From: Randy Dunlap <rdunlap@infradead.org>
To: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>, Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>,
Benjamin Herrenschmidt <benh@kernel.crashing.org>,
Heiko Carstens <heiko.carstens@de.ibm.com>,
Paul Mackerras <paulus@samba.org>,
"H . Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>, Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>,
Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@redhat.com>,
linux-s390@vger.kernel.org, Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>,
x86@kernel.org, Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>,
Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>,
Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>,
Waiman Long <longman@redhat.com>,
linux-arch@vger.kernel.org, Jon Masters <jcm@redhat.com>,
Jiri Kosina <jikos@kernel.org>, Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>,
Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>,
linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org,
Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>,
linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, Tyler Hicks <tyhicks@canonical.com>,
Martin Schwidefsky <schwidefsky@de.ibm.com>l
Subject: Re: [PATCH RFC 2/5] x86/speculation: Add support for 'cpu_spec_mitigations=' cmdline options
Date: Fri, 5 Apr 2019 08:18:09 -0700 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <5ccc7515-33e6-b726-833e-9553ab0f4c6a@infradead.org> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20190405135712.GF23348@zn.tnic>
On 4/5/19 6:57 AM, Borislav Petkov wrote:
> On Thu, Apr 04, 2019 at 11:44:12AM -0500, Josh Poimboeuf wrote:
>> Configure x86 runtime CPU speculation bug mitigations in accordance with
>> the 'cpu_spec_mitigations=' cmdline options. This affects Meltdown,
>> Spectre v2, Speculative Store Bypass, and L1TF.
>>
>> The default behavior is unchanged.
>>
>> Signed-off-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
>> ---
>> .../admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt | 15 +++++++++
>> arch/x86/include/asm/processor.h | 1 +
>> arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c | 32 ++++++++++++++++---
>> arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c | 2 ++
>> arch/x86/mm/pti.c | 4 ++-
>> 5 files changed, 49 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)
>>
>> diff --git a/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt b/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt
>> index ac42e510bd6e..29dc03971630 100644
>> --- a/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt
>> +++ b/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt
>> @@ -2552,6 +2552,11 @@
>>
>> off
>> Disable all speculative CPU mitigations.
>> + Equivalent to: nopti [x86]
>> + nospectre_v2 [x86]
>> + spectre_v2_user=off [x86]
>> + spec_store_bypass_disable=off [x86]
>> + l1tf=off [x86]
>>
>> auto (default)
>> Mitigate all speculative CPU vulnerabilities,
>> @@ -2560,12 +2565,22 @@
>> surprised by SMT getting disabled across kernel
>> upgrades, or who have other ways of avoiding
>> SMT-based attacks.
>> + Equivalent to: pti=auto [x86]
>> + spectre_v2=auto [x86]
>> + spectre_v2_user=auto [x86]
>> + spec_store_bypass_disable=auto [x86]
>> + l1tf=flush [x86]
>>
>> auto,nosmt
>> Mitigate all speculative CPU vulnerabilities,
>> disabling SMT if needed. This is for users who
>> always want to be fully mitigated, even if it
>> means losing SMT.
>> + Equivalent to: pti=auto [x86]
>> + spectre_v2=auto [x86]
>> + spectre_v2_user=auto [x86]
>> + spec_store_bypass_disable=auto [x86]
>> + l1tf=flush,nosmt [x86]
>>
>> mminit_loglevel=
>> [KNL] When CONFIG_DEBUG_MEMORY_INIT is set, this
>
> Yap, those sets look ok.
