From: Tianyu Lan <ltykernel@gmail.com>
To: luto@kernel.org, tglx@linutronix.de, mingo@redhat.com,
bp@alien8.de, dave.hansen@linux.intel.com, x86@kernel.org,
hpa@zytor.com, seanjc@google.com, pbonzini@redhat.com,
jgross@suse.com, tiala@microsoft.com, kirill@shutemov.name,
jiangshan.ljs@antgroup.com, peterz@infradead.org,
ashish.kalra@amd.com, srutherford@google.com,
akpm@linux-foundation.org, anshuman.khandual@arm.com,
pawan.kumar.gupta@linux.intel.com, adrian.hunter@intel.com,
daniel.sneddon@linux.intel.com,
alexander.shishkin@linux.intel.com, sandipan.das@amd.com,
ray.huang@amd.com, brijesh.singh@amd.com, michael.roth@amd.com,
thomas.lendacky@amd.com, venu.busireddy@oracle.com,
sterritt@google.com, tony.luck@intel.com,
samitolvanen@google.com, fenghua.yu@intel.com
Cc: pangupta@amd.com, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
kvm@vger.kernel.org, linux-hyperv@vger.kernel.org,
linux-arch@vger.kernel.org
Subject: [RFC PATCH V4 15/17] x86/sev: optimize system vector processing invoked from #HV exception
Date: Mon, 3 Apr 2023 13:44:03 -0400 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20230403174406.4180472-16-ltykernel@gmail.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20230403174406.4180472-1-ltykernel@gmail.com>
From: Ashish Kalra <ashish.kalra@amd.com>
Construct system vector table and dispatch system vector exceptions through
sysvec_table from #HV exception handler instead of explicitly calling each
system vector. The system vector table is created dynamically and is placed
in a new named ELF section.
Signed-off-by: Ashish Kalra <ashish.kalra@amd.com>
---
arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S | 6 +++
arch/x86/kernel/sev.c | 70 +++++++++++++----------------------
arch/x86/kernel/vmlinux.lds.S | 7 ++++
3 files changed, 38 insertions(+), 45 deletions(-)
diff --git a/arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S b/arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S
index efa56dfde19e..802fb6dec244 100644
--- a/arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S
+++ b/arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S
@@ -419,6 +419,12 @@ SYM_CODE_START(\asmsym)
_ASM_NOKPROBE(\asmsym)
SYM_CODE_END(\asmsym)
+ .if \vector >= FIRST_SYSTEM_VECTOR && \vector < NR_VECTORS
+ .section .system_vectors, "aw"
+ .byte \vector
+ .quad \cfunc
+ .previous
+ .endif
.endm
/*
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/sev.c b/arch/x86/kernel/sev.c
index 7fcb3b548215..2c964f7ac7dc 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/sev.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/sev.c
@@ -151,6 +151,16 @@ struct sev_snp_runtime_data {
static DEFINE_PER_CPU(struct sev_snp_runtime_data*, snp_runtime_data);
+static void (*sysvec_table[NR_VECTORS - FIRST_SYSTEM_VECTOR])
+ (struct pt_regs *regs) __ro_after_init;
+
+struct sysvec_entry {
+ unsigned char vector;
+ void (*sysvec_func)(struct pt_regs *regs);
+} __packed;
+
