From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 From: Kees Cook Subject: Re: [kernel-hardening] [PATCH 09/38] usercopy: Mark kmalloc caches as usercopy caches Date: Tue, 12 Nov 2019 13:21:54 -0800 Message-ID: <201911121313.1097D6EE@keescook> References: <1515636190-24061-1-git-send-email-keescook@chromium.org> <1515636190-24061-10-git-send-email-keescook@chromium.org> <9519edb7-456a-a2fa-659e-3e5a1ff89466@suse.cz> Mime-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=iso-8859-1 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit Return-path: Content-Disposition: inline In-Reply-To: <9519edb7-456a-a2fa-659e-3e5a1ff89466@suse.cz> Sender: netdev-owner@vger.kernel.org To: Jiri Slaby , Alexander Viro Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, David Windsor , Pekka Enberg , David Rientjes , Joonsoo Kim , Andrew Morton , linux-mm@kvack.org, linux-xfs@vger.kernel.org, Linus Torvalds , Andy Lutomirski , Christoph Hellwig , Christoph Lameter , "David S. Miller" , Laura Abbott , Mark Rutland , "Martin K. Petersen" , Paolo Bonzini , Christian Borntraeger , Christoffer Dall , Dave Kleikamp List-Id: linux-arch.vger.kernel.org On Tue, Nov 12, 2019 at 08:17:57AM +0100, Jiri Slaby wrote: > On 11. 01. 18, 3:02, Kees Cook wrote: > > From: David Windsor > > > > Mark the kmalloc slab caches as entirely whitelisted. These caches > > are frequently used to fulfill kernel allocations that contain data > > to be copied to/from userspace. Internal-only uses are also common, > > but are scattered in the kernel. For now, mark all the kmalloc caches > > as whitelisted. > > > > This patch is modified from Brad Spengler/PaX Team's PAX_USERCOPY > > whitelisting code in the last public patch of grsecurity/PaX based on my > > understanding of the code. Changes or omissions from the original code are > > mine and don't reflect the original grsecurity/PaX code. > > > > Signed-off-by: David Windsor > > [kees: merged in moved kmalloc hunks, adjust commit log] > > Cc: Pekka Enberg > > Cc: David Rientjes > > Cc: Joonsoo Kim > > Cc: Andrew Morton > > Cc: linux-mm@kvack.org > > Cc: linux-xfs@vger.kernel.org > > Signed-off-by: Kees Cook > > Acked-by: Christoph Lameter > > --- > > mm/slab.c | 3 ++- > > mm/slab.h | 3 ++- > > mm/slab_common.c | 10 ++++++---- > > 3 files changed, 10 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-) > > > > diff --git a/mm/slab.c b/mm/slab.c > > index b9b0df620bb9..dd367fe17a4e 100644 > > --- a/mm/slab.c > > +++ b/mm/slab.c > ... > > @@ -1098,7 +1099,8 @@ void __init setup_kmalloc_cache_index_table(void) > > static void __init new_kmalloc_cache(int idx, slab_flags_t flags) > > { > > kmalloc_caches[idx] = create_kmalloc_cache(kmalloc_info[idx].name, > > - kmalloc_info[idx].size, flags); > > + kmalloc_info[idx].size, flags, 0, > > + kmalloc_info[idx].size); > > } > > > > /* > > @@ -1139,7 +1141,7 @@ void __init create_kmalloc_caches(slab_flags_t flags) > > > > BUG_ON(!n); > > kmalloc_dma_caches[i] = create_kmalloc_cache(n, > > - size, SLAB_CACHE_DMA | flags); > > + size, SLAB_CACHE_DMA | flags, 0, 0); > > Hi, > > was there any (undocumented) reason NOT to mark DMA caches as usercopy? > > We are seeing this on s390x: > > > usercopy: Kernel memory overwrite attempt detected to SLUB object > 'dma-kmalloc-1k' (offset 0, size 11)! > > ------------[ cut here ]------------ > > kernel BUG at mm/usercopy.c:99! Interesting! I believe the rationale was that if the region is used for