From: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
To: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>,
stable@vger.kernel.org, Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>,
Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com>,
Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>,
linux-arch@vger.kernel.org,
Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>,
Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>,
kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com,
Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>,
torvalds@linux-foundation.org, alan@linux.intel.com
Subject: [PATCH 4.15 37/60] x86/usercopy: Replace open coded stac/clac with __uaccess_{begin, end}
Date: Mon, 5 Feb 2018 10:23:10 -0800 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20180205182215.491244329@linuxfoundation.org> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20180205182213.902626065@linuxfoundation.org>
4.15-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Dan Williams dan.j.williams@intel.com
commit b5c4ae4f35325d520b230bab6eb3310613b72ac1
In preparation for converting some __uaccess_begin() instances to
__uacess_begin_nospec(), make sure all 'from user' uaccess paths are
using the _begin(), _end() helpers rather than open-coded stac() and
clac().
No functional changes.
Suggested-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: linux-arch@vger.kernel.org
Cc: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com
Cc: gregkh@linuxfoundation.org
Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Cc: torvalds@linux-foundation.org
Cc: alan@linux.intel.com
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/151727416438.33451.17309465232057176966.stgit@dwillia2-desk3.amr.corp.intel.com
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
arch/x86/lib/usercopy_32.c | 8 ++++----
1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
--- a/arch/x86/lib/usercopy_32.c
+++ b/arch/x86/lib/usercopy_32.c
@@ -331,12 +331,12 @@ do { \
unsigned long __copy_user_ll(void *to, const void *from, unsigned long n)
{
- stac();
+ __uaccess_begin();
if (movsl_is_ok(to, from, n))
__copy_user(to, from, n);
else
n = __copy_user_intel(to, from, n);
- clac();
+ __uaccess_end();
return n;
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL(__copy_user_ll);
@@ -344,7 +344,7 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(__copy_user_ll);
unsigned long __copy_from_user_ll_nocache_nozero(void *to, const void __user *from,
unsigned long n)
{
- stac();
+ __uaccess_begin();
#ifdef CONFIG_X86_INTEL_USERCOPY
if (n > 64 && static_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_XMM2))
n = __copy_user_intel_nocache(to, from, n);
@@ -353,7 +353,7 @@ unsigned long __copy_from_user_ll_nocach
#else
__copy_user(to, from, n);
#endif
- clac();
+ __uaccess_end();
return n;
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL(__copy_from_user_ll_nocache_nozero);
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2018-02-05 18:23 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 22+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
[not found] <20180205182213.902626065@linuxfoundation.org>
2018-02-05 18:23 ` [PATCH 4.15 32/60] Documentation: Document array_index_nospec Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-02-05 18:23 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-02-05 18:23 ` [PATCH 4.15 33/60] array_index_nospec: Sanitize speculative array de-references Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-02-05 18:23 ` [PATCH 4.15 34/60] x86: Implement array_index_mask_nospec Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-02-05 18:23 ` [PATCH 4.15 35/60] x86: Introduce barrier_nospec Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-02-05 18:23 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-02-05 18:23 ` [PATCH 4.15 36/60] x86: Introduce __uaccess_begin_nospec() and uaccess_try_nospec Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-02-05 18:23 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-02-05 18:23 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman [this message]
2018-02-05 18:23 ` [PATCH 4.15 37/60] x86/usercopy: Replace open coded stac/clac with __uaccess_{begin, end} Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-02-05 18:23 ` [PATCH 4.15 38/60] x86/uaccess: Use __uaccess_begin_nospec() and uaccess_try_nospec Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-02-05 18:23 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-02-05 18:23 ` [PATCH 4.15 39/60] x86/get_user: Use pointer masking to limit speculation Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-02-05 18:23 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-02-05 18:23 ` [PATCH 4.15 40/60] x86/syscall: Sanitize syscall table de-references under speculation Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-02-05 18:23 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-02-05 18:23 ` [PATCH 4.15 41/60] vfs, fdtable: Prevent bounds-check bypass via speculative execution Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-02-05 18:23 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-02-05 18:23 ` [PATCH 4.15 42/60] nl80211: Sanitize array index in parse_txq_params Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-02-05 18:23 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-02-05 18:23 ` [PATCH 4.15 43/60] x86/spectre: Report get_user mitigation for spectre_v1 Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-02-05 18:23 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
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