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From: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas-5wv7dgnIgG8@public.gmane.org>
To: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland-5wv7dgnIgG8@public.gmane.org>
Cc: Mike Rapoport <rppt-DgEjT+Ai2ygdnm+yROfE0A@public.gmane.org>,
	linux-kernel-u79uwXL29TY76Z2rM5mHXA@public.gmane.org,
	Alexander Viro
	<viro-RmSDqhL/yNMiFSDQTTA3OLVCufUGDwFn@public.gmane.org>,
	Andrew Morton
	<akpm-de/tnXTf+JLsfHDXvbKv3WD2FQJk+8+b@public.gmane.org>,
	Andy Lutomirski <luto-DgEjT+Ai2ygdnm+yROfE0A@public.gmane.org>,
	Arnd Bergmann <arnd-r2nGTMty4D4@public.gmane.org>,
	Borislav Petkov <bp-Gina5bIWoIWzQB+pC5nmwQ@public.gmane.org>,
	Christopher Lameter <cl-vYTEC60ixJUAvxtiuMwx3w@public.gmane.org>,
	Dan Williams
	<dan.j.williams-ral2JQCrhuEAvxtiuMwx3w@public.gmane.org>,
	Dave Hansen <dave.hansen-VuQAYsv1563Yd54FQh9/CA@public.gmane.org>,
	Elena Reshetova
	<elena.reshetova-ral2JQCrhuEAvxtiuMwx3w@public.gmane.org>,
	"H. Peter Anvin" <hpa-YMNOUZJC4hwAvxtiuMwx3w@public.gmane.org>,
	Idan Yaniv <idan.yaniv-qyM6JfAXOaQ@public.gmane.org>,
	Ingo Molnar <mingo-H+wXaHxf7aLQT0dZR+AlfA@public.gmane.org>,
	James Bottomley <jejb-tEXmvtCZX7AybS5Ee8rs3A@public.gmane.org>,
	"Kirill A. Shutemov"
	<kirill-oKw7cIdHH8eLwutG50LtGA@public.gmane.org>,
	Matthew Wilcox <willy-wEGCiKHe2LqWVfeAwA7xHQ@public.gmane.org>,
	Mike Rapoport <rppt-tEXmvtCZX7AybS5Ee8rs3A@public.gmane.org>,
	Michael Kerrisk
	<mtk.manpages-Re5JQEeQqe8AvxtiuMwx3w@public.gmane.org>,
	Palmer Dabbelt <palmer-96lFi9zoCfxBDgjK7y7TUQ@public.gmane.org>,
	Paul
Subject: Re: [PATCH v2 3/7] mm: introduce memfd_secret system call to create "secret" memory areas
Date: Fri, 31 Jul 2020 17:22:34 +0100	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20200731162234.GF29569@gaia> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20200731142905.GA67415-NxAhncQ8SJbILnBEAk/BfazUEOm+Xw19@public.gmane.org>

