From: Yu-cheng Yu <yu-cheng.yu@intel.com> To: x86@kernel.org, "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>, Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>, Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, linux-doc@vger.kernel.org, linux-mm@kvack.org, linux-arch@vger.kernel.org, linux-api@vger.kernel.org, Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>, Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>, Balbir Singh <bsingharora@gmail.com>, Cyrill Gorcunov <gorcunov@gmail.com>, Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>, Florian Weimer <fweimer@redhat.com>, "H.J. Lu" <hjl.tools@gmail.com>, Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>, Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net>, Kees Cook <keescook@chromiun.org>, Mike Kravetz <mike.kravetz@oracle.com>, Nadav Amit <nadav.amit@gmail.com>, Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>, Pavel Machek <pavel@ucw.cz>Peter Cc: Yu-cheng Yu <yu-cheng.yu@intel.com> Subject: [RFC PATCH v3 13/24] x86/mm: Shadow stack page fault error checking Date: Thu, 30 Aug 2018 07:38:53 -0700 [thread overview] Message-ID: <20180830143904.3168-14-yu-cheng.yu@intel.com> (raw) In-Reply-To: <20180830143904.3168-1-yu-cheng.yu@intel.com> If a page fault is triggered by a shadow stack access (e.g. call/ret) or shadow stack management instructions (e.g. wrussq), then bit[6] of the page fault error code is set. In access_error(), we check if a shadow stack page fault is within a shadow stack memory area. Signed-off-by: Yu-cheng Yu <yu-cheng.yu@intel.com> --- arch/x86/include/asm/traps.h | 2 ++ arch/x86/mm/fault.c | 18 ++++++++++++++++++ 2 files changed, 20 insertions(+) diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/traps.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/traps.h index 5196050ff3d5..58ea2f5722e9 100644 --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/traps.h +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/traps.h @@ -157,6 +157,7 @@ enum { * bit 3 == 1: use of reserved bit detected * bit 4 == 1: fault was an instruction fetch * bit 5 == 1: protection keys block access + * bit 6 == 1: shadow stack access fault */ enum x86_pf_error_code { X86_PF_PROT = 1 << 0, @@ -165,5 +166,6 @@ enum x86_pf_error_code { X86_PF_RSVD = 1 << 3, X86_PF_INSTR = 1 << 4, X86_PF_PK = 1 << 5, + X86_PF_SHSTK = 1 << 6, }; #endif /* _ASM_X86_TRAPS_H */ diff --git a/arch/x86/mm/fault.c b/arch/x86/mm/fault.c index b9123c497e0a..3842353fb4a3 100644 --- a/arch/x86/mm/fault.c +++ b/arch/x86/mm/fault.c @@ -1162,6 +1162,17 @@ access_error(unsigned long error_code, struct vm_area_struct *vma) (error_code & X86_PF_INSTR), foreign)) return 1; + /* + * Verify X86_PF_SHSTK is within a shadow stack VMA. + * It is always an error if there is a shadow stack + * fault outside a shadow stack VMA. + */ + if (error_code & X86_PF_SHSTK) { + if (!