DMA, allowing direct access to it from userspace could be prone to races. > See: > https://bugzilla.suse.com/show_bug.cgi?id=1156053 For context from the bug, the trace is: (<0000000000386c5a> usercopy_abort+0xa2/0xa8) <000000000036097a> __check_heap_object+0x11a/0x120 <0000000000386b3a> __check_object_size+0x18a/0x208 <000000000079b4ba> skb_copy_datagram_from_iter+0x62/0x240 <000003ff804edd5c> iucv_sock_sendmsg+0x1fc/0x858 Ýaf_iucv¨ <0000000000785894> sock_sendmsg+0x54/0x90 <0000000000785944> sock_write_iter+0x74/0xa0 <000000000038a3f0> new_sync_write+0x110/0x180 <000000000038d42e> vfs_write+0xa6/0x1d0 <000000000038d748> ksys_write+0x60/0xe8 <000000000096a660> system_call+0xdc/0x2e0 I know Al worked on fixing up usercopy checking for iters. I wonder if there is redundant checking happening here? i.e. haven't iters already done object size verifications, so they're not needed during iter copy helpers? > This indeed fixes it: > --- a/mm/slab_common.c > +++ b/mm/slab_common.c > @@ -1290,7 +1290,8 @@ void __init create_kmalloc_caches(slab_flags_t flags) > kmalloc_caches[KMALLOC_DMA][i] = > create_kmalloc_cache( > kmalloc_info[i].name[KMALLOC_DMA], > kmalloc_info[i].size, > - SLAB_CACHE_DMA | flags, 0, 0); > + SLAB_CACHE_DMA | flags, 0, > + kmalloc_info[i].size); > } > } > #endif How is iucv the only network protocol that has run into this? Do others use a bounce buffer? -- Kees Cook From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Return-Path: Received: from mail-pg1-f194.google.com ([209.85.215.194]:35853 "EHLO mail-pg1-f194.google.com" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S1727272AbfKLVV4 (ORCPT ); Tue, 12 Nov 2019 16:21:56 -0500 Received: by mail-pg1-f194.google.com with SMTP id k13so12700641pgh.3 for ; Tue, 12 Nov 2019 13:21:56 -0800 (PST) Date: Tue, 12 Nov 2019 13:21:54 -0800 From: Kees Cook Subject: Re: [kernel-hardening] [PATCH 09/38] usercopy: Mark kmalloc caches as usercopy caches Message-ID: <201911121313.1097D6EE@keescook> References: <1515636190-24061-1-git-send-email-keescook@chromium.org> <1515636190-24061-10-git-send-email-keescook@chromium.org> <9519edb7-456a-a2fa-659e-3e5a1ff89466@suse.cz> MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=iso-8859-1 Content-Disposition: inline Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit In-Reply-To: <9519edb7-456a-a2fa-659e-3e5a1ff89466@suse.cz> Sender: linux-arch-owner@vger.kernel.org List-ID: To: Jiri Slaby , Alexander Viro Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, David Windsor , Pekka Enberg , David Rientjes , Joonsoo Kim , Andrew Morton , linux-mm@kvack.org, linux-xfs@vger.kernel.org, Linus Torvalds , Andy Lutomirski , Christoph Hellwig , Christoph Lameter , "David S. Miller" , Laura Abbott , Mark Rutland , "Martin K. Petersen" , Paolo Bonzini , Christian Borntraeger , Christoffer Dall , Dave Kleikamp , Jan Kara , Luis de Bethencourt , Marc Zyngier , Rik van Riel , Matthew Garrett , linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org, linux-arch@vger.kernel.org, netdev@vger.kernel.org, kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com, Vlastimil Babka , Michal Kubecek Message-ID: <20191112212154.1pGZw5MeqvMv5UL1mZJxsigoV7GddQqpW9IPgXA0euo@z> On Tue, Nov 12, 2019 at 08:17:57AM +0100, Jiri Slaby wrote: > On 11. 01. 