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From: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
To: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, x86@kernel.org,
	Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>,
	Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>, "H . Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>,
	Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>,
	Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>,
	Jiri Kosina <jikos@kernel.org>, Waiman Long <longman@redhat.com>,
	Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@redhat.com>,
	Jon Masters <jcm@redhat.com>,
	Benjamin Herrenschmidt <benh@kernel.crashing.org>,
	Paul Mackerras <paulus@samba.org>,
	Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>,
	linuxppc-dev@lists.ozlabs.org,
	Martin Schwidefsky <schwidefsky@de.ibm.com>,
	Heiko Carstens <heiko.carstens@de.ibm.com>,
	linux-s390@vger.kernel.org,
	Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>,
	Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>,
	linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead
Subject: Re: [PATCH RFC 1/5] cpu/speculation: Add 'cpu_spec_mitigations=' cmdline options
Date: Fri, 5 Apr 2019 15:12:11 +0200	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20190405131211.GE23348@zn.tnic> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <f0bd17358ab478eaca52f3b1da8305c150911b40.1554396090.git.jpoimboe@redhat.com>

On Thu, Apr 04, 2019 at 11:44:11AM -0500, Josh Poimboeuf wrote:
> Keeping track of the number of mitigations for all the CPU speculation
> bugs has become overwhelming for many users.  It's getting more and more
> complicated to decide which mitigations are needed for a given
> architecture.  Complicating matters is the fact that each arch tends to
> their own custom way to mitigate the same vulnerability.

Yap, we definitely need something like that.

> Most users fall into a few basic categories:
> 
> a) they want all mitigations off;
> 
> b) they want all reasonable mitigations on, with SMT enabled even if
>    it's vulnerable; or

Uff, "reasonable" - there's the bikeshed waiting to happen.

> c) they want all reasonable mitigations on, with SMT disabled if
>    vulnerable.
> 
> Define a set of curated, arch-independent options, each of which is an
> aggregation of existing options:
> 
> - cpu_spec_mitigations=off: Disable all mitigations.

"cpu_spec_mitigations" is too long, TBH.

Imagine yourself in a loud, noisy data center - you basically can't wait
to leave - crouched over a keyboard in an impossible position, having
to type that thing and then making a typo. Whoops, too late, already
pressed Enter. Shiiiit!

Now you have to wait at least 15 mins for the damn single-threaded added
value BIOS crap to noodle through all the cores just so you can try
again, because you just rebooted the box.

And I know, my ideas for shorter cmdline options are crazy, like

cpu_spec_mtg=

which people would say, yuck, unreadable...

Oh, I know! How about

cpu_vulns=

?

We already have /sys/devices/system/cpu/vulnerabilities so it'll be the
same as that. Less things to remember.

> - cpu_spec_mitigations=auto: [default] Enable all the default
>   mitigations, but leave SMT enabled, even if it's vulnerable.
> 
> - cpu_spec_mitigations=auto,nosmt: Enable all the default mitigations,
>   disabling SMT if needed by a mitigation.

Yah, the suboption choices make sense to me.

> 
> Currently, these options are placeholders which don't actually do
> anything.  They will be fleshed out in upcoming patches.
> 
> Signed-off-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
> ---
>  .../admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt         | 23 +++++++++++++++++++
>  include/linux/cpu.h                           |  8 +++++++
>  kernel/cpu.c                                  | 15 ++++++++++++
>  3 files changed, 46 insertions(+)
> 
> diff --git a/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt b/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt
> index c4d830003b21..ac42e510bd6e 100644
> --- a/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt
> +++ b/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt
> @@ -2544,6 +2544,29 @@
>  			in the "bleeding edge" mini2440 support kernel at
>  			http://repo.or.cz/w/linux-2.6/mini2440.git
>  
> +	cpu_spec_mitigations=
> +			[KNL] Control mitigations for CPU speculation
> +			vulnerabilities on affected CPUs.  This is a set of
> +			curated, arch-independent options, each of which is an
> +			aggregation of existing options.
> +
> +			off
> +				Disable all speculative CPU mitigations.

Alias to

cpu_vulns=make_linux_fast_again

:-P

-- 
Regards/Gruss,
    Boris.

Good mailing practices for 400: avoid top-posting and trim the reply.