(vma->vm_flags & VM_SHSTK)) + return 1; + return 0; + } + if (error_code & X86_PF_WRITE) { /* write, present and write, not present: */ if (unlikely(!(vma->vm_flags & VM_WRITE))) @@ -1300,6 +1311,13 @@ __do_page_fault(struct pt_regs *regs, unsigned long error_code, perf_sw_event(PERF_COUNT_SW_PAGE_FAULTS, 1, regs, address); + /* + * If the fault is caused by a shadow stack access, + * i.e. CALL/RET/SAVEPREVSSP/RSTORSSP, then set + * FAULT_FLAG_WRITE to effect copy-on-write. + */ + if (error_code & X86_PF_SHSTK) + flags |= FAULT_FLAG_WRITE; if (error_code & X86_PF_WRITE) flags |= FAULT_FLAG_WRITE; if (error_code & X86_PF_INSTR) -- 2.17.1
WARNING: multiple messages have this Message-ID (diff)
From: Yu-cheng Yu <yu-cheng.yu@intel.com> To: x86@kernel.org, "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>, Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>, Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, linux-doc@vger.kernel.org, linux-mm@kvack.org, linux-arch@vger.kernel.org, linux-api@vger.kernel.org, Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>, Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>, Balbir Singh <bsingharora@gmail.com>, Cyrill Gorcunov <gorcunov@gmail.com>, Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>, Florian Weimer <fweimer@redhat.com>, "H.J. Lu" <hjl.tools@gmail.com>, Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>, Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net>, Kees Cook <keescook@chromiun.org>, Mike Kravetz <mike.kravetz@oracle.com>, Nadav Amit <nadav.amit@gmail.com>, Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>, Pavel Machek <pavel@ucw.cz>, Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>, "Ravi V. Shankar" <ravi.v.shankar@intel.com>, Vedvyas Shanbhogue <vedvyas.shanbhogue@intel.com> Cc: Yu-cheng Yu <yu-cheng.yu@intel.com> Subject: [RFC PATCH v3 13/24] x86/mm: Shadow stack page fault error checking Date: Thu, 30 Aug 2018 07:38:53 -0700 [thread overview] Message-ID: <20180830143904.3168-14-yu-cheng.yu@intel.com> (raw) Message-ID: <20180830143853.ypEQrOCzs67ipJFIuQN7dIIN_zhvu3Zk-7PTn54fIms@z> (raw) In-Reply-To: <20180830143904.3168-1-yu-cheng.yu@intel.com> If a page fault is triggered by a shadow stack access (e.g. call/ret) or shadow stack management instructions (e.g. wrussq), then bit[6] of the page fault error code is set. In access_error(), we check if a shadow stack page fault is within a shadow stack memory area. Signed-off-by: Yu-cheng Yu <yu-cheng.yu@intel.com> --- arch/x86/include/asm/traps.h | 2 ++ arch/x86/mm/fault.c | 18 ++++++++++++++++++ 2 files changed, 20 insertions(+) diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/traps.