From: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
To: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>,
stable@vger.kernel.org,
Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>,
Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com>,
Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com>,
Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>,
linux-arch@vger.kernel.org, Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>,
kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com,
Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>,
alan@linux.intel.com
Subject: [PATCH 4.14 42/64] x86/uaccess: Use __uaccess_begin_nospec() and uaccess_try_nospec
Date: Mon, 5 Feb 2018 10:23:01 -0800 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20180205182140.302820196@linuxfoundation.org> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20180205182138.571333346@linuxfoundation.org>
4.14-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Dan Williams dan.j.williams@intel.com
commit 304ec1b050310548db33063e567123fae8fd0301
Quoting Linus:
I do think that it would be a good idea to very expressly document
the fact that it's not that the user access itself is unsafe. I do
agree that things like "get_user()" want to be protected, but not
because of any direct bugs or problems with get_user() and friends,
but simply because get_user() is an excellent source of a pointer
that is obviously controlled from a potentially attacking user
space. So it's a prime candidate for then finding _subsequent_
accesses that can then be used to perturb the cache.
__uaccess_begin_nospec() covers __get_user() and copy_from_iter() where the
limit check is far away from the user pointer de-reference. In those cases
a barrier_nospec() prevents speculation with a potential pointer to
privileged memory. uaccess_try_nospec covers get_user_try.
Suggested-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Suggested-by: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: linux-arch@vger.kernel.org
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com
Cc: gregkh@linuxfoundation.org
Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Cc: alan@linux.intel.com
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/151727416953.33451.10508284228526170604.stgit@dwillia2-desk3.amr.corp.intel.com
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
arch/x86/include/asm/uaccess.h | 6 +++---
arch/x86/include/asm/uaccess_32.h | 6 +++---
arch/x86/include/asm/uaccess_64.h | 12 ++++++------
arch/x86/lib/usercopy_32.c | 4 ++--
4 files changed, 14 insertions(+), 14 deletions(-)
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/uaccess.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/uaccess.h
@@ -450,7 +450,7 @@ do { \
({ \
int __gu_err; \
__inttype(*(ptr)) __gu_val; \
- __uaccess_begin(); \
+ __uaccess_begin_nospec(); \
__get_user_size(__gu_val, (ptr), (size), __gu_err, -EFAULT); \
__uaccess_end(); \
(x) = (__force __typeof__(*(ptr)))__gu_val; \
@@ -557,7 +557,7 @@ struct __large_struct { unsigned long bu
* get_user_ex(...);
* } get_user_catch(err)
*/
-#define get_user_try uaccess_try
+#define get_user_try uaccess_try_nospec
#define get_user_catch(err) uaccess_catch(err)
#define get_user_ex(x, ptr) do { \
@@ -591,7 +591,7 @@ extern void __cmpxchg_wrong_size(void)
__typeof__(ptr) __uval = (uval); \
__typeof__(*(ptr)) __old = (old); \
__typeof__(*(ptr)) __new = (new); \
- __uaccess_begin(); \
+ __uaccess_begin_nospec(); \
switch (size) { \
case 1: \
{ \
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/uaccess_32.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/uaccess_32.h
@@ -29,21 +29,21 @@ raw_copy_from_user(void *to, const void
switch (n) {
case 1:
ret = 0;
- __uaccess_begin();
+ __uaccess_begin_nospec();
__get_user_asm_nozero(*(u8 *)to, from, ret,
"b", "b", "=q", 1);
__uaccess_end();
return ret;
case 2:
ret = 0;
- __uaccess_begin();
+ __uaccess_begin_nospec();
__get_user_asm_nozero(*(u16 *)to, from, ret,
"w", "w", "=r", 2);
__uaccess_end();
return ret;
case 4:
ret = 0;
- __uaccess_begin();
+ __uaccess_begin_nospec();
__get_user_asm_nozero(*(u32 *)to, from, ret,
"l", "k", "=r", 4);
__uaccess_end();
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/uaccess_64.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/uaccess_64.h
@@ -55,31 +55,31 @@ raw_copy_from_user(void *dst, const void
return copy_user_generic(dst, (__force void *)src, size);
