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From: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>
To: Mathias Krause <minipli@googlemail.com>,
	kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com
Cc: "linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org" <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>,
	Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>,
	Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>,
	Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>,
	Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>, x86-ml <x86@kernel.org>,
	Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>,
	Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>,
	linux-arch@vger.kernel.org, PaX Team <pageexec@freemail.hu>,
	Emese Revfy <re.emese@gmail.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH 0/2] introduce post-init read-only memory
Date: Wed, 25 Nov 2015 09:31:05 -0800	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <5655F059.4010801@zytor.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <CA+rthh-euk2hGGWjsDqXogWSmzmJNV1aiUVfnTfrzyQhndgbOQ@mail.gmail.com>

On 11/25/15 01:13, Mathias Krause wrote:
> 
> While having that annotation makes perfect sense, not only from a
> security perspective but also from a micro-optimization point of view
> (much like the already existing __read_mostly annotation), it has its
> drawbacks. Violating the "r/o after init" rule by writing to such
> annotated variables from non-init code goes unnoticed as far as it
> concerns the toolchain. Neither the compiler nor the linker will flag
> that incorrect use. It'll just trap at runtime and that's bad.
> 
> I myself had some educating experience seeing my machine triple fault
> when resuming from a S3 sleep. The root cause was a variable that was
> annotated __read_only but that was (unnecessarily) modified during CPU
> bring-up phase. Debugging that kind of problems is sort of a PITA, you
> could imagine.
> 
> So, prior extending the usage of the __read_only annotation some
> toolchain support is needed. Maybe a gcc plugin that'll warn/error on
> code that writes to such a variable but is not __init itself. The
> initify and checker plugins from the PaX patch might be worth to look
> at for that purpose, as they're doing similar things already. Adding
> such a check to sparse might be worth it, too.
> A modpost check probably won't work as it's unable to tell if it's a
> legitimate access (r/o) or a violation (/w access). So the gcc plugin
> is the way to go, IMHO.
> 

We should not wait for compile-time support, that doesn't make any
sense.  What would be useful would be a way to override this on the
command line -- that way, if disabling RO or RO-after-init memory makes
something work, we have an instant diagnosis.

	-hpa

WARNING: multiple messages have this Message-ID (diff)
From: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>
To: Mathias Krause <minipli@googlemail.com>,
	kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com
Cc: "linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org" <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>,
	Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>,
	Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>,
	Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>,
	Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>, x86-ml <x86@kernel.org>,
	Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>,
	Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>,
	linux-arch@vger.kernel.org, PaX Team <pageexec@freemail.hu>,
	Emese Revfy <re.emese@gmail.com>
Subject: Re: [kernel-hardening] [PATCH 0/2] introduce post-init read-only memory
Date: Wed, 25 Nov 2015 09:31:05 -0800	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <5655F059.4010801@zytor.com> (raw)
Message-ID: <20151125173105.LwEdxi8Mmw5a-Xj7lKWwTi4Xm-kJFPZ66GtHOmGx3Bs@z> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <CA+rthh-euk2hGGWjsDqXogWSmzmJNV1aiUVfnTfrzyQhndgbOQ@mail.gmail.com>

On 11/25/15 01:13, Mathias Krause wrote:
> 
> While having that annotation makes perfect sense, not only from a
> security perspective but also from a micro-optimization point of view
> (much like the already existing __read_mostly annotation), it has its
> drawbacks. Violating the "r/o after init" rule by writing to such
> annotated variables from non-init code goes unnoticed as far as it
> concerns the toolchain. Neither the compiler nor the linker will flag
> that incorrect use. It'll just trap at runtime and that's bad.
> 
> I myself had some educating experience seeing my machine triple fault
> when resuming from a S3 sleep. The root cause was a variable that was
> annotated __read_only but that was (unnecessarily) modified during CPU
> bring-up phase. Debugging that kind of problems is sort of a PITA, you
> could imagine.
> 
> So, prior extending the usage of the __read_only annotation some
> toolchain support is needed. Maybe a gcc plugin that'll warn/error on
> code that writes to such a variable but is not __init itself. The
> initify and checker plugins from the PaX patch might be worth to look
> at for that purpose, as they're doing similar things already. Adding
> such a check to sparse might be worth it, too.
> A modpost check probably won't work as it's unable to tell if it's a
> legitimate access (r/o) or a violation (/w access). So the gcc plugin
> is the way to go, IMHO.
> 

We should not wait for compile-time support, that doesn't make any
sense.  What would be useful would be a way to override this on the
command line -- that way, if disabling RO or RO-after-init memory makes
something work, we have an instant diagnosis.