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/traps.h index 5196050ff3d5..58ea2f5722e9 100644 --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/traps.h +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/traps.h @@ -157,6 +157,7 @@ enum { * bit 3 == 1: use of reserved bit detected * bit 4 == 1: fault was an instruction fetch * bit 5 == 1: protection keys block access + * bit 6 == 1: shadow stack access fault */ enum x86_pf_error_code { X86_PF_PROT = 1 << 0, @@ -165,5 +166,6 @@ enum x86_pf_error_code { X86_PF_RSVD = 1 << 3, X86_PF_INSTR = 1 << 4, X86_PF_PK = 1 << 5, + X86_PF_SHSTK = 1 << 6, }; #endif /* _ASM_X86_TRAPS_H */ diff --git a/arch/x86/mm/fault.c b/arch/x86/mm/fault.c index b9123c497e0a..3842353fb4a3 100644 --- a/arch/x86/mm/fault.c +++ b/arch/x86/mm/fault.c @@ -1162,6 +1162,17 @@ access_error(unsigned long error_code, struct vm_area_struct *vma) (error_code & X86_PF_INSTR), foreign)) return 1; + /* + * Verify X86_PF_SHSTK is within a shadow stack VMA. + * It is always an error if there is a shadow stack + * fault outside a shadow stack VMA. + */ + if (error_code & X86_PF_SHSTK) { + if (!(vma->vm_flags & VM_SHSTK)) + return 1; + return 0; + } + if (error_code & X86_PF_WRITE) { /* write, present and write, not present: */ if (unlikely(!(vma->vm_flags & VM_WRITE))) @@ -1300,6 +1311,13 @@ __do_page_fault(struct pt_regs *regs, unsigned long error_code, perf_sw_event(PERF_COUNT_SW_PAGE_FAULTS, 1, regs, address); + /* + * If the fault is caused by a shadow stack access, + * i.e. CALL/RET/SAVEPREVSSP/RSTORSSP, then set + * FAULT_FLAG_WRITE to effect copy-on-write. + */ + if (error_code & X86_PF_SHSTK) + flags |= FAULT_FLAG_WRITE; if (error_code & X86_PF_WRITE) flags |= FAULT_FLAG_WRITE; if (error_code & X86_PF_INSTR) -- 2.17.1
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2018-08-30 14:38 UTC|newest] Thread overview: 146+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top 2018-08-30 14:38 [RFC PATCH v3 00/24] Control Flow Enforcement: Shadow Stack Yu-cheng Yu 2018-08-30 14:38 ` Yu-cheng Yu 2018-08-30 14:38 ` [RFC PATCH v3 01/24] x86/cpufeatures: Add CPUIDs for Control-flow Enforcement Technology (CET) Yu-cheng Yu 2018-08-30 14:38 ` Yu-cheng Yu 2018-08-30 14:38 ` [RFC PATCH v3 02/24] x86/fpu/xstate: Change some names to separate XSAVES system and user states Yu-cheng Yu 2018-08-30 14:38 ` Yu-cheng Yu 2018-08-30 14:38 ` [RFC PATCH v3 03/24] x86/fpu/xstate: Enable XSAVES system states Yu-cheng Yu 2018-08-30 14:38 ` Yu-cheng Yu 2018-08-30 14:38 ` [RFC PATCH v3 04/24] x86/fpu/xstate: Add XSAVES system states for shadow stack Yu-cheng Yu 2018-08-30 14:38 ` Yu-cheng Yu 2018-08-30 14:38 ` [RFC PATCH v3 05/24] Documentation/x86: Add CET description Yu-cheng Yu 2018-08-30 14:38 ` Yu-cheng Yu 2018-08-30 20:39 ` Pavel Machek 