switch (size) {
case 1:
- __uaccess_begin();
+ __uaccess_begin_nospec();
__get_user_asm_nozero(*(u8 *)dst, (u8 __user *)src,
ret, "b", "b", "=q", 1);
__uaccess_end();
return ret;
case 2:
- __uaccess_begin();
+ __uaccess_begin_nospec();
__get_user_asm_nozero(*(u16 *)dst, (u16 __user *)src,
ret, "w", "w", "=r", 2);
__uaccess_end();
return ret;
case 4:
- __uaccess_begin();
+ __uaccess_begin_nospec();
__get_user_asm_nozero(*(u32 *)dst, (u32 __user *)src,
ret, "l", "k", "=r", 4);
__uaccess_end();
return ret;
case 8:
- __uaccess_begin();
+ __uaccess_begin_nospec();
__get_user_asm_nozero(*(u64 *)dst, (u64 __user *)src,
ret, "q", "", "=r", 8);
__uaccess_end();
return ret;
case 10:
- __uaccess_begin();
+ __uaccess_begin_nospec();
__get_user_asm_nozero(*(u64 *)dst, (u64 __user *)src,
ret, "q", "", "=r", 10);
if (likely(!ret))
@@ -89,7 +89,7 @@ raw_copy_from_user(void *dst, const void
__uaccess_end();
return ret;
case 16:
- __uaccess_begin();
+ __uaccess_begin_nospec();
__get_user_asm_nozero(*(u64 *)dst, (u64 __user *)src,
ret, "q", "", "=r", 16);
if (likely(!ret))
--- a/arch/x86/lib/usercopy_32.c
+++ b/arch/x86/lib/usercopy_32.c
@@ -331,7 +331,7 @@ do { \
unsigned long __copy_user_ll(void *to, const void *from, unsigned long n)
{
- __uaccess_begin();
+ __uaccess_begin_nospec();
if (movsl_is_ok(to, from, n))
__copy_user(to, from, n);
else
@@ -344,7 +344,7 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(__copy_user_ll);
unsigned long __copy_from_user_ll_nocache_nozero(void *to, const void __user *from,
unsigned long n)
{
- __uaccess_begin();
+ __uaccess_begin_nospec();
#ifdef CONFIG_X86_INTEL_USERCOPY
if (n > 64 && static_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_XMM2))
n = __copy_user_intel_nocache(to, from, n);
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2018-02-05 18:24 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 23+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
[not found] <20180205182138.571333346@linuxfoundation.org>
2018-02-05 18:22 ` [PATCH 4.14 36/64] Documentation: Document array_index_nospec Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-02-05 18:22 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-02-05 18:22 ` [PATCH 4.14 37/64] array_index_nospec: Sanitize speculative array de-references Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-02-05 18:22 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-02-05 18:22 ` [PATCH 4.14 38/64] x86: Implement array_index_mask_nospec Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-02-05 18:22 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-02-05 18:22 ` [PATCH 4.14 39/64] x86: Introduce barrier_nospec Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-02-05 18:22 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-02-05 18:22 ` [PATCH 4.14 40/64] x86: Introduce __uaccess_begin_nospec() and uaccess_try_nospec Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-02-05 18:22 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-02-05 18:23 ` [PATCH 4.14 41/64] x86/usercopy: Replace open coded stac/clac with __uaccess_{begin, end} Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-02-05 18:23 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-02-05 18:23 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman [this message]
2018-02-05 18:23 ` [PATCH 4.14 43/64] x86/get_user: Use pointer masking to limit speculation Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-02-05 18:23 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-02-05 18:23 ` [PATCH 4.14 44/64] x86/syscall: Sanitize syscall table de-references under speculation Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-02-05 18:23 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-02-05 18:23 ` [PATCH 4.14 45/64] vfs, fdtable: Prevent bounds-check bypass via speculative execution Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-02-05 18:23 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-02-05 18:23 ` [PATCH 4.14 46/64] nl80211: Sanitize array index in parse_txq_params Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-02-05 18:23 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-02-05 18:23 ` [PATCH 4.14 47/64] x86/spectre: Report get_user mitigation for spectre_v1 Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-02-05 18:23 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
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