From: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
To: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>,
stable@vger.kernel.org,
Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>,
Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com>, Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>,
Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com>,
Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>,
linux-arch@vger.kernel.org,
Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>,
Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>,
kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com,
Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>,
alan@linux.intel.com, David Woodhouse <dwmw@amazon.co.uk>,
Jack Wang <jinpu.wang@profitbricks.com>
Subject: [PATCH 4.4 176/193] x86: Introduce barrier_nospec
Date: Fri, 23 Feb 2018 19:26:49 +0100 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20180223170353.649405309@linuxfoundation.org> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20180223170325.997716448@linuxfoundation.org>
4.4-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com>
(cherry picked from commit b3d7ad85b80bbc404635dca80f5b129f6242bc7a)
Rename the open coded form of this instruction sequence from
rdtsc_ordered() into a generic barrier primitive, barrier_nospec().
One of the mitigations for Spectre variant1 vulnerabilities is to fence
speculative execution after successfully validating a bounds check. I.e.
force the result of a bounds check to resolve in the instruction pipeline
to ensure speculative execution honors that result before potentially
operating on out-of-bounds data.
No functional changes.
Suggested-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Suggested-by: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com>
Suggested-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: linux-arch@vger.kernel.org
Cc: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com
Cc: gregkh@linuxfoundation.org
Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Cc: alan@linux.intel.com
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/151727415361.33451.9049453007262764675.stgit@dwillia2-desk3.amr.corp.intel.com
Signed-off-by: David Woodhouse <dwmw@amazon.co.uk>
[jwang: cherry pick to 4.4]
Signed-off-by: Jack Wang <jinpu.wang@profitbricks.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
arch/x86/include/asm/barrier.h | 4 ++++
arch/x86/include/asm/msr.h | 3 +--
2 files changed, 5 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/barrier.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/barrier.h
@@ -48,6 +48,10 @@ static inline unsigned long array_index_
/* Override the default implementation from linux/nospec.h. */
#define array_index_mask_nospec array_index_mask_nospec
+/* Prevent speculative execution past this barrier. */
+#define barrier_nospec() alternative_2("", "mfence", X86_FEATURE_MFENCE_RDTSC, \
+ "lfence", X86_FEATURE_LFENCE_RDTSC)
+
#ifdef CONFIG_X86_PPRO_FENCE
#define dma_rmb() rmb()
#else
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/msr.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/msr.h
@@ -147,8 +147,7 @@ static __always_inline unsigned long lon
* that some other imaginary CPU is updating continuously with a
* time stamp.
*/
- alternative_2("", "mfence", X86_FEATURE_MFENCE_RDTSC,
- "lfence", X86_FEATURE_LFENCE_RDTSC);
+ barrier_nospec();
return rdtsc();
}
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2018-02-23 18:26 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 32+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
[not found] <20180223170325.997716448@linuxfoundation.org>
2018-02-23 18:26 ` [PATCH 4.4 173/193] Documentation: Document array_index_nospec Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-02-23 18:26 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-02-23 18:26 ` [PATCH 4.4 174/193] array_index_nospec: Sanitize speculative array de-references Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-02-23 18:26 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-02-23 18:26 ` [PATCH 4.4 175/193] x86: Implement array_index_mask_nospec Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-02-23 18:26 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-02-23 18:26 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman [this message]
2018-02-23 18:26 ` [PATCH 4.4 176/193] x86: Introduce barrier_nospec Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-02-23 18:26 ` [PATCH 4.4 177/193] x86/get_user: Use pointer masking to limit speculation Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-02-23 18:26 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-02-23 18:26 ` [PATCH 4.4 178/193] x86/syscall: Sanitize syscall table de-references under speculation Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-02-23 18:26 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-03-06 14:21 ` Jiri Slaby
2018-03-06 14:21 ` Jiri Slaby
2018-03-06 16:02 ` Jiri Slaby
2018-03-06 16:02 ` Jiri Slaby
2018-03-06 16:11 ` Jinpu Wang
2018-03-06 16:11 ` Jinpu Wang
2018-03-07 7:53 ` [PATCH stable-4.4] x86/syscall: Sanitize syscall table de-references under speculation fix Jiri Slaby
2018-03-07 7:53 ` Jiri Slaby
2018-03-07 7:55 ` Jiri Slaby
2018-03-07 7:55 ` Jiri Slaby
2018-03-07 7:56 ` [PATCH v2 " Jiri Slaby
2018-03-07 7:56 ` Jiri Slaby
2018-03-07 15:06 ` Greg KH
2018-03-07 15:06 ` Greg KH
2018-02-23 18:26 ` [PATCH 4.4 179/193] vfs, fdtable: Prevent bounds-check bypass via speculative execution Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-02-23 18:26 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-02-23 18:26 ` [PATCH 4.4 180/193] nl80211: Sanitize array index in parse_txq_params Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-02-23 18:26 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-02-23 18:26 ` [PATCH 4.4 181/193] x86/spectre: Report get_user mitigation for spectre_v1 Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-02-23 18:26 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
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