From: Greg KH <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
To: Jiri Slaby <jslaby@suse.cz>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org,
Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>,
Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com>,
Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>,
linux-arch@vger.kernel.org, kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com,
Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>,
alan@linux.intel.com, Jinpu Wang <jinpu.wang@profitbricks.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v2 stable-4.4] x86/syscall: Sanitize syscall table de-references under speculation fix
Date: Wed, 7 Mar 2018 07:06:29 -0800 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20180307150629.GI4109@kroah.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20180307075623.12336-1-jslaby@suse.cz>
On Wed, Mar 07, 2018 at 08:56:23AM +0100, Jiri Slaby wrote:
> In 4.4.118, we have commit c8961332d6da (x86/syscall: Sanitize syscall
> table de-references under speculation), which is a backport of upstream
> commit 2fbd7af5af86. But it fixed only the C part of the upstream patch
> -- the IA32 sysentry. So it ommitted completely the assembly part -- the
> 64bit sysentry.
>
> Fix that in this patch by explicit array_index_mask_nospec written in
> assembly. The same was used in lib/getuser.S.
<snip>
Thanks for the patch, now queued up.
greg k-h
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2018-03-07 15:06 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 32+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
[not found] <20180223170325.997716448@linuxfoundation.org>
2018-02-23 18:26 ` [PATCH 4.4 173/193] Documentation: Document array_index_nospec Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-02-23 18:26 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-02-23 18:26 ` [PATCH 4.4 174/193] array_index_nospec: Sanitize speculative array de-references Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-02-23 18:26 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-02-23 18:26 ` [PATCH 4.4 175/193] x86: Implement array_index_mask_nospec Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-02-23 18:26 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-02-23 18:26 ` [PATCH 4.4 176/193] x86: Introduce barrier_nospec Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-02-23 18:26 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-02-23 18:26 ` [PATCH 4.4 177/193] x86/get_user: Use pointer masking to limit speculation Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-02-23 18:26 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-02-23 18:26 ` [PATCH 4.4 178/193] x86/syscall: Sanitize syscall table de-references under speculation Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-02-23 18:26 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-03-06 14:21 ` Jiri Slaby
2018-03-06 14:21 ` Jiri Slaby
2018-03-06 16:02 ` Jiri Slaby
2018-03-06 16:02 ` Jiri Slaby
2018-03-06 16:11 ` Jinpu Wang
2018-03-06 16:11 ` Jinpu Wang
2018-03-07 7:53 ` [PATCH stable-4.4] x86/syscall: Sanitize syscall table de-references under speculation fix Jiri Slaby
2018-03-07 7:53 ` Jiri Slaby
2018-03-07 7:55 ` Jiri Slaby
2018-03-07 7:55 ` Jiri Slaby
2018-03-07 7:56 ` [PATCH v2 " Jiri Slaby
2018-03-07 7:56 ` Jiri Slaby
2018-03-07 15:06 ` Greg KH [this message]
2018-03-07 15:06 ` Greg KH
2018-02-23 18:26 ` [PATCH 4.4 179/193] vfs, fdtable: Prevent bounds-check bypass via speculative execution Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-02-23 18:26 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-02-23 18:26 ` [PATCH 4.4 180/193] nl80211: Sanitize array index in parse_txq_params Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-02-23 18:26 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-02-23 18:26 ` [PATCH 4.4 181/193] x86/spectre: Report get_user mitigation for spectre_v1 Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-02-23 18:26 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
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