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From: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
To: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>,
	stable@vger.kernel.org,
	Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>,
	Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com>,
	Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>,
	linux-arch@vger.kernel.org, kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com,
	alan@linux.intel.com
Subject: [PATCH 4.15 34/60] x86: Implement array_index_mask_nospec
Date: Mon,  5 Feb 2018 10:23:07 -0800	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20180205182215.361264698@linuxfoundation.org> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20180205182213.902626065@linuxfoundation.org>

4.15-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Dan Williams dan.j.williams@intel.com

commit babdde2698d482b6c0de1eab4f697cf5856c5859

array_index_nospec() uses a mask to sanitize user controllable array
indexes, i.e. generate a 0 mask if 'index' >= 'size', and a ~0 mask
otherwise. While the default array_index_mask_nospec() handles the
carry-bit from the (index - size) result in software.

The x86 array_index_mask_nospec() does the same, but the carry-bit is
handled in the processor CF flag without conditional instructions in the
control flow.

Suggested-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: linux-arch@vger.kernel.org
Cc: kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com
Cc: gregkh@linuxfoundation.org
Cc: alan@linux.intel.com
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/151727414808.33451.1873237130672785331.stgit@dwillia2-desk3.amr.corp.intel.com
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>


---
 arch/x86/include/asm/barrier.h |   24 ++++++++++++++++++++++++
 1 file changed, 24 insertions(+)

--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/barrier.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/barrier.h
@@ -24,6 +24,30 @@
 #define wmb()	asm volatile("sfence" ::: "memory")
 #endif
 
+/**
+ * array_index_mask_nospec() - generate a mask that is ~0UL when the
+ * 	bounds check succeeds and 0 otherwise
+ * @index: array element index
+ * @size: number of elements in array
+ *
+ * Returns:
+ *     0 - (index < size)
+ */
+static inline unsigned long array_index_mask_nospec(unsigned long index,
+		unsigned long size)
+{
+	unsigned long mask;
+
+	asm ("cmp %1,%2; sbb %0,%0;"
+			:"=r" (mask)
+			:"r"(size),"r" (index)
+			:"cc");
+	return mask;
+}
+
+/* Override the default implementation from linux/nospec.h. */
+#define array_index_mask_nospec array_index_mask_nospec
+
 #ifdef CONFIG_X86_PPRO_FENCE
 #define dma_rmb()	rmb()
 #else

  parent reply	other threads:[~2018-02-05 18:25 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 22+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
     [not found] <20180205182213.902626065@linuxfoundation.org>
2018-02-05 18:23 ` [PATCH 4.15 32/60] Documentation: Document array_index_nospec Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-02-05 18:23   ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-02-05 18:23 ` [PATCH 4.15 33/60] array_index_nospec: Sanitize speculative array de-references Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-02-05 18:23 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman [this message]
2018-02-05 18:23 ` [PATCH 4.15 35/60] x86: Introduce barrier_nospec Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-02-05 18:23   ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-02-05 18:23 ` [PATCH 4.15 36/60] x86: Introduce __uaccess_begin_nospec() and uaccess_try_nospec Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-02-05 18:23   ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-02-05 18:23 ` [PATCH 4.15 37/60] x86/usercopy: Replace open coded stac/clac with __uaccess_{begin, end} Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-02-05 18:23   ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-02-05 18:23 ` [PATCH 4.15 38/60] x86/uaccess: Use __uaccess_begin_nospec() and uaccess_try_nospec Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-02-05 18:23   ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-02-05 18:23 ` [PATCH 4.15 39/60] x86/get_user: Use pointer masking to limit speculation Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-02-05 18:23   ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-02-05 18:23 ` [PATCH 4.15 40/60] x86/syscall: Sanitize syscall table de-references under speculation Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-02-05 18:23   ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-02-05 18:23 ` [PATCH 4.15 41/60] vfs, fdtable: Prevent bounds-check bypass via speculative execution Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-02-05 18:23   ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-02-05 18:23 ` [PATCH 4.15 42/60] nl80211: Sanitize array index in parse_txq_params Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-02-05 18:23   ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-02-05 18:23 ` [PATCH 4.15 43/60] x86/spectre: Report get_user mitigation for spectre_v1 Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-02-05 18:23   ` Greg Kroah-Hartman

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