nit: s/x86/X86/g
according to Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.rst
--
~Randy
WARNING: multiple messages have this Message-ID (diff)
From: Randy Dunlap <rdunlap@infradead.org>
To: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>, Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, x86@kernel.org,
Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>,
Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>, "H . Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>,
Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>,
Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>,
Jiri Kosina <jikos@kernel.org>, Waiman Long <longman@redhat.com>,
Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@redhat.com>,
Jon Masters <jcm@redhat.com>,
Benjamin Herrenschmidt <benh@kernel.crashing.org>,
Paul Mackerras <paulus@samba.org>,
Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>,
linuxppc-dev@lists.ozlabs.org,
Martin Schwidefsky <schwidefsky@de.ibm.com>,
Heiko Carstens <heiko.carstens@de.ibm.com>,
linux-s390@vger.kernel.org,
Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>,
Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>,
linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org, linux-arch@vger.kernel.org,
Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>,
Tyler Hicks <tyhicks@canonical.com>,
Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Subject: Re: [PATCH RFC 2/5] x86/speculation: Add support for 'cpu_spec_mitigations=' cmdline options
Date: Fri, 5 Apr 2019 08:18:09 -0700 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <5ccc7515-33e6-b726-833e-9553ab0f4c6a@infradead.org> (raw)
Message-ID: <20190405151809.loO3BRPkxdSIbjhaOkHcgSzX7AEXml11-UID3nahj9s@z> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20190405135712.GF23348@zn.tnic>
On 4/5/19 6:57 AM, Borislav Petkov wrote:
> On Thu, Apr 04, 2019 at 11:44:12AM -0500, Josh Poimboeuf wrote:
>> Configure x86 runtime CPU speculation bug mitigations in accordance with
>> the 'cpu_spec_mitigations=' cmdline options. This affects Meltdown,
>> Spectre v2, Speculative Store Bypass, and L1TF.
>>
>> The default behavior is unchanged.
>>
>> Signed-off-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
>> ---
>> .../admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt | 15 +++++++++
>> arch/x86/include/asm/processor.h | 1 +
>> arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c | 32 ++++++++++++++++---
>> arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c | 2 ++
>> arch/x86/mm/pti.c | 4 ++-
>> 5 files changed, 49 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)
>>
>> diff --git a/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt b/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt
>> index ac42e510bd6e..29dc03971630 100644
>> --- a/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt
>> +++ b/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt
>> @@ -2552,6 +2552,11 @@
>>
>> off
>> Disable all speculative CPU mitigations.
>> + Equivalent to: nopti [x86]
>> + nospectre_v2 [x86]
>> + spectre_v2_user=off [x86]
>> + spec_store_bypass_disable=off [x86]
>> + l1tf=off [x86]
>>
>> auto (default)
>> Mitigate all speculative CPU vulnerabilities,
>> @@ -2560,12 +2565,22 @@
>> surprised by SMT getting disabled across kernel
>> upgrades, or who have other ways of avoiding
>> SMT-based attacks.
>> + Equivalent to: pti=auto [x86]
>> + spectre_v2=auto [x86]
>> + spectre_v2_user=auto [x86]
>> + spec_store_bypass_disable=auto [x86]
>> + l1tf=flush [x86]
>>
>> auto,nosmt
>> Mitigate all speculative CPU vulnerabilities,
>> disabling SMT if needed. This is for users who
>> always want to be fully mitigated, even if it
>> means losing SMT.
>> + Equivalent to: pti=auto [x86]
>> + spectre_v2=auto [x86]
>> + spectre_v2_user=auto [x86]
>> + spec_store_bypass_disable=auto [x86]
>> + l1tf=flush,nosmt [x86]
>>
>> mminit_loglevel=
>> [KNL] When CONFIG_DEBUG_MEMORY_INIT is set, this
>
> Yap, those sets look ok.
