[PATCH 4.4 247/266] cpu/speculation: Add mitigations= cmdline option

[PATCH 4.4 247/266] cpu/speculation: Add mitigations= cmdline option

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

From: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>

commit 98af8452945c55652de68536afdde3b520fec429 upstream.

Keeping track of the number of mitigations for all the CPU speculation
bugs has become overwhelming for many users.  It's getting more and more
complicated to decide which mitigations are needed for a given
architecture.  Complicating matters is the fact that each arch tends to
have its own custom way to mitigate the same vulnerability.

Most users fall into a few basic categories:

a) they want all mitigations off;

b) they want all reasonable mitigations on, with SMT enabled even if
   it's vulnerable; or

c) they want all reasonable mitigations on, with SMT disabled if
   vulnerable.

Define a set of curated, arch-independent options, each of which is an
aggregation of existing options:

- mitigations=off: Disable all mitigations.

- mitigations=auto: [default] Enable all the default mitigations, but
  leave SMT enabled, even if it's vulnerable.

- mitigations=auto,nosmt: Enable all the default mitigations, disabling
  SMT if needed by a mitigation.

Currently, these options are placeholders which don't actually do
anything.  They will be fleshed out in upcoming patches.

Signed-off-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Tested-by: Jiri Kosina <jkosina@suse.cz> (on x86)
Reviewed-by: Jiri Kosina <jkosina@suse.cz>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: "H . Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Jiri Kosina <jikos@kernel.org>
Cc: Waiman Long <longman@redhat.com>
Cc: Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@redhat.com>
Cc: Jon Masters <jcm@redhat.com>
Cc: Benjamin Herrenschmidt <benh@kernel.crashing.org>
Cc: Paul Mackerras <paulus@samba.org>
Cc: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
Cc: linuxppc-dev@lists.ozlabs.org
Cc: Martin Schwidefsky <schwidefsky@de.ibm.com>
Cc: Heiko Carstens <heiko.carstens@de.ibm.com>
Cc: linux-s390@vger.kernel.org
Cc: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
Cc: linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org
Cc: linux-arch@vger.kernel.org
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Cc: Tyler Hicks <tyhicks@canonical.com>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Randy Dunlap <rdunlap@infradead.org>
Cc: Steven Price <steven.price@arm.com>
Cc: Phil Auld <pauld@redhat.com>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/b07a8ef9b7c5055c3a4637c87d07c296d5016fe0.1555085500.git.jpoimboe@redhat.com
[bwh: Backported to 4.4:
 - Drop the auto,nosmt option which we can't support
 - Adjust filename]
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
 Documentation/kernel-parameters.txt |   19 +++++++++++++++++++
 include/linux/cpu.h                 |   17 +++++++++++++++++
 kernel/cpu.c                        |   13 +++++++++++++
 3 files changed, 49 insertions(+)

--- a/Documentation/kernel-parameters.txt
+++ b/Documentation/kernel-parameters.txt
@@ -2173,6 +2173,25 @@ bytes respectively. Such letter suffixes
 			in the "bleeding edge" mini2440 support kernel at
 			http://repo.or.cz/w/linux-2.6/mini2440.git
 
+	mitigations=
+			Control optional mitigations for CPU vulnerabilities.
+			This is a set of curated, arch-independent options, each
+			of which is an aggregation of existing arch-specific
+			options.
+
+			off
+				Disable all optional CPU mitigations.  This
+				improves system performance, but it may also
+				expose users to several CPU vulnerabilities.
+
+			auto (default)
+				Mitigate all CPU vulnerabilities, but leave SMT
+				enabled, even if it's vulnerable.  This is for
+				users who don't want to be surprised by SMT
+				getting disabled across kernel upgrades, or who
+				have other ways of avoiding SMT-based attacks.
+				This is the default behavior.
+
 	mminit_loglevel=
 			[KNL] When CONFIG_DEBUG_MEMORY_INIT is set, this
 			parameter allows control of the logging verbosity for
--- a/include/linux/cpu.h
+++ b/include/linux/cpu.h
@@ -296,4 +296,21 @@ bool cpu_wait_death(unsigned int cpu, in
 bool cpu_report_death(void);
 #endif /* #ifdef CONFIG_HOTPLUG_CPU */
 
