From: Christian Borntraeger <borntraeger@de.ibm.com> To: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Cc: LKML <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>, Balbir Singh <bsingharora@gmail.com>, Daniel Micay <danielmicay@gmail.com>, Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>, Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com>, Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>, PaX Team <pageexec@freemail.hu>, Brad Spengler <spender@grsecurity.net>, Russell King <linux@armlinux.org.uk>, Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>, Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>, Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>, Benjamin Herrenschmidt <benh@kernel.crashing.org>, Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>, Tony Luck <tony.luck@intel.com>, Fenghua Yu <fenghua.yu@intel.com>, "David S. Miller" <davem@davemloft.net>, "x86@kernel.org" <x86@kernel.org>, Christoph Lameter <cl@linux.com>, Pekka Enberg <penberg@kernel.org>Davi Subject: Re: [PATCH v3 02/11] mm: Hardened usercopy Date: Tue, 19 Jul 2016 22:14:26 +0200 [thread overview] Message-ID: <578E8A22.5080807@de.ibm.com> (raw) In-Reply-To: <CAGXu5jKRDuELqGY1F-D4+MD+dMXSbiPGzf1hXb7Kp8ACBjpw9g@mail.gmail.com> On 07/19/2016 09:31 PM, Kees Cook wrote: > On Tue, Jul 19, 2016 at 2:21 AM, Christian Borntraeger > <borntraeger@de.ibm.com> wrote: >> On 07/15/2016 11:44 PM, Kees Cook wrote: >>> +config HAVE_ARCH_LINEAR_KERNEL_MAPPING >>> + bool >>> + help >>> + An architecture should select this if it has a secondary linear >>> + mapping of the kernel text. This is used to verify that kernel >>> + text exposures are not visible under CONFIG_HARDENED_USERCOPY. >> >> I have trouble parsing this. (What does secondary linear mapping mean?) > > I likely need help clarifying this language... > >> So let me give an example below >> >>> + >> [...] >>> +/* Is this address range in the kernel text area? */ >>> +static inline const char *check_kernel_text_object(const void *ptr, >>> + unsigned long n) >>> +{ >>> + unsigned long textlow = (unsigned long)_stext; >>> + unsigned long texthigh = (unsigned long)_etext; >>> + >>> + if (overlaps(ptr, n, textlow, texthigh)) >>> + return "<kernel text>"; >>> + >>> +#ifdef HAVE_ARCH_LINEAR_KERNEL_MAPPING >>> + /* Check against linear mapping as well. */ >>> + if (overlaps(ptr, n, (unsigned long)__va(__pa(textlow)), >>> + (unsigned long)__va(__pa(texthigh)))) >>> + return "<linear kernel text>"; >>> +#endif >>> + >>> + return NULL; >>> +} >> >> s390 has an address space for user (primary address space from 0..4TB/8PB) and a separate >> address space (home space from 0..4TB/8PB) for the kernel. In this home space the kernel >> mapping is virtual containing the physical memory as well as vmalloc memory (creating aliases >> into the physical one). The kernel text is mapped from _stext to _etext in this mapping. >> So I assume this would qualify for HAVE_ARCH_LINEAR_KERNEL_MAPPING ? > > If I understand your example, yes. In the home space you have two > addresses that reference the kernel image? No, there is only one address that points to the kernel. As we have no kernel ASLR yet, and the kernel mapping is a 1:1 mapping from 0 to memory end and the kernel is only from _stext to _etext. The vmalloc area contains modules and vmalloc but not a 2nd kernel mapping. But thanks for your example, now I understood. If we have only one address >>> + if (overlaps(ptr, n, textlow, texthigh)) >>> + return "<kernel text>"; This is just enough. So what about for the CONFIG text: An architecture should select