From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 From: Greg Kroah-Hartman Subject: [PATCH 4.15 43/60] x86/spectre: Report get_user mitigation for spectre_v1 Date: Mon, 5 Feb 2018 10:23:16 -0800 Message-ID: <20180205182215.744093198@linuxfoundation.org> References: <20180205182213.902626065@linuxfoundation.org> Mime-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 Return-path: List-Post: List-Help: List-Unsubscribe: List-Subscribe: In-Reply-To: <20180205182213.902626065@linuxfoundation.org> To: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman , stable@vger.kernel.org, Jiri Slaby , Dan Williams , Thomas Gleixner , linux-arch@vger.kernel.org, kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com, torvalds@linux-foundation.org, alan@linux.intel.com List-Id: linux-arch.vger.kernel.org 4.15-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know. ------------------ From: Dan Williams dan.j.williams@intel.com commit edfbae53dab8348fca778531be9f4855d2ca0360 Reflect the presence of get_user(), __get_user(), and 'syscall' protections in sysfs. The expectation is that new and better tooling will allow the kernel to grow more usages of array_index_nospec(), for now, only claim mitigation for __user pointer de-references. Reported-by: Jiri Slaby Signed-off-by: Dan Williams Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner Cc: linux-arch@vger.kernel.org Cc: kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com Cc: gregkh@linuxfoundation.org Cc: torvalds@linux-foundation.org Cc: alan@linux.intel.com Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/151727420158.33451.11658324346540434635.stgit@dwillia2-desk3.amr.corp.intel.com Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) --- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c @@ -297,7 +297,7 @@ ssize_t cpu_show_spectre_v1(struct devic { if (!boot_cpu_has_bug(X86_BUG_SPECTRE_V1)) return sprintf(buf, "Not affected\n"); - return sprintf(buf, "Vulnerable\n"); + return sprintf(buf, "Mitigation: __user pointer sanitization\n"); } ssize_t cpu_show_spectre_v2(struct device *dev, From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Return-Path: Received: from mail.linuxfoundation.org ([140.211.169.12]:52896 "EHLO mail.linuxfoundation.org" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S1753800AbeBESZq (ORCPT ); Mon, 5 Feb 2018 13:25:46 -0500 From: Greg Kroah-Hartman Subject: [PATCH 4.15 43/60] x86/spectre: Report get_user mitigation for spectre_v1 Date: Mon, 5 Feb 2018 10:23:16 -0800 Message-ID: <20180205182215.744093198@linuxfoundation.org> In-Reply-To: <20180205182213.902626065@linuxfoundation.org> References: <20180205182213.902626065@linuxfoundation.org> MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 Sender: linux-arch-owner@vger.kernel.org List-ID: To: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman , stable@vger.kernel.org, Jiri Slaby , Dan Williams , Thomas Gleixner , linux-arch@vger.kernel.org, kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com, torvalds@linux-foundation.org, alan@linux.intel.com Message-ID: <20180205182316.ZvAG46wejH9aB6AcJii8rDeZhS0jgeGZcLi8F9_0OCU@z> 4.15-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know. ------------------ From: Dan Williams dan.j.williams@intel.com commit edfbae53dab8348fca778531be9f4855d2ca0360 Reflect the presence of get_user(), __get_user(), and 'syscall' protections in sysfs. The expectation is that new and better tooling will allow the kernel to grow more usages of array_index_nospec(), for now, only claim mitigation for __user pointer de-references. Reported-by: Jiri Slaby Signed-off-by: Dan Williams Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner Cc: linux-arch@vger.kernel.org Cc: kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com Cc: gregkh@linuxfoundation.org Cc: torvalds@linux-foundation.org Cc: alan@linux.intel.com Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/151727420158.33451.11658324346540434635.stgit@dwillia2-desk3.amr.corp.intel.com Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) --- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c @@ -297,7 +297,7 @@ ssize_t cpu_show_spectre_v1(struct devic { if (!boot_cpu_has_bug(X86_BUG_SPECTRE_V1)) return sprintf(buf, "Not affected\n"); - return sprintf(buf, "Vulnerable\n"); + return sprintf(buf, "Mitigation: __user pointer sanitization\n"); } ssize_t cpu_show_spectre_v2(struct device *dev,