+extern struct sysvec_entry __system_vectors[], __system_vectors_end[];
+
static inline u64 sev_es_rd_ghcb_msr(void)
{
return __rdmsr(MSR_AMD64_SEV_ES_GHCB);
@@ -216,51 +226,11 @@ static void do_exc_hv(struct pt_regs *regs)
} else if (pending_events.vector == IA32_SYSCALL_VECTOR) {
WARN(1, "syscall shouldn't happen\n");
} else if (pending_events.vector >= FIRST_SYSTEM_VECTOR) {
- switch (pending_events.vector) {
-#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_HYPERV)
- case HYPERV_STIMER0_VECTOR:
- sysvec_hyperv_stimer0(regs);
- break;
- case HYPERVISOR_CALLBACK_VECTOR:
- sysvec_hyperv_callback(regs);
- break;
-#endif
-#ifdef CONFIG_SMP
- case RESCHEDULE_VECTOR:
- sysvec_reschedule_ipi(regs);
- break;
- case IRQ_MOVE_CLEANUP_VECTOR:
- sysvec_irq_move_cleanup(regs);
- break;
- case REBOOT_VECTOR:
- sysvec_reboot(regs);
- break;
- case CALL_FUNCTION_SINGLE_VECTOR:
- sysvec_call_function_single(regs);
- break;
- case CALL_FUNCTION_VECTOR:
- sysvec_call_function(regs);
- break;
-#endif
-#ifdef CONFIG_X86_LOCAL_APIC
- case ERROR_APIC_VECTOR:
- sysvec_error_interrupt(regs);
- break;
- case SPURIOUS_APIC_VECTOR:
- sysvec_spurious_apic_interrupt(regs);
- break;
- case LOCAL_TIMER_VECTOR:
- sysvec_apic_timer_interrupt(regs);
- break;
- case X86_PLATFORM_IPI_VECTOR:
- sysvec_x86_platform_ipi(regs);
- break;
-#endif
- case 0x0:
- break;
- default:
- panic("Unexpected vector %d\n", vector);
- unreachable();
+ if (!(sysvec_table[pending_events.vector - FIRST_SYSTEM_VECTOR])) {
+ WARN(1, "system vector entry 0x%x is NULL\n",
+ pending_events.vector);
+ } else {
+ (*sysvec_table[pending_events.vector - FIRST_SYSTEM_VECTOR])(regs);
}
} else {
common_interrupt(regs, pending_events.vector);
@@ -383,6 +353,14 @@ static bool sev_restricted_injection_enabled(void)
return sev_status & MSR_AMD64_SNP_RESTRICTED_INJ;
}
+static void __init construct_sysvec_table(void)
+{
+ struct sysvec_entry *p;
+
+ for (p = __system_vectors; p < __system_vectors_end; p++)
+ sysvec_table[p->vector - FIRST_SYSTEM_VECTOR] = p->sysvec_func;
+}
+
void __init sev_snp_init_hv_handling(void)
{
struct sev_es_runtime_data *data;
@@ -407,6 +385,8 @@ void __init sev_snp_init_hv_handling(void)
apic_set_eoi_write(hv_doorbell_apic_eoi_write);
local_irq_restore(flags);
+
+ construct_sysvec_table();
}
static int vc_fetch_insn_kernel(struct es_em_ctxt *ctxt,
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/vmlinux.lds.S b/arch/x86/kernel/vmlinux.lds.S
index 25f155205770..c37165d8e877 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/vmlinux.lds.S
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/vmlinux.lds.S
@@ -338,6 +338,13 @@ SECTIONS
*(.altinstr_replacement)
}
+ . = ALIGN(8);
+ .system_vectors : AT(ADDR(.system_vectors) - LOAD_OFFSET) {
+ __system_vectors = .;
+ *(.system_vectors)
+ __system_vectors_end = .;
+ }
+
. = ALIGN(8);
.apicdrivers : AT(ADDR(.apicdrivers) - LOAD_OFFSET) {
__apicdrivers = .;
--
2.25.1