2018-08-30 20:39 ` Pavel Machek 2018-08-30 22:49 ` Yu-cheng Yu 2018-08-30 22:49 ` Yu-cheng Yu 2018-09-14 21:17 ` Yu-cheng Yu 2018-09-14 21:17 ` Yu-cheng Yu 2018-09-03 2:56 ` Randy Dunlap 2018-09-03 2:56 ` Randy Dunlap 2018-08-30 14:38 ` [RFC PATCH v3 06/24] x86/cet: Control protection exception handler Yu-cheng Yu 2018-08-30 14:38 ` Yu-cheng Yu 2018-08-31 15:01 ` Jann Horn 2018-08-31 15:01 ` Jann Horn 2018-08-31 16:20 ` Yu-cheng Yu 2018-08-31 16:20 ` Yu-cheng Yu 2018-08-30 14:38 ` [RFC PATCH v3 07/24] x86/cet/shstk: Add Kconfig option for user-mode shadow stack Yu-cheng Yu 2018-08-30 14:38 ` Yu-cheng Yu 2018-08-30 14:38 ` [RFC PATCH v3 08/24] mm: Introduce VM_SHSTK for shadow stack memory Yu-cheng Yu 2018-08-30 14:38 ` Yu-cheng Yu 2018-08-30 14:38 ` [RFC PATCH v3 09/24] x86/mm: Change _PAGE_DIRTY to _PAGE_DIRTY_HW Yu-cheng Yu 2018-08-30 14:38 ` Yu-cheng Yu 2018-08-30 14:38 ` [RFC PATCH v3 10/24] x86/mm: Introduce _PAGE_DIRTY_SW Yu-cheng Yu 2018-08-30 14:38 ` Yu-cheng Yu 2018-08-30 14:38 ` [RFC PATCH v3 11/24] drm/i915/gvt: Update _PAGE_DIRTY to _PAGE_DIRTY_BITS Yu-cheng Yu 2018-08-30 14:38 ` Yu-cheng Yu 2018-08-30 14:38 ` [RFC PATCH v3 12/24] x86/mm: Modify ptep_set_wrprotect and pmdp_set_wrprotect for _PAGE_DIRTY_SW Yu-cheng Yu 2018-08-30 14:38 ` Yu-cheng Yu 2018-08-30 15:49 ` Jann Horn 2018-08-30 15:49 ` Jann Horn 2018-08-30 16:02 ` Yu-cheng Yu 2018-08-30 16:02 ` Yu-cheng Yu 2018-08-30 16:08 ` Dave Hansen 2018-08-30 16:08 ` Dave Hansen 2018-08-30 16:23 ` Jann Horn 2018-08-30 16:23 ` Jann Horn 2018-08-30 17:19 ` Dave Hansen 2018-08-30 17:19 ` Dave Hansen 2018-08-30 17:26 ` Yu-cheng Yu 2018-08-30 17:26 ` Yu-cheng Yu 2018-08-30 17:33 ` Dave Hansen 2018-08-30 17:33 ` Dave Hansen 2018-08-30 17:54 ` Yu-cheng Yu 2018-08-30 17:54 ` Yu-cheng Yu 2018-08-30 17:59 ` Jann Horn 2018-08-30 17:59 ` Jann Horn 2018-08-30 20:21 ` Yu-cheng Yu 2018-08-30 20:21 ` Yu-cheng Yu 2018-08-30 20:44 ` Jann Horn 2018-08-30 20:44 ` Jann Horn 2018-08-30 20:52 ` Yu-cheng Yu 2018-08-30 20:52 ` Yu-cheng Yu 2018-08-30 21:01 ` Jann Horn 2018-08-30 21:01 ` Jann Horn 2018-08-30 21:47 ` Jann Horn 2018-08-30 21:47 ` Jann Horn 2018-08-31 9:53 ` Peter Zijlstra 2018-08-31 9:53 ` Peter Zijlstra 2018-08-31 14:33 ` Yu-cheng Yu 2018-08-31 14:33 ` Yu-cheng Yu 2018-08-31 14:47 ` Dave Hansen 2018-08-31 14:47 ` Dave Hansen 2018-08-31 15:48 ` Yu-cheng Yu 2018-08-31 15:48 ` Yu-cheng Yu 2018-08-31 15:58 ` Dave Hansen 2018-08-31 15:58 ` Dave Hansen 2018-08-31 16:29 ` Peter Zijlstra 2018-08-31 16:29 ` Peter Zijlstra 2018-09-14 20:39 ` Yu-cheng Yu 2018-09-14 20:39 ` Yu-cheng Yu 2018-09-14 20:46 ` Dave Hansen 2018-09-14 20:46 ` Dave Hansen 2018-09-14 21:08 ` Yu-cheng Yu 2018-09-14 21:08 ` Yu-cheng Yu 2018-09-14 21:33 ` Dave Hansen 2018-09-14 21:33 ` Dave Hansen 2018-08-31 1:23 ` Andy