+/*
+ * These are used for a global "mitigations=" cmdline option for toggling
+ * optional CPU mitigations.
+ */
+enum cpu_mitigations {
+	CPU_MITIGATIONS_OFF,
+	CPU_MITIGATIONS_AUTO,
+};
+
+extern enum cpu_mitigations cpu_mitigations;
+
+/* mitigations=off */
+static inline bool cpu_mitigations_off(void)
+{
+	return cpu_mitigations == CPU_MITIGATIONS_OFF;
+}
+
 #endif /* _LINUX_CPU_H_ */
--- a/kernel/cpu.c
+++ b/kernel/cpu.c
@@ -842,3 +842,16 @@ void init_cpu_online(const struct cpumas
 {
 	cpumask_copy(to_cpumask(cpu_online_bits), src);
 }
+
+enum cpu_mitigations cpu_mitigations = CPU_MITIGATIONS_AUTO;
+
+static int __init mitigations_parse_cmdline(char *arg)
+{
+	if (!strcmp(arg, "off"))
+		cpu_mitigations = CPU_MITIGATIONS_OFF;
+	else if (!strcmp(arg, "auto"))
+		cpu_mitigations = CPU_MITIGATIONS_AUTO;
+
+	return 0;
+}
+early_param("mitigations", mitigations_parse_cmdline);

[PATCH 4.4 248/266] x86/speculation: Support mitigations= cmdline option

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

From: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>

commit d68be4c4d31295ff6ae34a8ddfaa4c1a8ff42812 upstream.

Configure x86 runtime CPU speculation bug mitigations in accordance with
the 'mitigations=' cmdline option.  This affects Meltdown, Spectre v2,
Speculative Store Bypass, and L1TF.

The default behavior is unchanged.

Signed-off-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Tested-by: Jiri Kosina <jkosina@suse.cz> (on x86)
Reviewed-by: Jiri Kosina <jkosina@suse.cz>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: "H . Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Jiri Kosina <jikos@kernel.org>
Cc: Waiman Long <longman@redhat.com>
Cc: Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@redhat.com>
Cc: Jon Masters <jcm@redhat.com>
Cc: Benjamin Herrenschmidt <benh@kernel.crashing.org>
Cc: Paul Mackerras <paulus@samba.org>
Cc: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
Cc: linuxppc-dev@lists.ozlabs.org
Cc: Martin Schwidefsky <schwidefsky@de.ibm.com>
Cc: Heiko Carstens <heiko.carstens@de.ibm.com>
Cc: linux-s390@vger.kernel.org
Cc: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
Cc: linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org
Cc: linux-arch@vger.kernel.org
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Cc: Tyler Hicks <tyhicks@canonical.com>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Randy Dunlap <rdunlap@infradead.org>
Cc: Steven Price <steven.price@arm.com>
Cc: Phil Auld <pauld@redhat.com>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/6616d0ae169308516cfdf5216bedd169f8a8291b.1555085500.git.jpoimboe@redhat.com
[bwh: Backported to 4.4:
 - Drop the auto,nosmt option and the l1tf mitigation selection, which we can't
   support
 - Adjust filenames, context]
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
 Documentation/kernel-parameters.txt |   14 +++++++++-----
 arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c          |    6 ++++--
 arch/x86/mm/kaiser.c                |    4 +++-
 3 files changed, 16 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-)

--- a/Documentation/kernel-parameters.txt
+++ b/Documentation/kernel-parameters.txt
@@ -2174,15 +2174,19 @@ bytes respectively. Such letter suffixes
 			http://repo.or.cz/w/linux-2.6/mini2440.git
 
 	mitigations=
-			Control optional mitigations for CPU vulnerabilities.
-			This is a set of curated, arch-independent options, each
-			of which is an aggregation of existing arch-specific
-			options.
+			[X86] Control optional mitigations for CPU
+			vulnerabilities.  This is a set of curated,
+			arch-independent options, each of which is an
+			aggregation of existing arch-specific options.
 
 			off
 				Disable all optional CPU mitigations.  This
 				improves system performance, but it may also
 				expose users to several CPU vulnerabilities.
+				Equivalent to: nopti [X86]
+					       nospectre_v2 [X86]
+					       spectre_v2_user=off [X86]
+					       spec_store_bypass_disable=off [X86]
 
 			auto (default)
 				Mitigate all CPU vulnerabilities, but leave SMT
@@ -2190,7 +2194,7 @@ bytes respectively. Such letter suffixes
 				users who don't want to be surprised by SMT
 				getting disabled across kernel upgrades, or who
 				have other ways of avoiding SMT-based attacks.
-				This is the default behavior.
+				Equivalent to: (default behavior)
 
 	mminit_loglevel=
 			[KNL] When CONFIG_DEBUG_MEMORY_INIT is set, this
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
@@ -479,7 +479,8 @@ static enum spectre_v2_mitigation_cmd __
 	char arg[20];
 	int ret, i;
 
-	if (cmdline_find_option_bool(boot_command_line, "nospectre_v2"))
+	if (cmdline_find_option_bool(boot_command_line, "nospectre_v2") ||
+	    cpu_mitigations_off())
 		return SPECTRE_V2_CMD_NONE;
 
 	ret = cmdline_find_option(boot_command_line, "spectre_v2", arg, sizeof(arg));
@@ -743,7 +744,8 @@ static enum ssb_mitigation_cmd __init ss
 	char arg[20];
 	int ret, i;
 
