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From: Christian Borntraeger <borntraeger@de.ibm.com>
To: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: LKML <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>,
	Balbir Singh <bsingharora@gmail.com>,
	Daniel Micay <danielmicay@gmail.com>,
	Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>,
	Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com>,
	Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>,
	PaX Team <pageexec@freemail.hu>,
	Brad Spengler <spender@grsecurity.net>,
	Russell King <linux@armlinux.org.uk>,
	Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>,
	Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>,
	Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>,
	Benjamin Herrenschmidt <benh@kernel.crashing.org>,
	Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>,
	Tony Luck <tony.luck@intel.com>,
	Fenghua Yu <fenghua.yu@intel.com>,
	"David S. Miller" <davem@davemloft.net>,
	"x86@kernel.org" <x86@kernel.org>,
	Christoph Lameter <cl@linux.com>,
	Pekka Enberg <penberg@kernel.org>Davi
Subject: Re: [PATCH v3 02/11] mm: Hardened usercopy
Date: Tue, 19 Jul 2016 22:44:58 +0200	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <578E914A.7070900@de.ibm.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <CAGXu5j+HqLY1gZycV9S9_Vf8uuQj4Z3qsV8WBxLORuseiJaw5Q@mail.gmail.com>

On 07/19/2016 10:34 PM, Kees Cook wrote:
[...]
>>
>> So what about for the CONFIG text:
>>
>>        An architecture should select this if the kernel mapping has a secondary
>>        linear mapping of the kernel text - in other words more than one virtual
>>        kernel address that points to the kernel image. This is used to verify
>>        that kernel text exposures are not visible under CONFIG_HARDENED_USERCOPY.
> 
> Sounds good, I've adjusted it for now.
> 
>>> I wonder if I can avoid the CONFIG entirely if I just did a
>>> __va(__pa(_stext)) != _stext test... would that break anyone?
>>
>> Can this be resolved on all platforms at compile time?
> 
> Well, I think it still needs a runtime check (compile-time may not be
> able to tell about kaslr, or who knows what else). I would really like
> to avoid the CONFIG if possible, though. Would this do the right thing
> on s390? This appears to work where I'm able to test it (32/64 x86,
> 32/64 arm):
> 
>         unsigned long textlow = (unsigned long)_stext;
>         unsigned long texthigh = (unsigned long)_etext;
>         unsigned long textlow_linear = (unsigned long)__va(__pa(textlow);
>         unsigned long texthigh_linear = (unsigned long)__va(__pa(texthigh);
> 
as we have

#define PAGE_OFFSET             0x0UL
#define __pa(x)                 (unsigned long)(x)
#define __va(x)                 (void *)(unsigned long)(x)

both should be identical on s390 as of today, so it should work fine and only
do the check once

>         if (overlaps(ptr, n, textlow, texthigh))
>                 return "<kernel text>";
> 
>         /* Check against possible secondary linear mapping as well. */
>         if (textlow != textlow_linear &&
>             overlaps(ptr, n, textlow_linear, texthigh_linear))
>                 return "<linear kernel text>";
> 
>         return NULL;
> 
> 
> -Kees
> 


PS: Not sure how useful and flexible this offers is but you can get some temporary
free access to an s390 on https://developer.ibm.com/linuxone/