WARNING: multiple messages have this Message-ID (diff)
From: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
To: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, x86@kernel.org,
	Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>,
	Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>, "H . Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>,
	Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>,
	Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>,
	Jiri Kosina <jikos@kernel.org>, Waiman Long <longman@redhat.com>,
	Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@redhat.com>,
	Jon Masters <jcm@redhat.com>,
	Benjamin Herrenschmidt <benh@kernel.crashing.org>,
	Paul Mackerras <paulus@samba.org>,
	Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>,
	linuxppc-dev@lists.ozlabs.org,
	Martin Schwidefsky <schwidefsky@de.ibm.com>,
	Heiko Carstens <heiko.carstens@de.ibm.com>,
	linux-s390@vger.kernel.org,
	Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>,
	Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>,
	linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org, linux-arch@vger.kernel.org,
	Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>,
	Tyler Hicks <tyhicks@canonical.com>,
	Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Subject: Re: [PATCH RFC 1/5] cpu/speculation: Add 'cpu_spec_mitigations=' cmdline options
Date: Fri, 5 Apr 2019 15:12:11 +0200	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20190405131211.GE23348@zn.tnic> (raw)
Message-ID: <20190405131211.Q2NjuOAdnJlvlrA0AG2RZhInDwko2zhWKJScqKXcYKQ@z> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <f0bd17358ab478eaca52f3b1da8305c150911b40.1554396090.git.jpoimboe@redhat.com>

On Thu, Apr 04, 2019 at 11:44:11AM -0500, Josh Poimboeuf wrote:
> Keeping track of the number of mitigations for all the CPU speculation
> bugs has become overwhelming for many users.  It's getting more and more
> complicated to decide which mitigations are needed for a given
> architecture.  Complicating matters is the fact that each arch tends to
> their own custom way to mitigate the same vulnerability.

Yap, we definitely need something like that.

> Most users fall into a few basic categories:
> 
> a) they want all mitigations off;
> 
> b) they want all reasonable mitigations on, with SMT enabled even if
>    it's vulnerable; or

Uff, "reasonable" - there's the bikeshed waiting to happen.

> c) they want all reasonable mitigations on, with SMT disabled if
>    vulnerable.
> 
> Define a set of curated, arch-independent options, each of which is an
> aggregation of existing options:
> 
> - cpu_spec_mitigations=off: Disable all mitigations.

"cpu_spec_mitigations" is too long, TBH.

Imagine yourself in a loud, noisy data center - you basically can't wait
to leave - crouched over a keyboard in an impossible position, having
to type that thing and then making a typo. Whoops, too late, already
pressed Enter. Shiiiit!

Now you have to wait at least 15 mins for the damn single-threaded added
value BIOS crap to noodle through all the cores just so you can try
again, because you just rebooted the box.

And I know, my ideas for shorter cmdline options are crazy, like

cpu_spec_mtg=

which people would say, yuck, unreadable...

Oh, I know! How about

cpu_vulns=

?

We already have /sys/devices/system/cpu/vulnerabilities so it'll be the
same as that. Less things to remember.

> - cpu_spec_mitigations=auto: [default] Enable all the default
>   mitigations, but leave SMT enabled, even if it's vulnerable.
> 
> - cpu_spec_mitigations=auto,nosmt: Enable all the default mitigations,
>   disabling SMT if needed by a mitigation.

Yah, the suboption choices make sense to me.

> 
> Currently, these options are placeholders which don't actually do
> anything.  They will be fleshed out in upcoming patches.
> 
> Signed-off-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
> ---
>  .../admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt         | 23 +++++++++++++++++++
>  include/linux/cpu.h                           |  8 +++++++
>  kernel/cpu.c                                  | 15 ++++++++++++
>  3 files changed, 46 insertions(+)
> 
> diff --git a/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt b/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt
> index c4d830003b21..ac42e510bd6e 100644
> --- a/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt
> +++ b/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt
> @@ -2544,6 +2544,29 @@
>  			in the "bleeding edge" mini2440 support kernel at
>  			http://repo.or.cz/w/linux-2.6/mini2440.git
>  
> +	cpu_spec_mitigations=
> +			[KNL] Control mitigations for CPU speculation
> +			vulnerabilities on affected CPUs.  This is a set of
> +			curated, arch-independent options, each of which is an
> +			aggregation of existing options.
> +
> +			off
> +				Disable all speculative CPU mitigations.

Alias to

cpu_vulns=make_linux_fast_again

:-P

-- 
Regards/Gruss,
    Boris.

