* [PATCH 4.14 115/140] nospec: Kill array_index_nospec_mask_check()
[not found] <20180313152458.201155692@linuxfoundation.org>
@ 2018-03-13 15:25 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-03-13 15:25 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-03-13 15:25 ` [PATCH 4.14 116/140] nospec: Include <asm/barrier.h> dependency Greg Kroah-Hartman
1 sibling, 1 reply; 4+ messages in thread
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman @ 2018-03-13 15:25 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: linux-kernel
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman, stable, Linus Torvalds, Dan Williams,
Andy Lutomirski, Arjan van de Ven, Borislav Petkov, Dave Hansen,
David Woodhouse, Josh Poimboeuf, Peter Zijlstra, Thomas Gleixner,
Will Deacon, linux-arch, Ingo Molnar
4.14-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com>
commit 1d91c1d2c80cb70e2e553845e278b87a960c04da upstream.
There are multiple problems with the dynamic sanity checking in
array_index_nospec_mask_check():
* It causes unnecessary overhead in the 32-bit case since integer sized
@index values will no longer cause the check to be compiled away like
in the 64-bit case.
* In the 32-bit case it may trigger with user controllable input when
the expectation is that should only trigger during development of new
kernel enabling.
* The macro reuses the input parameter in multiple locations which is
broken if someone passes an expression like 'index++' to
array_index_nospec().
Reported-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Cc: Arjan van de Ven <arjan@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>
Cc: David Woodhouse <dwmw2@infradead.org>
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
Cc: linux-arch@vger.kernel.org
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/151881604278.17395.6605847763178076520.stgit@dwillia2-desk3.amr.corp.intel.com
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
include/linux/nospec.h | 22 +---------------------
1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 21 deletions(-)
--- a/include/linux/nospec.h
+++ b/include/linux/nospec.h
@@ -30,26 +30,6 @@ static inline unsigned long array_index_
#endif
/*
- * Warn developers about inappropriate array_index_nospec() usage.
- *
- * Even if the CPU speculates past the WARN_ONCE branch, the
- * sign bit of @index is taken into account when generating the
- * mask.
- *
- * This warning is compiled out when the compiler can infer that
- * @index and @size are less than LONG_MAX.
- */
-#define array_index_mask_nospec_check(index, size) \
-({ \
- if (WARN_ONCE(index > LONG_MAX || size > LONG_MAX, \
- "array_index_nospec() limited to range of [0, LONG_MAX]\n")) \
- _mask = 0; \
- else \
- _mask = array_index_mask_nospec(index, size); \
- _mask; \
-})
-
-/*
* array_index_nospec - sanitize an array index after a bounds check
*
* For a code sequence like:
@@ -67,7 +47,7 @@ static inline unsigned long array_index_
({ \
typeof(index) _i = (index); \
typeof(size) _s = (size); \
- unsigned long _mask = array_index_mask_nospec_check(_i, _s); \
+ unsigned long _mask = array_index_mask_nospec(_i, _s); \
\
BUILD_BUG_ON(sizeof(_i) > sizeof(long)); \
BUILD_BUG_ON(sizeof(_s) > sizeof(long)); \
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 4+ messages in thread
* [PATCH 4.14 115/140] nospec: Kill array_index_nospec_mask_check()
2018-03-13 15:25 ` [PATCH 4.14 115/140] nospec: Kill array_index_nospec_mask_check() Greg Kroah-Hartman
@ 2018-03-13 15:25 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
0 siblings, 0 replies; 4+ messages in thread
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman @ 2018-03-13 15:25 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: linux-kernel
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman, stable, Linus Torvalds, Dan Williams,
Andy Lutomirski, Arjan van de Ven, Borislav Petkov, Dave Hansen,
David Woodhouse, Josh Poimboeuf, Peter Zijlstra, Thomas Gleixner,
Will Deacon, linux-arch, Ingo Molnar
4.14-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com>
commit 1d91c1d2c80cb70e2e553845e278b87a960c04da upstream.
There are multiple problems with the dynamic sanity checking in
array_index_nospec_mask_check():
* It causes unnecessary overhead in the 32-bit case since integer sized
@index values will no longer cause the check to be compiled away like
in the 64-bit case.
* In the 32-bit case it may trigger with user controllable input when
the expectation is that should only trigger during development of new
kernel enabling.
* The macro reuses the input parameter in multiple locations which is
broken if someone passes an expression like 'index++' to
array_index_nospec().
Reported-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Cc: Arjan van de Ven <arjan@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>
Cc: David Woodhouse <dwmw2@infradead.org>
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
Cc: linux-arch@vger.kernel.org
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/151881604278.17395.6605847763178076520.stgit@dwillia2-desk3.amr.corp.intel.com
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
include/linux/nospec.h | 22 +---------------------
1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 21 deletions(-)
--- a/include/linux/nospec.h
+++ b/include/linux/nospec.h
@@ -30,26 +30,6 @@ static inline unsigned long array_index_
#endif
/*
- * Warn developers about inappropriate array_index_nospec() usage.
- *
- * Even if the CPU speculates past the WARN_ONCE branch, the
- * sign bit of @index is taken into account when generating the
- * mask.