On Fri, Jul 31, 2020 at 03:29:05PM +0100, Mark Rutland wrote:
> On Thu, Jul 30, 2020 at 05:22:10PM +0100, Catalin Marinas wrote:
> > On Mon, Jul 27, 2020 at 07:29:31PM +0300, Mike Rapoport wrote:
> > > +static int secretmem_mmap(struct file *file, struct vm_area_struct *vma)
> > > +{
> > > +	struct secretmem_ctx *ctx = file->private_data;
> > > +	unsigned long mode = ctx->mode;
> > > +	unsigned long len = vma->vm_end - vma->vm_start;
> > > +
> > > +	if (!mode)
> > > +		return -EINVAL;
> > > +
> > > +	if ((vma->vm_flags & (VM_SHARED | VM_MAYSHARE)) == 0)
> > > +		return -EINVAL;
> > > +
> > > +	if (mlock_future_check(vma->vm_mm, vma->vm_flags | VM_LOCKED, len))
> > > +		return -EAGAIN;
> > > +
> > > +	switch (mode) {
> > > +	case SECRETMEM_UNCACHED:
> > > +		vma->vm_page_prot = pgprot_noncached(vma->vm_page_prot);
> > > +		fallthrough;
> > > +	case SECRETMEM_EXCLUSIVE:
> > > +		vma->vm_ops = &secretmem_vm_ops;
> > > +		break;
> > > +	default:
> > > +		return -EINVAL;
> > > +	}
> > > +
> > > +	vma->vm_flags |= VM_LOCKED;
> > > +
> > > +	return 0;
> > > +}
> > 
> > I think the uncached mapping is not the right thing for arm/arm64. First
> > of all, pgprot_noncached() gives us Strongly Ordered (Device memory)
> > semantics together with not allowing unaligned accesses. I suspect the
> > semantics are different on x86.
> 
> > The second, more serious problem, is that I can't find any place where
> > the caches are flushed for the page mapped on fault. When a page is
> > allocated, assuming GFP_ZERO, only the caches are guaranteed to be
> > zeroed. Exposing this subsequently to user space as uncached would allow
> > the user to read stale data prior to zeroing. The arm64
> > set_direct_map_default_noflush() doesn't do any cache maintenance.
> 
> It's also worth noting that in a virtual machine this is liable to be
> either broken (with a potential loss of coherency if the host has a
> cacheable alias as existing KVM hosts have), or pointless (if the host
> uses S2FWB to upgrade Stage-1 attribues to cacheable as existing KVM
> hosts also have).
> 
> I think that trying to avoid the data caches creates many more problems
> than it solves, and I don't think there's a strong justification for
> trying to support that on arm64 to begin with, so I'd rather entirely
> opt-out on supporting SECRETMEM_UNCACHED.

Good point, I forgot the virtualisation aspect. So unless there is a
hypervisor API to unmap it from the host memory, the uncached option
isn't of much use on arm64.

-- 
Catalin

  parent reply	other threads:[~2020-07-31 16:22 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 17+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2020-07-27 16:29 [PATCH v2 0/7] mm: introduce memfd_secret system call to create "secret" memory areas Mike Rapoport
2020-07-27 16:29 ` [PATCH v2 2/7] mmap: make mlock_future_check() global Mike Rapoport
2020-07-27 16:29 ` [PATCH v2 3/7] mm: introduce memfd_secret system call to create "secret" memory areas Mike Rapoport
2020-07-30 16:22   ` Catalin Marinas
2020-07-30 20:44     ` Mike Rapoport
2020-07-30 20:44       ` Mike Rapoport
     [not found]       ` <20200730204409.GB534153-DgEjT+Ai2ygdnm+yROfE0A@public.gmane.org>
2020-07-31 14:10         ` Catalin Marinas
2020-07-31 14:29     ` Mark Rutland
     [not found]       ` <20200731142905.GA67415-NxAhncQ8SJbILnBEAk/BfazUEOm+Xw19@public.gmane.org>
2020-07-31 16:22         ` Catalin Marinas [this message]
     [not found] ` <20200727162935.31714-1-rppt-DgEjT+Ai2ygdnm+yROfE0A@public.gmane.org>
2020-07-27 16:29   ` [PATCH v2 1/7] mm: add definition of PMD_PAGE_ORDER Mike Rapoport
2020-07-27 16:29   ` [PATCH v2 4/7] arch, mm: wire up memfd_secret system call were relevant Mike Rapoport
     [not found]     ` <20200727162935.31714-5-rppt-DgEjT+Ai2ygdnm+yROfE0A@public.gmane.org>
2020-07-27 17:25       ` Arnd Bergmann
2020-07-27 16:29   ` [PATCH v2 5/7] mm: secretmem: use PMD-size pages to amortize direct map fragmentation Mike Rapoport
2020-07-27 16:29 ` [PATCH v2 6/7] mm: secretmem: add ability to reserve memory at boot Mike Rapoport
2020-07-27 16:29 ` [PATCH v2 7/7] " Mike Rapoport
2020-07-27 17:11   ` Mike Rapoport
2020-07-27 17:11     ` Mike Rapoport

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