Good mailing practices for 400: avoid top-posting and trim the reply.

  parent reply	other threads:[~2019-04-05 13:12 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 66+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2019-04-04 16:44 [PATCH RFC 0/5] cpu/speculation: Add 'cpu_spec_mitigations=' cmdline options Josh Poimboeuf
2019-04-04 16:44 ` Josh Poimboeuf
2019-04-04 16:44 ` [PATCH RFC 1/5] " Josh Poimboeuf
2019-04-04 16:44   ` Josh Poimboeuf
2019-04-04 16:49   ` Josh Poimboeuf
2019-04-04 16:49     ` Josh Poimboeuf
2019-04-05 13:12   ` Borislav Petkov [this message]
2019-04-05 13:12     ` Borislav Petkov
2019-04-05 14:20     ` Josh Poimboeuf
2019-04-05 14:20       ` Josh Poimboeuf
2019-04-05 15:20       ` Borislav Petkov
2019-04-05 15:20         ` Borislav Petkov
2019-04-05 16:01         ` Borislav Petkov
2019-04-05 16:01           ` Borislav Petkov
2019-04-05 16:18           ` Josh Poimboeuf
2019-04-05 16:18             ` Josh Poimboeuf
2019-04-10  5:48             ` Michael Ellerman
2019-04-10  5:48               ` Michael Ellerman
2019-04-10  8:30               ` Borislav Petkov
2019-04-10  8:30                 ` Borislav Petkov
2019-04-10 12:10               ` Thomas Gleixner
2019-04-10 12:10                 ` Thomas Gleixner
2019-04-11 13:15                 ` Josh Poimboeuf
2019-04-11 13:15                   ` Josh Poimboeuf
2019-04-12  2:41                   ` Michael Ellerman
2019-04-12  2:41                     ` Michael Ellerman
2019-04-12  2:29                 ` Michael Ellerman
2019-04-12  2:29                   ` Michael Ellerman
2019-04-04 16:44 ` [PATCH RFC 2/5] x86/speculation: Add support for " Josh Poimboeuf
2019-04-04 16:44   ` Josh Poimboeuf
2019-04-05 13:57   ` Borislav Petkov
2019-04-05 13:57     ` Borislav Petkov
2019-04-05 14:31     ` Josh Poimboeuf
2019-04-05 14:31       ` Josh Poimboeuf
2019-04-05 15:26       ` Borislav Petkov
2019-04-05 15:26         ` Borislav Petkov
2019-04-05 16:05         ` Josh Poimboeuf
2019-04-05 16:05           ` Josh Poimboeuf
2019-04-05 15:18     ` Randy Dunlap
2019-04-05 15:18       ` Randy Dunlap
2019-04-05 15:30       ` Josh Poimboeuf
2019-04-05 15:30         ` Josh Poimboeuf
2019-04-04 16:44 ` [PATCH RFC 3/5] powerpc/speculation: " Josh Poimboeuf
2019-04-04 16:44   ` Josh Poimboeuf
2019-04-04 19:49   ` Jiri Kosina
2019-04-04 19:49     ` Jiri Kosina
2019-04-04 20:01     ` Timothy Pearson
2019-04-04 20:01       ` Timothy Pearson
2019-04-10  6:06   ` Michael Ellerman
2019-04-10  6:06     ` Michael Ellerman
2019-04-11  4:02     ` Josh Poimboeuf
2019-04-11  4:02       ` Josh Poimboeuf
2019-04-04 16:44 ` [PATCH RFC 4/5] s390/speculation: " Josh Poimboeuf
2019-04-04 16:44   ` Josh Poimboeuf
2019-04-04 16:44 ` [PATCH RFC 5/5] arm64/speculation: " Josh Poimboeuf
2019-04-04 16:44   ` Josh Poimboeuf
2019-04-05 14:39   ` Steven Price
2019-04-05 14:39     ` Steven Price
2019-04-05 14:43     ` Josh Poimboeuf
2019-04-05 14:43       ` Josh Poimboeuf
2019-04-05 14:44   ` Will Deacon
2019-04-05 14:44     ` Will Deacon
2019-04-05 16:03     ` Josh Poimboeuf
2019-04-05 16:03       ` Josh Poimboeuf
2019-04-04 16:50 ` [PATCH RFC 0/5] cpu/speculation: Add " Waiman Long
2019-04-04 16:50   ` Waiman Long

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