WARNING: multiple messages have this Message-ID (diff)
From: Christian Borntraeger <borntraeger@de.ibm.com>
To: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: LKML <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>,
	Balbir Singh <bsingharora@gmail.com>,
	Daniel Micay <danielmicay@gmail.com>,
	Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>,
	Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com>,
	Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>,
	PaX Team <pageexec@freemail.hu>,
	Brad Spengler <spender@grsecurity.net>,
	Russell King <linux@armlinux.org.uk>,
	Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>,
	Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>,
	Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>,
	Benjamin Herrenschmidt <benh@kernel.crashing.org>,
	Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>,
	Tony Luck <tony.luck@intel.com>,
	Fenghua Yu <fenghua.yu@intel.com>,
	"David S. Miller" <davem@davemloft.net>,
	"x86@kernel.org" <x86@kernel.org>,
	Christoph Lameter <cl@linux.com>,
	Pekka Enberg <penberg@kernel.org>,
	David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com>,
	Joonsoo Kim <iamjoonsoo.kim@lge.com>,
	Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>,
	Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>, Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>,
	Mathias Krause <minipli@googlemail.com>, Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz>,
	Vitaly Wool <vitalywool@gmail.com>,
	Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@redhat.com>,
	Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>,
	Laura Abbott <labbott@fedoraproject.org>,
	"linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org"
	<linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org>,
	linux-ia64@vger.kernel.org,
	"linuxppc-dev@lists.ozlabs.org" <linuxppc-dev@lists.ozlabs.org>,
	sparclinux <sparclinux@vger.kernel.org>,
	linux-arch <linux-arch@vger.kernel.org>,
	Linux-MM <linux-mm@kvack.org>,
	"kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com"
	<kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v3 02/11] mm: Hardened usercopy
Date: Tue, 19 Jul 2016 22:44:58 +0200	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <578E914A.7070900@de.ibm.com> (raw)
Message-ID: <20160719204458.w-XZdwQGURMWoZJAAtAnkFOAWQc4ZClYbyeHQGyuZ_I@z> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <CAGXu5j+HqLY1gZycV9S9_Vf8uuQj4Z3qsV8WBxLORuseiJaw5Q@mail.gmail.com>

On 07/19/2016 10:34 PM, Kees Cook wrote:
[...]
>>
>> So what about for the CONFIG text:
>>
>>        An architecture should select this if the kernel mapping has a secondary
>>        linear mapping of the kernel text - in other words more than one virtual
>>        kernel address that points to the kernel image. This is used to verify
>>        that kernel text exposures are not visible under CONFIG_HARDENED_USERCOPY.
> 
> Sounds good, I've adjusted it for now.
> 
>>> I wonder if I can avoid the CONFIG entirely if I just did a
>>> __va(__pa(_stext)) != _stext test... would that break anyone?
>>
>> Can this be resolved on all platforms at compile time?
> 
> Well, I think it still needs a runtime check (compile-time may not be
> able to tell about kaslr, or who knows what else). I would really like
> to avoid the CONFIG if possible, though. Would this do the right thing
> on s390? This appears to work where I'm able to test it (32/64 x86,
> 32/64 arm):
> 
>         unsigned long textlow = (unsigned long)_stext;
>         unsigned long texthigh = (unsigned long)_etext;
>         unsigned long textlow_linear = (unsigned long)__va(__pa(textlow);
>         unsigned long texthigh_linear = (unsigned long)__va(__pa(texthigh);
> 
as we have

#define PAGE_OFFSET             0x0UL
#define __pa(x)                 (unsigned long)(x)
#define __va(x)                 (void *)(unsigned long)(x)

both should be identical on s390 as of today, so it should work fine and only
do the check once

>         if (overlaps(ptr, n, textlow, texthigh))
>                 return "<kernel text>";
> 
>         /* Check against possible secondary linear mapping as well. */
>         if (textlow != textlow_linear &&
>             overlaps(ptr, n, textlow_linear, texthigh_linear))
>                 return "<linear kernel text>";
> 
>         return NULL;
> 
> 
> -Kees
> 


PS: Not sure how useful and flexible this offers is but you can get some temporary
free access to an s390 on https://developer.ibm.com/linuxone/