	-hpa



  parent reply	other threads:[~2015-11-25 17:31 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 67+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2015-11-24 21:38 [PATCH 0/2] introduce post-init read-only memory Kees Cook
2015-11-24 21:38 ` Kees Cook
2015-11-24 21:38 ` [PATCH 1/2] x86: " Kees Cook
2015-11-24 21:38   ` Kees Cook
2015-11-25  0:34   ` Andy Lutomirski
2015-11-25  0:34     ` Andy Lutomirski
2015-11-25  0:44     ` Kees Cook
2015-11-25  0:54       ` [kernel-hardening] " Michael Ellerman
2015-11-25 15:03         ` Kees Cook
2015-11-25 23:05           ` Michael Ellerman
2015-11-25 23:32             ` Kees Cook
2015-11-25 23:32               ` [kernel-hardening] " Kees Cook
2015-11-24 21:38 ` [PATCH 2/2] x86, vdso: mark vDSO read-only after init Kees Cook
2015-11-24 21:38   ` Kees Cook
2015-11-25  9:13 ` [PATCH 0/2] introduce post-init read-only memory Mathias Krause
2015-11-25  9:13   ` [kernel-hardening] " Mathias Krause
2015-11-25 10:06   ` Clemens Ladisch
2015-11-25 10:06     ` Clemens Ladisch
2015-11-25 11:14     ` PaX Team
2015-11-25 11:14       ` [kernel-hardening] " PaX Team
2015-11-25 11:05   ` PaX Team
2015-11-25 11:05     ` [kernel-hardening] " PaX Team
2015-11-26  8:54     ` Ingo Molnar
2015-11-26  9:57       ` PaX Team
2015-11-26  9:57         ` [kernel-hardening] " PaX Team
2015-11-26 10:42         ` Ingo Molnar
2015-11-26 12:14           ` PaX Team
2015-11-26 12:14             ` [kernel-hardening] " PaX Team
2015-11-27  8:05             ` Ingo Molnar
2015-11-27  8:05               ` [kernel-hardening] " Ingo Molnar
2015-11-27 15:29               ` PaX Team
2015-11-27 15:29                 ` [kernel-hardening] " PaX Team
2015-11-27 16:30                 ` Andy Lutomirski
2015-11-29  8:08                 ` Ingo Molnar
2015-11-29  8:08                   ` Ingo Molnar
2015-11-29 11:15                   ` PaX Team
2015-11-29 11:15                     ` [kernel-hardening] " PaX Team
2015-11-29 15:39                     ` Ingo Molnar
2015-11-29 18:05                       ` Mathias Krause
2015-11-29 18:05                         ` [kernel-hardening] " Mathias Krause
2015-11-30  8:01                         ` Ingo Molnar
2015-11-30  8:01                           ` [kernel-hardening] " Ingo Molnar
2015-11-26 16:11       ` Andy Lutomirski
2015-11-26 16:11         ` [kernel-hardening] " Andy Lutomirski
2015-11-27  7:59         ` Ingo Molnar
2015-11-27  7:59           ` [kernel-hardening] " Ingo Molnar
2015-11-27 18:00           ` Linus Torvalds
2015-11-27 18:03             ` Linus Torvalds
2015-11-27 18:03               ` [kernel-hardening] " Linus Torvalds
2015-11-27 20:03             ` Kees Cook
2015-11-27 20:03               ` [kernel-hardening] " Kees Cook
2015-11-27 20:09               ` Andy Lutomirski
2015-11-29  8:05                 ` Ingo Molnar
2015-11-29  8:05                   ` Ingo Molnar
2015-11-30 21:14                   ` H. Peter Anvin
2015-11-30 21:14                     ` [kernel-hardening] " H. Peter Anvin
2015-11-30 21:33                     ` Kees Cook
2015-11-30 21:38                       ` Andy Lutomirski
2015-11-30 21:38                         ` Andy Lutomirski
2015-11-30 21:43                       ` H. Peter Anvin
2015-11-30 21:43                         ` [kernel-hardening] " H. Peter Anvin
2015-11-25 17:26   ` Kees Cook
2015-11-25 17:26     ` [kernel-hardening] " Kees Cook
2015-11-25 17:31   ` H. Peter Anvin [this message]
2015-11-25 17:31     ` H. Peter Anvin
2015-11-25 18:54     ` Kees Cook
2015-11-25 19:06       ` H. Peter Anvin

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