18, 3:02, Kees Cook wrote: > > From: David Windsor > > > > Mark the kmalloc slab caches as entirely whitelisted. These caches > > are frequently used to fulfill kernel allocations that contain data > > to be copied to/from userspace. Internal-only uses are also common, > > but are scattered in the kernel. For now, mark all the kmalloc caches > > as whitelisted. > > > > This patch is modified from Brad Spengler/PaX Team's PAX_USERCOPY > > whitelisting code in the last public patch of grsecurity/PaX based on my > > understanding of the code. Changes or omissions from the original code are > > mine and don't reflect the original grsecurity/PaX code. > > > > Signed-off-by: David Windsor > > [kees: merged in moved kmalloc hunks, adjust commit log] > > Cc: Pekka Enberg > > Cc: David Rientjes > > Cc: Joonsoo Kim > > Cc: Andrew Morton > > Cc: linux-mm@kvack.org > > Cc: linux-xfs@vger.kernel.org > > Signed-off-by: Kees Cook > > Acked-by: Christoph Lameter > > --- > > mm/slab.c | 3 ++- > > mm/slab.h | 3 ++- > > mm/slab_common.c | 10 ++++++---- > > 3 files changed, 10 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-) > > > > diff --git a/mm/slab.c b/mm/slab.c > > index b9b0df620bb9..dd367fe17a4e 100644 > > --- a/mm/slab.c > > +++ b/mm/slab.c > ... > > @@ -1098,7 +1099,8 @@ void __init setup_kmalloc_cache_index_table(void) > > static void __init new_kmalloc_cache(int idx, slab_flags_t flags) > > { > > kmalloc_caches[idx] = create_kmalloc_cache(kmalloc_info[idx].name, > > - kmalloc_info[idx].size, flags); > > + kmalloc_info[idx].size, flags, 0, > > + kmalloc_info[idx].size); > > } > > > > /* > > @@ -1139,7 +1141,7 @@ void __init create_kmalloc_caches(slab_flags_t flags) > > > > BUG_ON(!n); > > kmalloc_dma_caches[i] = create_kmalloc_cache(n, > > - size, SLAB_CACHE_DMA | flags); > > + size, SLAB_CACHE_DMA | flags, 0, 0); > > Hi, > > was there any (undocumented) reason NOT to mark DMA caches as usercopy? > > We are seeing this on s390x: > > > usercopy: Kernel memory overwrite attempt detected to SLUB object > 'dma-kmalloc-1k' (offset 0, size 11)! > > ------------[ cut here ]------------ > > kernel BUG at mm/usercopy.c:99! Interesting! I believe the rationale was that if the region is used for DMA, allowing direct access to it from userspace could be prone to races. > See: > https://bugzilla.suse.com/show_bug.cgi?id=1156053 For context from the bug, the trace is: (<0000000000386c5a> usercopy_abort+0xa2/0xa8) <000000000036097a> __check_heap_object+0x11a/0x120 <0000000000386b3a> __check_object_size+0x18a/0x208 <000000000079b4ba> skb_copy_datagram_from_iter+0x62/0x240 <000003ff804edd5c> iucv_sock_sendmsg+0x1fc/0x858 Ýaf_iucv¨ <0000000000785894> sock_sendmsg+0x54/0x90 <0000000000785944> sock_write_iter+0x74/0xa0 <000000000038a3f0> new_sync_write+0x110/0x180 <000000000038d42e> vfs_write+0xa6/0x1d0 <000000000038d748> ksys_write+0x60/0xe8 <000000000096a660> system_call+0xdc/0x2e0 I know Al worked on fixing up usercopy checking for iters. I wonder if there is redundant checking happening here? i.e. haven't iters already done object size verifications, so they're not needed during iter copy helpers? > This indeed fixes it: > --- a/mm/slab_common.c > +++ b/mm/slab_common.c > @@ -1290,7 +1290,8 @@ void __init create_kmalloc_caches(slab_flags_t flags) > kmalloc_caches[KMALLOC_DMA][i] = > create_kmalloc_cache( > kmalloc_info[i].name[KMALLOC_DMA], > kmalloc_info[i].size, > - SLAB_CACHE_DMA | flags, 0, 0); > + SLAB_CACHE_DMA | flags, 0, > + kmalloc_info[i].size); > } > } > #endif How is iucv the only network protocol that has run into this? Do others use a bounce buffer? -- Kees Cook