> Mime-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii Return-path: Received: from mail-wm0-f66.google.com ([74.125.82.66]:37744 "EHLO mail-wm0-f66.google.com" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S1750959AbeA1Jub (ORCPT ); Sun, 28 Jan 2018 04:50:31 -0500 Received: by mail-wm0-f66.google.com with SMTP id v71so28343225wmv.2 for ; Sun, 28 Jan 2018 01:50:31 -0800 (PST) Content-Disposition: inline In-Reply-To: <151703977742.26578.8362387033092864423.stgit@dwillia2-desk3.amr.corp.intel.com> Sender: linux-arch-owner@vger.kernel.org List-ID: To: Dan Williams Cc: tglx@linutronix.de, linux-arch@vger.kernel.org, kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com, gregkh@linuxfoundation.org, x86@kernel.org, torvalds@linux-foundation.org, Ingo Molnar , "H. Peter Anvin" , Jiri Slaby , alan@linux.intel.com * Dan Williams wrote: > Reflect the presence of 'get_user', '__get_user', and 'syscall' > protections in sysfs. Keep the "Vulnerable" distinction given the > expectation that the places that have been identified for 'array_idx' > usage are likely incomplete. (The style problems/inconsistencies of the previous patches are repeated here too, please fix.) > > Cc: Thomas Gleixner > Cc: Ingo Molnar > Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" > Cc: x86@kernel.org > Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman > Reported-by: Jiri Slaby > Signed-off-by: Dan Williams > --- > arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c | 2 +- > 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) > > diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c > index 390b3dc3d438..01d5ba48f745 100644 > --- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c > +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c > @@ -269,7 +269,7 @@ ssize_t cpu_show_spectre_v1(struct device *dev, > { > if (!boot_cpu_has_bug(X86_BUG_SPECTRE_V1)) > return sprintf(buf, "Not affected\n"); > - return sprintf(buf, "Vulnerable\n"); > + return sprintf(buf, "Vulnerable: Minimal user pointer sanitization\n"); Btw., I think this string is still somewhat passive-aggressive towards users, as it doesn't really give them any idea about what is missing from their system so that they can turn it into not vulnerable. What else is missing that would turn this into a "Mitigated" entry? Thanks, Ingo