- *
- * This warning is compiled out when the compiler can infer that
- * @index and @size are less than LONG_MAX.
- */
-#define array_index_mask_nospec_check(index, size) \
-({ \
- if (WARN_ONCE(index > LONG_MAX || size > LONG_MAX, \
- "array_index_nospec() limited to range of [0, LONG_MAX]\n")) \
- _mask = 0; \
- else \
- _mask = array_index_mask_nospec(index, size); \
- _mask; \
-})
-
-/*
* array_index_nospec - sanitize an array index after a bounds check
*
* For a code sequence like:
@@ -67,7 +47,7 @@ static inline unsigned long array_index_
({ \
typeof(index) _i = (index); \
typeof(size) _s = (size); \
- unsigned long _mask = array_index_mask_nospec_check(_i, _s); \
+ unsigned long _mask = array_index_mask_nospec(_i, _s); \
\
BUILD_BUG_ON(sizeof(_i) > sizeof(long)); \
BUILD_BUG_ON(sizeof(_s) > sizeof(long)); \
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 4+ messages in thread
* [PATCH 4.14 116/140] nospec: Include <asm/barrier.h> dependency
[not found] <20180313152458.201155692@linuxfoundation.org>
2018-03-13 15:25 ` [PATCH 4.14 115/140] nospec: Kill array_index_nospec_mask_check() Greg Kroah-Hartman
@ 2018-03-13 15:25 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-03-13 15:25 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
1 sibling, 1 reply; 4+ messages in thread
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman @ 2018-03-13 15:25 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: linux-kernel
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman, stable, Christian Borntraeger, Dan Williams,
Andy Lutomirski, Arjan van de Ven, Borislav Petkov, Dave Hansen,
David Woodhouse, Josh Poimboeuf, Linus Torvalds, Peter Zijlstra,
Thomas Gleixner, Will Deacon, linux-arch, Ingo Molnar
4.14-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com>
commit eb6174f6d1be16b19cfa43dac296bfed003ce1a6 upstream.
The nospec.h header expects the per-architecture header file
<asm/barrier.h> to optionally define array_index_mask_nospec(). Include
that dependency to prevent inadvertent fallback to the default
array_index_mask_nospec() implementation.
The default implementation may not provide a full mitigation
on architectures that perform data value speculation.
Reported-by: Christian Borntraeger <borntraeger@de.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Cc: Arjan van de Ven <arjan@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>
Cc: David Woodhouse <dwmw2@infradead.org>
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
Cc: linux-arch@vger.kernel.org
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/151881605404.17395.1341935530792574707.stgit@dwillia2-desk3.amr.corp.intel.com
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
include/linux/nospec.h | 1 +
1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)
--- a/include/linux/nospec.h
+++ b/include/linux/nospec.h
@@ -5,6 +5,7 @@
#ifndef _LINUX_NOSPEC_H
#define _LINUX_NOSPEC_H
+#include <asm/barrier.h>
/**
* array_index_mask_nospec() - generate a ~0 mask when index < size, 0 otherwise
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 4+ messages in thread
* [PATCH 4.14 116/140] nospec: Include <asm/barrier.h> dependency
2018-03-13 15:25 ` [PATCH 4.14 116/140] nospec: Include <asm/barrier.h> dependency Greg Kroah-Hartman
@ 2018-03-13 15:25 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
0 siblings, 0 replies; 4+ messages in thread
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman @ 2018-03-13 15:25 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: linux-kernel
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman, stable, Christian Borntraeger, Dan Williams,
Andy Lutomirski, Arjan van de Ven, Borislav Petkov, Dave Hansen,
David Woodhouse, Josh Poimboeuf, Linus Torvalds, Peter Zijlstra,
Thomas Gleixner, Will Deacon, linux-arch, Ingo Molnar
4.14-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com>
commit eb6174f6d1be16b19cfa43dac296bfed003ce1a6 upstream.
The nospec.h header expects the per-architecture header file
<asm/barrier.h> to optionally define array_index_mask_nospec(). Include
that dependency to prevent inadvertent fallback to the default
array_index_mask_nospec() implementation.
The default implementation may not provide a full mitigation
on architectures that perform data value speculation.
Reported-by: Christian Borntraeger <borntraeger@de.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Cc: Arjan van de Ven <arjan@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>
Cc: David Woodhouse <dwmw2@infradead.org>
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
Cc: linux-arch@vger.kernel.org
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/151881605404.17395.1341935530792574707.stgit@dwillia2-desk3.amr.corp.intel.com
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
include/linux/nospec.h | 1 +
1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)
--- a/include/linux/nospec.h
+++ b/include/linux/nospec.h
@@ -5,6 +5,7 @@
#ifndef _LINUX_NOSPEC_H
#define _LINUX_NOSPEC_H
+#include <asm/barrier.h>
/**
* array_index_mask_nospec() - generate a ~0 mask when index < size, 0 otherwise
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 4+ messages in thread
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2018-03-13 15:25 ` [PATCH 4.14 115/140] nospec: Kill array_index_nospec_mask_check() Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-03-13 15:25 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-03-13 15:25 ` [PATCH 4.14 116/140] nospec: Include <asm/barrier.h> dependency Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-03-13 15:25 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
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