this if the kernel mapping has a secondary linear mapping of the kernel text - in other words more than one virtual kernel address that points to the kernel image. This is used to verify that kernel text exposures are not visible under CONFIG_HARDENED_USERCOPY. > I wonder if I can avoid the CONFIG entirely if I just did a > __va(__pa(_stext)) != _stext test... would that break anyone? Can this be resolved on all platforms at compile time? -- To unsubscribe, send a message with 'unsubscribe linux-mm' in the body to majordomo@kvack.org. For more info on Linux MM, see: http://www.linux-mm.org/ . Don't email: <a href=mailto:"dont@kvack.org"> email@kvack.org </a>
WARNING: multiple messages have this Message-ID (diff)
From: Christian Borntraeger <borntraeger@de.ibm.com> To: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Cc: LKML <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>, Balbir Singh <bsingharora@gmail.com>, Daniel Micay <danielmicay@gmail.com>, Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>, Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com>, Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>, PaX Team <pageexec@freemail.hu>, Brad Spengler <spender@grsecurity.net>, Russell King <linux@armlinux.org.uk>, Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>, Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>, Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>, Benjamin Herrenschmidt <benh@kernel.crashing.org>, Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>, Tony Luck <tony.luck@intel.com>, Fenghua Yu <fenghua.yu@intel.com>, "David S. Miller" <davem@davemloft.net>, "x86@kernel.org" <x86@kernel.org>, Christoph Lameter <cl@linux.com>, Pekka Enberg <penberg@kernel.org>, David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com>, Joonsoo Kim <iamjoonsoo.kim@lge.com>, Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>, Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>, Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>, Mathias Krause <minipli@googlemail.com>, Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz>, Vitaly Wool <vitalywool@gmail.com>, Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@redhat.com>, Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>, Laura Abbott <labbott@fedoraproject.org>, "linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org" <linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org>, linux-ia64@vger.kernel.org, "linuxppc-dev@lists.ozlabs.org" <linuxppc-dev@lists.ozlabs.org>, sparclinux <sparclinux@vger.kernel.org>, linux-arch <linux-arch@vger.kernel.org>, Linux-MM <linux-mm@kvack.org>, "kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com" <kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com> Subject: Re: [PATCH v3 02/11] mm: Hardened usercopy Date: Tue, 19 Jul 2016 22:14:26 +0200 [thread overview] Message-ID: <578E8A22.5080807@de.ibm.com> (raw) Message-ID: <20160719201426.3FNDYUNHgNF6m5eH_8MmCub4vxVQlXBO3VSrwN063rk@z> (raw) In-Reply-To: <CAGXu5jKRDuELqGY1F-D4+MD+dMXSbiPGzf1hXb7Kp8ACBjpw9g@mail.gmail.com> On 07/19/2016 09:31 PM, Kees Cook wrote: > On Tue, Jul 19, 2016 at 2:21 AM, Christian Borntraeger > <borntraeger@de.ibm.com> wrote: >> On 07/15/2016 11:44 PM, Kees Cook wrote: >>> +config HAVE_ARCH_LINEAR_KERNEL_MAPPING >>> + bool >>> + help >>> + An architecture should select this if it has a secondary linear >>> + mapping of the kernel text. This is used to verify that kernel >>> + text exposures are not visible under CONFIG_HARDENED_USERCOPY. >> >> I have trouble parsing this. (What does secondary linear mapping mean?) > > I