Lutomirski 2018-08-31 1:23 ` Andy Lutomirski 2018-08-30 17:34 ` Andy Lutomirski 2018-08-30 17:34 ` Andy Lutomirski 2018-08-30 18:55 ` Dave Hansen 2018-08-30 18:55 ` Dave Hansen 2018-08-31 17:46 ` Andy Lutomirski 2018-08-31 17:46 ` Andy Lutomirski 2018-08-31 17:52 ` Dave Hansen 2018-08-31 17:52 ` Dave Hansen 2018-08-30 19:59 ` Randy Dunlap 2018-08-30 19:59 ` Randy Dunlap 2018-08-30 20:23 ` Yu-cheng Yu 2018-08-30 20:23 ` Yu-cheng Yu 2018-08-31 16:29 ` Dave Hansen 2018-08-31 16:29 ` Dave Hansen 2018-08-30 14:38 ` Yu-cheng Yu [this message] 2018-08-30 14:38 ` [RFC PATCH v3 13/24] x86/mm: Shadow stack page fault error checking Yu-cheng Yu 2018-08-30 14:38 ` [RFC PATCH v3 14/24] mm: Handle shadow stack page fault Yu-cheng Yu 2018-08-30 14:38 ` Yu-cheng Yu 2018-08-30 14:38 ` [RFC PATCH v3 15/24] mm: Handle THP/HugeTLB " Yu-cheng Yu 2018-08-30 14:38 ` Yu-cheng Yu 2018-08-30 14:38 ` [RFC PATCH v3 16/24] mm: Update can_follow_write_pte/pmd for shadow stack Yu-cheng Yu 2018-08-30 14:38 ` Yu-cheng Yu 2018-08-30 14:38 ` [RFC PATCH v3 17/24] mm: Introduce do_mmap_locked() Yu-cheng Yu 2018-08-30 14:38 ` Yu-cheng Yu 2018-08-30 14:38 ` [RFC PATCH v3 18/24] x86/cet/shstk: User-mode shadow stack support Yu-cheng Yu 2018-08-30 14:38 ` Yu-cheng Yu 2018-08-30 16:10 ` Jann Horn 2018-08-30 16:10 ` Jann Horn 2018-08-30 16:20 ` Yu-cheng Yu 2018-08-30 16:20 ` Yu-cheng Yu 2018-08-30 14:38 ` [RFC PATCH v3 19/24] x86/cet/shstk: Introduce WRUSS instruction Yu-cheng Yu 2018-08-30 14:38 ` Yu-cheng Yu 2018-08-30 15:39 ` Jann Horn 2018-08-30 15:39 ` Jann Horn 2018-08-30 15:55 ` Andy Lutomirski 2018-08-30 15:55 ` Andy Lutomirski 2018-08-30 16:22 ` Yu-cheng Yu 2018-08-30 16:22 ` Yu-cheng Yu 2018-08-31 21:49 ` Yu-cheng Yu 2018-08-31 21:49 ` Yu-cheng Yu 2018-08-31 22:16 ` Andy Lutomirski 2018-08-31 22:16 ` Andy Lutomirski 2018-09-14 20:46 ` Yu-cheng Yu 2018-09-14 20:46 ` Yu-cheng Yu 2018-08-30 14:39 ` [RFC PATCH v3 20/24] x86/cet/shstk: Signal handling for shadow stack Yu-cheng Yu 2018-08-30 14:39 ` Yu-cheng Yu 2018-08-30 14:39 ` [RFC PATCH v3 21/24] x86/cet/shstk: ELF header parsing of Shadow Stack Yu-cheng Yu 2018-08-30 14:39 ` Yu-cheng Yu 2018-08-30 14:39 ` [RFC PATCH v3 22/24] x86/cet/shstk: Handle thread shadow stack Yu-cheng Yu 2018-08-30 14:39 ` Yu-cheng Yu 2018-08-30 14:39 ` [RFC PATCH v3 23/24] x86/cet/shstk: Add arch_prctl functions for Shadow Stack Yu-cheng Yu 2018-08-30 14:39 ` Yu-cheng Yu 2018-08-30 14:39 ` [RFC PATCH v3 24/24] x86/cet/shstk: Add Shadow Stack instructions to opcode map Yu-cheng Yu 2018-08-30 14:39 ` Yu-cheng Yu 2018-09-02 8:13 ` [RFC PATCH v3 00/24] Control Flow Enforcement: Shadow Stack Balbir Singh 2018-09-02 8:13 ` Balbir Singh 2018-09-04 14:47 ` Yu-cheng Yu 2018-09-04 14:47 ` Yu-cheng Yu
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