nit: s/x86/X86/g
according to Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.rst
--
~Randy
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2019-04-05 15:18 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 66+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2019-04-04 16:44 [PATCH RFC 0/5] cpu/speculation: Add 'cpu_spec_mitigations=' cmdline options Josh Poimboeuf
2019-04-04 16:44 ` Josh Poimboeuf
2019-04-04 16:44 ` [PATCH RFC 1/5] " Josh Poimboeuf
2019-04-04 16:44 ` Josh Poimboeuf
2019-04-04 16:49 ` Josh Poimboeuf
2019-04-04 16:49 ` Josh Poimboeuf
2019-04-05 13:12 ` Borislav Petkov
2019-04-05 13:12 ` Borislav Petkov
2019-04-05 14:20 ` Josh Poimboeuf
2019-04-05 14:20 ` Josh Poimboeuf
2019-04-05 15:20 ` Borislav Petkov
2019-04-05 15:20 ` Borislav Petkov
2019-04-05 16:01 ` Borislav Petkov
2019-04-05 16:01 ` Borislav Petkov
2019-04-05 16:18 ` Josh Poimboeuf
2019-04-05 16:18 ` Josh Poimboeuf
2019-04-10 5:48 ` Michael Ellerman
2019-04-10 5:48 ` Michael Ellerman
2019-04-10 8:30 ` Borislav Petkov
2019-04-10 8:30 ` Borislav Petkov
2019-04-10 12:10 ` Thomas Gleixner
2019-04-10 12:10 ` Thomas Gleixner
2019-04-11 13:15 ` Josh Poimboeuf
2019-04-11 13:15 ` Josh Poimboeuf
2019-04-12 2:41 ` Michael Ellerman
2019-04-12 2:41 ` Michael Ellerman
2019-04-12 2:29 ` Michael Ellerman
2019-04-12 2:29 ` Michael Ellerman
2019-04-04 16:44 ` [PATCH RFC 2/5] x86/speculation: Add support for " Josh Poimboeuf
2019-04-04 16:44 ` Josh Poimboeuf
2019-04-05 13:57 ` Borislav Petkov
2019-04-05 13:57 ` Borislav Petkov
2019-04-05 14:31 ` Josh Poimboeuf
2019-04-05 14:31 ` Josh Poimboeuf
2019-04-05 15:26 ` Borislav Petkov
2019-04-05 15:26 ` Borislav Petkov
2019-04-05 16:05 ` Josh Poimboeuf
2019-04-05 16:05 ` Josh Poimboeuf
2019-04-05 15:18 ` Randy Dunlap [this message]
2019-04-05 15:18 ` Randy Dunlap
2019-04-05 15:30 ` Josh Poimboeuf
2019-04-05 15:30 ` Josh Poimboeuf
2019-04-04 16:44 ` [PATCH RFC 3/5] powerpc/speculation: " Josh Poimboeuf
2019-04-04 16:44 ` Josh Poimboeuf
2019-04-04 19:49 ` Jiri Kosina
2019-04-04 19:49 ` Jiri Kosina
2019-04-04 20:01 ` Timothy Pearson
2019-04-04 20:01 ` Timothy Pearson
2019-04-10 6:06 ` Michael Ellerman
2019-04-10 6:06 ` Michael Ellerman
2019-04-11 4:02 ` Josh Poimboeuf
2019-04-11 4:02 ` Josh Poimboeuf
2019-04-04 16:44 ` [PATCH RFC 4/5] s390/speculation: " Josh Poimboeuf
2019-04-04 16:44 ` Josh Poimboeuf
2019-04-04 16:44 ` [PATCH RFC 5/5] arm64/speculation: " Josh Poimboeuf
2019-04-04 16:44 ` Josh Poimboeuf
2019-04-05 14:39 ` Steven Price
2019-04-05 14:39 ` Steven Price
2019-04-05 14:43 ` Josh Poimboeuf
2019-04-05 14:43 ` Josh Poimboeuf
2019-04-05 14:44 ` Will Deacon
2019-04-05 14:44 ` Will Deacon
2019-04-05 16:03 ` Josh Poimboeuf
2019-04-05 16:03 ` Josh Poimboeuf
2019-04-04 16:50 ` [PATCH RFC 0/5] cpu/speculation: Add " Waiman Long
2019-04-04 16:50 ` Waiman Long
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