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2023-04-03 17:46 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 44+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2023-04-03 17:43 [RFC PATCH V4 00/17] x86/hyperv/sev: Add AMD sev-snp enlightened guest support on hyperv Tianyu Lan
2023-04-03 17:43 ` [RFC PATCH V4 01/17] x86/hyperv: Add sev-snp enlightened guest static key Tianyu Lan
2023-04-03 17:43 ` [RFC PATCH V4 02/17] Drivers: hv: vmbus: Decrypt vmbus ring buffer Tianyu Lan
2023-04-12 14:07 ` Michael Kelley (LINUX)
2023-04-03 17:43 ` [RFC PATCH V4 03/17] x86/hyperv: Set Virtual Trust Level in VMBus init message Tianyu Lan
2023-04-12 14:24 ` Michael Kelley (LINUX)
2023-04-13 3:29 ` Tianyu Lan
2023-04-03 17:43 ` [RFC PATCH V4 04/17] x86/hyperv: Use vmmcall to implement Hyper-V hypercall in sev-snp enlightened guest Tianyu Lan
2023-04-03 17:43 ` [RFC PATCH V4 05/17] clocksource/drivers/hyper-v: decrypt hyperv tsc page " Tianyu Lan
2023-04-03 17:43 ` [RFC PATCH V4 06/17] x86/hyperv: decrypt VMBus pages for " Tianyu Lan
2023-04-12 14:32 ` Michael Kelley (LINUX)
2023-04-14 4:40 ` Tianyu Lan
2023-04-03 17:43 ` [RFC PATCH V4 07/17] drivers: hv: Decrypt percpu hvcall input arg page in " Tianyu Lan
2023-04-12 14:34 ` Michael Kelley (LINUX)
2023-04-03 17:43 ` [RFC PATCH V4 08/17] x86/hyperv: Initialize cpu and memory for " Tianyu Lan
2023-04-12 14:39 ` Michael Kelley (LINUX)
2023-04-16 7:21 ` Tianyu Lan
2023-04-17 12:49 ` Michael Kelley (LINUX)
2023-04-18 14:12 ` Tianyu Lan
2023-04-16 7:23 ` sky free
2023-04-12 15:53 ` Dave Hansen
2023-04-18 13:24 ` Tianyu Lan
2023-04-03 17:43 ` [RFC PATCH V4 09/17] x86/hyperv: SEV-SNP enlightened guest don't support legacy rtc Tianyu Lan
2023-04-03 17:43 ` [RFC PATCH V4 10/17] x86/hyperv: Add smp support for sev-snp guest Tianyu Lan
2023-04-12 14:59 ` Michael Kelley (LINUX)
2023-04-14 16:22 ` Tianyu Lan
2023-04-03 17:43 ` [RFC PATCH V4 11/17] x86/hyperv: Add hyperv-specific handling for VMMCALL under SEV-ES Tianyu Lan
2023-04-03 17:44 ` [RFC PATCH V4 12/17] x86/sev: Add a #HV exception handler Tianyu Lan
2023-04-03 18:06 ` Borislav Petkov
2023-04-03 17:44 ` [RFC PATCH V4 13/17] x86/sev: Add Check of #HV event in path Tianyu Lan
2023-04-14 11:02 ` Pankaj Gupta
2023-04-14 16:32 ` Tianyu Lan
2023-04-17 8:14 ` Pankaj Gupta
2023-04-18 14:01 ` Gupta, Pankaj
2023-04-03 17:44 ` [RFC PATCH V4 14/17] x86/hyperv/sev: Add AMD sev-snp enlightened guest support on hyperv Tianyu Lan
2023-04-05 5:43 ` Gupta, Pankaj
2023-04-16 7:21 ` Tianyu Lan
2023-04-12 15:02 ` Michael Kelley (LINUX)
2023-04-16 7:37 ` Tianyu Lan
2023-04-03 17:44 ` Tianyu Lan [this message]
2023-04-03 17:44 ` [RFC PATCH V4 16/17] x86/sev: Fix interrupt exit code paths from #HV exception Tianyu Lan
2023-04-03 17:44 ` [RFC PATCH V4 17/17] x86/sev: Remove restrict interrupt injection from SNP_FEATURES_IMPL_REQ Tianyu Lan
2023-04-04 12:25 ` Gupta, Pankaj
2023-04-04 13:22 ` Tianyu Lan
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