-	if (cmdline_find_option_bool(boot_command_line, "nospec_store_bypass_disable")) {
+	if (cmdline_find_option_bool(boot_command_line, "nospec_store_bypass_disable") ||
+	    cpu_mitigations_off()) {
 		return SPEC_STORE_BYPASS_CMD_NONE;
 	} else {
 		ret = cmdline_find_option(boot_command_line, "spec_store_bypass_disable",
--- a/arch/x86/mm/kaiser.c
+++ b/arch/x86/mm/kaiser.c
@@ -10,6 +10,7 @@
 #include <linux/mm.h>
 #include <linux/uaccess.h>
 #include <linux/ftrace.h>
+#include <linux/cpu.h>
 
 #undef pr_fmt
 #define pr_fmt(fmt)     "Kernel/User page tables isolation: " fmt
@@ -297,7 +298,8 @@ void __init kaiser_check_boottime_disabl
 			goto skip;
 	}
 
-	if (cmdline_find_option_bool(boot_command_line, "nopti"))
+	if (cmdline_find_option_bool(boot_command_line, "nopti") ||
+	    cpu_mitigations_off())
 		goto disable;
 
 skip:

Re: [PATCH 4.4 247/266] cpu/speculation: Add mitigations= cmdline option

[Geert Uytterhoeven]

Hi Greg, Ben,

On Wed, May 15, 2019 at 1:12 PM Greg Kroah-Hartman
<gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> wrote:
> From: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
>
> commit 98af8452945c55652de68536afdde3b520fec429 upstream.
>
> Keeping track of the number of mitigations for all the CPU speculation
> bugs has become overwhelming for many users.  It's getting more and more
> complicated to decide which mitigations are needed for a given
> architecture.  Complicating matters is the fact that each arch tends to
> have its own custom way to mitigate the same vulnerability.
>
> Most users fall into a few basic categories:
>
> a) they want all mitigations off;
>
> b) they want all reasonable mitigations on, with SMT enabled even if
>    it's vulnerable; or
>
> c) they want all reasonable mitigations on, with SMT disabled if
>    vulnerable.
>
> Define a set of curated, arch-independent options, each of which is an
> aggregation of existing options:
>
> - mitigations=off: Disable all mitigations.
>
> - mitigations=auto: [default] Enable all the default mitigations, but
>   leave SMT enabled, even if it's vulnerable.
>
> - mitigations=auto,nosmt: Enable all the default mitigations, disabling
>   SMT if needed by a mitigation.
>
> Currently, these options are placeholders which don't actually do
> anything.  They will be fleshed out in upcoming patches.
>
> Signed-off-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
> Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>

> [bwh: Backported to 4.4:
>  - Drop the auto,nosmt option which we can't support

This doesn't really stand out. I.e. I completely missed it, and started
wondering why "auto,nosmt" was not documented in
kernel-parameters.txt below...

> --- a/Documentation/kernel-parameters.txt
> +++ b/Documentation/kernel-parameters.txt
> @@ -2173,6 +2173,25 @@ bytes respectively. Such letter suffixes
>                         in the "bleeding edge" mini2440 support kernel at
>                         http://repo.or.cz/w/linux-2.6/mini2440.git
>
> +       mitigations=
> +                       Control optional mitigations for CPU vulnerabilities.
> +                       This is a set of curated, arch-independent options, each
> +                       of which is an aggregation of existing arch-specific
> +                       options.
> +
> +                       off
> +                               Disable all optional CPU mitigations.  This
> +                               improves system performance, but it may also
> +                               expose users to several CPU vulnerabilities.
> +
> +                       auto (default)
> +                               Mitigate all CPU vulnerabilities, but leave SMT
> +                               enabled, even if it's vulnerable.  This is for
> +                               users who don't want to be surprised by SMT
> +                               getting disabled across kernel upgrades, or who
> +                               have other ways of avoiding SMT-based attacks.
> +                               This is the default behavior.
> +
>         mminit_loglevel=
>                         [KNL] When CONFIG_DEBUG_MEMORY_INIT is set, this
>                         parameter allows control of the logging verbosity for

> --- a/kernel/cpu.c
> +++ b/kernel/cpu.c
> @@ -842,3 +842,16 @@ void init_cpu_online(const struct cpumas
>  {
>         cpumask_copy(to_cpumask(cpu_online_bits), src);
>  }
> +
> +enum cpu_mitigations cpu_mitigations = CPU_MITIGATIONS_AUTO;
> +
> +static int __init mitigations_parse_cmdline(char *arg)
> +{
> +       if (!strcmp(arg, "off"))
> +               cpu_mitigations = CPU_MITIGATIONS_OFF;
> +       else if (!strcmp(arg, "auto"))
> +               cpu_mitigations = CPU_MITIGATIONS_AUTO;

Perhaps

    else
            pr_crit("mitigations=%s is not supported\n", arg);

?