likely need help clarifying this language... > >> So let me give an example below >> >>> + >> [...] >>> +/* Is this address range in the kernel text area? */ >>> +static inline const char *check_kernel_text_object(const void *ptr, >>> + unsigned long n) >>> +{ >>> + unsigned long textlow = (unsigned long)_stext; >>> + unsigned long texthigh = (unsigned long)_etext; >>> + >>> + if (overlaps(ptr, n, textlow, texthigh)) >>> + return "<kernel text>"; >>> + >>> +#ifdef HAVE_ARCH_LINEAR_KERNEL_MAPPING >>> + /* Check against linear mapping as well. */ >>> + if (overlaps(ptr, n, (unsigned long)__va(__pa(textlow)), >>> + (unsigned long)__va(__pa(texthigh)))) >>> + return "<linear kernel text>"; >>> +#endif >>> + >>> + return NULL; >>> +} >> >> s390 has an address space for user (primary address space from 0..4TB/8PB) and a separate >> address space (home space from 0..4TB/8PB) for the kernel. In this home space the kernel >> mapping is virtual containing the physical memory as well as vmalloc memory (creating aliases >> into the physical one). The kernel text is mapped from _stext to _etext in this mapping. >> So I assume this would qualify for HAVE_ARCH_LINEAR_KERNEL_MAPPING ? > > If I understand your example, yes. In the home space you have two > addresses that reference the kernel image? No, there is only one address that points to the kernel. As we have no kernel ASLR yet, and the kernel mapping is a 1:1 mapping from 0 to memory end and the kernel is only from _stext to _etext. The vmalloc area contains modules and vmalloc but not a 2nd kernel mapping. But thanks for your example, now I understood. If we have only one address >>> + if (overlaps(ptr, n, textlow, texthigh)) >>> + return "<kernel text>"; This is just enough. So what about for the CONFIG text: An architecture should select this if the kernel mapping has a secondary linear mapping of the kernel text - in other words more than one virtual kernel address that points to the kernel image. This is used to verify that kernel text exposures are not visible under CONFIG_HARDENED_USERCOPY. > I wonder if I can avoid the CONFIG entirely if I just did a > __va(__pa(_stext)) != _stext test... would that break anyone? Can this be resolved on all platforms at compile time?
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2016-07-19 20:14 UTC|newest] Thread overview: 80+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top 2016-07-15 21:44 [PATCH v3 00/11] mm: Hardened usercopy Kees Cook 2016-07-15 21:44 ` Kees Cook 2016-07-15 21:44 ` [PATCH v3 01/11] mm: Implement stack frame object validation Kees Cook 2016-07-15 21:44 ` Kees Cook 2016-07-15 21:44 ` [PATCH v3 02/11] mm: Hardened usercopy Kees Cook 2016-07-15 21:44 ` Kees Cook 2016-07-19 1:06 ` Laura Abbott 2016-07-19 1:06 ` Laura Abbott 2016-07-19 18:48 ` Kees Cook 2016-07-19 18:48 ` Kees Cook 2016-07-19 22:00 ` [PATCH] mm: Add is_migrate_cma_page Laura Abbott 2016-07-19 22:00 ` Laura Abbott 2016-07-19 22:40 ` Kees Cook 2016-07-19 22:40 ` Kees Cook 2016-07-20 10:24 ` [PATCH v3 02/11] mm: Hardened usercopy Balbir Singh 2016-07-20 10:24 ` Balbir Singh 2016-07-20 15:36 ` Laura Abbott 2016-07-20 15:36 ` Laura Abbott 2016-07-19 1:52 ` Laura Abbott 2016-07-19 1:52 ` Laura Abbott 2016-07-19 19:12 ` Kees Cook 2016-07-19 19:12 ` Kees Cook 2016-07-19 22:55 ` Kees Cook 2016-07-19 22:55 ` Kees Cook 2016-07-19 9:21 ` Christian Borntraeger 2016-07-19 9:21 ` Christian Borntraeger 2016-07-19 19:31 ` Kees Cook 2016-07-19 19:31 ` Kees Cook 2016-07-19 20:14 ` Christian Borntraeger [this message] 2016-07-19 20:14 ` Christian Borntraeger 2016-07-19 20:34 ` Kees Cook 2016-07-19 20:34 ` Kees Cook 2016-07-19 20:44 ` Christian Borntraeger 2016-07-19 20:44 ` Christian Borntraeger 2016-07-21 6:52 ` Michael Ellerman 2016-07-21 6:52 ` Michael Ellerman 2016-07-21 6:52 ` Michael Ellerman 2016-07-21 6:52 ` Michael Ellerman 2016-07-21 6:52 ` Michael Ellerman [not found] ` <5790711f.2350420a.b4287.2cc0SMTPIN_ADDED_BROKEN@mx.google.com> 2016-07-21 18:34 ` Kees Cook 2016-07-21 18:34 ` Kees Cook 2016-07-22 17:45 ` Josh Poimboeuf 2016-07-22 17:45 ` Josh Poimboeuf 2016-07-25 9:27 ` David Laight 2016-07-25 9:27 ` David Laight 2016-07-26 2:09 ` Michael Ellerman 2016-07-26 2:09 ` Michael Ellerman 2016-07-26 2:03 ` Michael Ellerman 2016-07-26 4:46 ` Kees Cook 2016-07-26 4:46 ` Kees Cook 2016-07-15 21:44 ` [PATCH v3 03/11] x86/uaccess: Enable hardened usercopy Kees Cook 2016-07-15 21:44 ` Kees Cook 2016-07-15 21:44 ` [PATCH v3 04/11] ARM: uaccess: " Kees Cook 2016-07-15 21:44 ` Kees Cook 2016-07-15 21:44 ` [PATCH v3 05/11] arm64/uaccess: " Kees Cook 2016-07-15 21:44 ` Kees Cook 2016-07-15 21:44 ` [PATCH v3 06/11] ia64/uaccess: " Kees Cook 2016-07-15 21:44 ` Kees Cook 2016-07-15 21:44 ` [PATCH v3 07/11] powerpc/uaccess: " Kees Cook 2016-07-15 21:44 ` Kees Cook 2016-07-15 21:44 ` [PATCH v3 08/11] sparc/uaccess: " Kees Cook 2016-07-15 21:44 ` Kees Cook 2016-07-15 21:44 ` [PATCH v3 09/11] s390/uaccess: " Kees Cook 2016-07-15 21:44 ` Kees Cook 2016-07-15 21:44 ` [PATCH v3 10/11] mm: SLAB hardened usercopy support Kees Cook 2016-07-15 21:44 ` Kees Cook 2016-07-15 21:44 ` [PATCH v3 11/11] mm: SLUB " Kees Cook 2016-07-15 21:44 ` Kees Cook 2016-07-18 8:26 ` [PATCH v3 00/11] mm: Hardened usercopy Balbir Singh 2016-07-18 8:26 ` Balbir Singh 2016-07-20 9:52 ` David Laight 2016-07-20 9:52 ` David Laight 2016-07-20 15:31 ` Kees Cook 2016-07-20 15:31 ` Kees Cook 2016-07-20 16:02 ` David Laight 2016-07-20 16:02 ` David Laight 2016-07-20 16:22 ` Rik van Riel 2016-07-20 16:22 ` Rik van Riel 2016-07-20 17:44 ` Kees Cook 2016-07-20 17:44 ` Kees Cook
Reply instructions: You may reply publicly to this message via plain-text email using any one of the following methods: * Save the following mbox file, import it into your mail client, and reply-to-all from there: mbox Avoid top-posting and favor interleaved quoting: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Posting_style#Interleaved_style * Reply using the --to, --cc, and --in-reply-to switches of git-send-email(1): git send-email \ --in-reply-to=578E8A22.5080807@de.ibm.com \ --to=borntraeger@de.ibm.com \ --cc=ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org \ --cc=benh@kernel.crashing.org \ --cc=bsingharora@gmail.com \ --cc=casey@schaufler-ca.com \ --cc=catalin.marinas@arm.com \ --cc=cl@linux.com \ --cc=danielmicay@gmail.com \ --cc=davem@davemloft.net \ --cc=fenghua.yu@intel.com \ --cc=jpoimboe@redhat.com \ --cc=keescook@chromium.org \ --cc=linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org \ --cc=linux@armlinux.org.uk \ --cc=mpe@ellerman.id.au \ --cc=pageexec@freemail.hu \ --cc=penberg@kernel.org \ --cc=riel@redhat.com \ --cc=spender@grsecurity.net \ --cc=tony.luck@intel.com \ --cc=will.deacon@arm.com \ --cc=x86@kernel.org \ /path/to/YOUR_REPLY https://kernel.org/pub/software/scm/git/docs/git-send-email.html * If your mail client supports setting the In-Reply-To header via mailto: links, try the mailto: linkBe sure your reply has a Subject: header at the top and a blank line before the message body.
This is a public inbox, see mirroring instructions for how to clone and mirror all data and code used for this inbox; as well as URLs for NNTP newsgroup(s).