  parent reply	other threads:[~2016-07-19 20:44 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 80+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2016-07-15 21:44 [PATCH v3 00/11] mm: Hardened usercopy Kees Cook
2016-07-15 21:44 ` Kees Cook
2016-07-15 21:44 ` [PATCH v3 01/11] mm: Implement stack frame object validation Kees Cook
2016-07-15 21:44   ` Kees Cook
2016-07-15 21:44 ` [PATCH v3 02/11] mm: Hardened usercopy Kees Cook
2016-07-15 21:44   ` Kees Cook
2016-07-19  1:06   ` Laura Abbott
2016-07-19  1:06     ` Laura Abbott
2016-07-19 18:48     ` Kees Cook
2016-07-19 18:48       ` Kees Cook
2016-07-19 22:00       ` [PATCH] mm: Add is_migrate_cma_page Laura Abbott
2016-07-19 22:00         ` Laura Abbott
2016-07-19 22:40         ` Kees Cook
2016-07-19 22:40           ` Kees Cook
2016-07-20 10:24       ` [PATCH v3 02/11] mm: Hardened usercopy Balbir Singh
2016-07-20 10:24         ` Balbir Singh
2016-07-20 15:36         ` Laura Abbott
2016-07-20 15:36           ` Laura Abbott
2016-07-19  1:52   ` Laura Abbott
2016-07-19  1:52     ` Laura Abbott
2016-07-19 19:12     ` Kees Cook
2016-07-19 19:12       ` Kees Cook
2016-07-19 22:55       ` Kees Cook
2016-07-19 22:55         ` Kees Cook
2016-07-19  9:21   ` Christian Borntraeger
2016-07-19  9:21     ` Christian Borntraeger
2016-07-19 19:31     ` Kees Cook
2016-07-19 19:31       ` Kees Cook
2016-07-19 20:14       ` Christian Borntraeger
2016-07-19 20:14         ` Christian Borntraeger
2016-07-19 20:34         ` Kees Cook
2016-07-19 20:34           ` Kees Cook
2016-07-19 20:44           ` Christian Borntraeger [this message]
2016-07-19 20:44             ` Christian Borntraeger
2016-07-21  6:52   ` Michael Ellerman
2016-07-21  6:52   ` Michael Ellerman
2016-07-21  6:52   ` Michael Ellerman
2016-07-21  6:52   ` Michael Ellerman
2016-07-21  6:52   ` Michael Ellerman
     [not found]   ` <5790711f.2350420a.b4287.2cc0SMTPIN_ADDED_BROKEN@mx.google.com>
2016-07-21 18:34     ` Kees Cook
2016-07-21 18:34       ` Kees Cook
2016-07-22 17:45       ` Josh Poimboeuf
2016-07-22 17:45         ` Josh Poimboeuf
2016-07-25  9:27         ` David Laight
2016-07-25  9:27           ` David Laight
2016-07-26  2:09           ` Michael Ellerman
2016-07-26  2:09             ` Michael Ellerman
2016-07-26  2:03         ` Michael Ellerman
2016-07-26  4:46           ` Kees Cook
2016-07-26  4:46             ` Kees Cook
2016-07-15 21:44 ` [PATCH v3 03/11] x86/uaccess: Enable hardened usercopy Kees Cook
2016-07-15 21:44   ` Kees Cook
2016-07-15 21:44 ` [PATCH v3 04/11] ARM: uaccess: " Kees Cook
2016-07-15 21:44   ` Kees Cook
2016-07-15 21:44 ` [PATCH v3 05/11] arm64/uaccess: " Kees Cook
2016-07-15 21:44   ` Kees Cook
2016-07-15 21:44 ` [PATCH v3 06/11] ia64/uaccess: " Kees Cook
2016-07-15 21:44   ` Kees Cook
2016-07-15 21:44 ` [PATCH v3 07/11] powerpc/uaccess: " Kees Cook
2016-07-15 21:44   ` Kees Cook
2016-07-15 21:44 ` [PATCH v3 08/11] sparc/uaccess: " Kees Cook
2016-07-15 21:44   ` Kees Cook
2016-07-15 21:44 ` [PATCH v3 09/11] s390/uaccess: " Kees Cook
2016-07-15 21:44   ` Kees Cook
2016-07-15 21:44 ` [PATCH v3 10/11] mm: SLAB hardened usercopy support Kees Cook
2016-07-15 21:44   ` Kees Cook
2016-07-15 21:44 ` [PATCH v3 11/11] mm: SLUB " Kees Cook
2016-07-15 21:44   ` Kees Cook
2016-07-18  8:26 ` [PATCH v3 00/11] mm: Hardened usercopy Balbir Singh
2016-07-18  8:26   ` Balbir Singh
2016-07-20  9:52 ` David Laight
2016-07-20  9:52   ` David Laight
2016-07-20 15:31   ` Kees Cook
2016-07-20 15:31     ` Kees Cook
2016-07-20 16:02     ` David Laight
2016-07-20 16:02       ` David Laight
2016-07-20 16:22       ` Rik van Riel
2016-07-20 16:22         ` Rik van Riel
2016-07-20 17:44       ` Kees Cook
2016-07-20 17:44         ` Kees Cook

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