Actually that makes sense on mainline, too.
Cooking a patch...

> +
> +       return 0;
> +}
> +early_param("mitigations", mitigations_parse_cmdline);

Gr{oetje,eeting}s,

                        Geert

-- 
Geert Uytterhoeven -- There's lots of Linux beyond ia32 -- geert@linux-m68k.org

In personal conversations with technical people, I call myself a hacker. But
when I'm talking to journalists I just say "programmer" or something like that.
                                -- Linus Torvalds

Re: [PATCH 4.4 247/266] cpu/speculation: Add mitigations= cmdline option

[Geert Uytterhoeven]

Hi Greg, Ben,

On Wed, May 15, 2019 at 1:12 PM Greg Kroah-Hartman
<gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> wrote:
> From: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
>
> commit 98af8452945c55652de68536afdde3b520fec429 upstream.
>
> Keeping track of the number of mitigations for all the CPU speculation
> bugs has become overwhelming for many users.  It's getting more and more
> complicated to decide which mitigations are needed for a given
> architecture.  Complicating matters is the fact that each arch tends to
> have its own custom way to mitigate the same vulnerability.
>
> Most users fall into a few basic categories:
>
> a) they want all mitigations off;
>
> b) they want all reasonable mitigations on, with SMT enabled even if
>    it's vulnerable; or
>
> c) they want all reasonable mitigations on, with SMT disabled if
>    vulnerable.
>
> Define a set of curated, arch-independent options, each of which is an
> aggregation of existing options:
>
> - mitigations=off: Disable all mitigations.
>
> - mitigations=auto: [default] Enable all the default mitigations, but
>   leave SMT enabled, even if it's vulnerable.
>
> - mitigations=auto,nosmt: Enable all the default mitigations, disabling
>   SMT if needed by a mitigation.
>
> Currently, these options are placeholders which don't actually do
> anything.  They will be fleshed out in upcoming patches.
>
> Signed-off-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
> Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>

> [bwh: Backported to 4.4:
>  - Drop the auto,nosmt option which we can't support

This doesn't really stand out. I.e. I completely missed it, and started
wondering why "auto,nosmt" was not documented in
kernel-parameters.txt below...

> --- a/Documentation/kernel-parameters.txt
> +++ b/Documentation/kernel-parameters.txt
> @@ -2173,6 +2173,25 @@ bytes respectively. Such letter suffixes
>                         in the "bleeding edge" mini2440 support kernel at
>                         http://repo.or.cz/w/linux-2.6/mini2440.git
>
> +       mitigations=
> +                       Control optional mitigations for CPU vulnerabilities.
> +                       This is a set of curated, arch-independent options, each
> +                       of which is an aggregation of existing arch-specific
> +                       options.
> +
> +                       off
> +                               Disable all optional CPU mitigations.  This
> +                               improves system performance, but it may also
> +                               expose users to several CPU vulnerabilities.
> +
> +                       auto (default)
> +                               Mitigate all CPU vulnerabilities, but leave SMT
> +                               enabled, even if it's vulnerable.  This is for
> +                               users who don't want to be surprised by SMT
> +                               getting disabled across kernel upgrades, or who
> +                               have other ways of avoiding SMT-based attacks.
> +                               This is the default behavior.
> +
>         mminit_loglevel=
>                         [KNL] When CONFIG_DEBUG_MEMORY_INIT is set, this
>                         parameter allows control of the logging verbosity for

> --- a/kernel/cpu.c
> +++ b/kernel/cpu.c
> @@ -842,3 +842,16 @@ void init_cpu_online(const struct cpumas
>  {
>         cpumask_copy(to_cpumask(cpu_online_bits), src);
>  }
> +
> +enum cpu_mitigations cpu_mitigations = CPU_MITIGATIONS_AUTO;
> +
> +static int __init mitigations_parse_cmdline(char *arg)
> +{
> +       if (!strcmp(arg, "off"))
> +               cpu_mitigations = CPU_MITIGATIONS_OFF;
> +       else if (!strcmp(arg, "auto"))
> +               cpu_mitigations = CPU_MITIGATIONS_AUTO;

Perhaps

    else
            pr_crit("mitigations=%s is not supported\n", arg);

?

Actually that makes sense on mainline, too.
Cooking a patch...

> +
> +       return 0;
> +}
> +early_param("mitigations", mitigations_parse_cmdline);

Gr{oetje,eeting}s,

                        Geert

-- 
Geert Uytterhoeven -- There's lots of Linux beyond ia32 -- geert@linux-m68k.org

In personal conversations with technical people, I call myself a hacker. But
when I'm talking to journalists I just say "programmer" or something like that.
                                -- Linus Torvalds