messages from 2017-07-16 03:56:46 to 2017-07-18 13:51:23 UTC [more...]
[PATCH 1/8] signal/alpha: Document a conflict with SI_USER for SIGTRAP
2017-07-18 13:43 UTC (12+ messages)
` [PATCH 3/8] signal/sparc: Document a conflict with SI_USER with SIGFPE
[PATCH v10 00/38] x86: Secure Memory Encryption (AMD)
2017-07-18 12:03 UTC (82+ messages)
` [PATCH v10 01/38] x86: Document AMD Secure Memory Encryption (SME)
` [PATCH v10 02/38] x86/mm/pat: Set write-protect cache mode for full PAT support
` [PATCH v10 03/38] x86, mpparse, x86/acpi, x86/PCI, x86/dmi, SFI: Use memremap for RAM mappings
` [PATCH v10 04/38] x86/CPU/AMD: Add the Secure Memory Encryption CPU feature
` [PATCH v10 05/38] x86/CPU/AMD: Handle SME reduction in physical address size
` [PATCH v10 06/38] x86/mm: Add Secure Memory Encryption (SME) support
` [PATCH v10 07/38] x86/mm: Remove phys_to_virt() usage in ioremap()
` [PATCH v10 08/38] x86/mm: Add support to enable SME in early boot processing
` [PATCH v10 09/38] x86/mm: Simplify p[g4um]d_page() macros
` [PATCH v10 10/38] x86/mm: Provide general kernel support for memory encryption
` [PATCH v10 11/38] x86/mm: Add SME support for read_cr3_pa()
` [PATCH v10 12/38] x86/mm: Extend early_memremap() support with additional attrs
` [PATCH v10 13/38] x86/mm: Add support for early encrypt/decrypt of memory
` [PATCH v10 14/38] x86/mm: Insure that boot memory areas are mapped properly
` [PATCH v10 15/38] x86/boot/e820: Add support to determine the E820 type of an address
` [PATCH v10 16/38] efi: Add an EFI table address match function
` [PATCH v10 17/38] efi: Update efi_mem_type() to return an error rather than 0
` [PATCH v10 18/38] x86/efi: Update EFI pagetable creation to work with SME
` [PATCH v10 19/38] x86/mm: Add support to access boot related data in the clear
` [PATCH v10 20/38] x86, mpparse: Use memremap to map the mpf and mpc data
` [PATCH v10 21/38] x86/mm: Add support to access persistent memory in the clear
` [PATCH v10 22/38] x86/mm: Add support for changing the memory encryption attribute
` [PATCH v10 23/38] x86/realmode: Decrypt trampoline area if memory encryption is active
` [PATCH v10 24/38] x86, swiotlb: Add memory encryption support
` [PATCH v10 25/38] swiotlb: Add warnings for use of bounce buffers with SME
` [PATCH v10 26/38] x86/CPU/AMD: Make the microcode level available earlier in the boot
` [PATCH v10 27/38] iommu/amd: Allow the AMD IOMMU to work with memory encryption
` [PATCH v10 28/38] x86, realmode: Check for memory encryption on the APs
` [PATCH v10 29/38] x86, drm, fbdev: Do not specify encrypted memory for video mappings
` [PATCH v10 30/38] kvm: x86: svm: Support Secure Memory Encryption within KVM
` [PATCH v10 31/38] x86/mm, kexec: Allow kexec to be used with SME
` [PATCH v10 32/38] xen/x86: Remove SME feature in PV guests
` [PATCH v10 33/38] x86/mm: Use proper encryption attributes with /dev/mem
` [PATCH v10 34/38] x86/mm: Create native_make_p4d() for PGTABLE_LEVELS <= 4
` [PATCH v10 35/38] x86/mm: Add support to encrypt the kernel in-place
` [PATCH v10 36/38] x86/boot: Add early cmdline parsing for options with arguments
` [PATCH v10 37/38] compiler-gcc.h: Introduce __nostackp function attribute
` [PATCH v10 38/38] x86/mm: Add support to make use of Secure Memory Encryption
(unknown),
2017-07-18 5:45 UTC
semantics of dma_map_single()
2017-07-17 16:46 UTC (6+ messages)
(unknown),
2017-07-17 15:42 UTC
[PATCH] [PING] Fix TIOCGPTPEER ioctl definition
2017-07-17 13:47 UTC (4+ messages)
[PATCH 0/8] 5-level paging enabling for v4.14
2017-07-17 5:45 UTC (20+ messages)
` [PATCH 1/8] x86/dump_pagetables: Generalize address normalization
` [PATCH 2/8] x86/dump_pagetables: Fix printout of p4d level
` [PATCH 3/8] x86/xen: Redefine XEN_ELFNOTE_INIT_P2M using PUD_SIZE * PTRS_PER_PUD
` [PATCH 4/8] x86/mm: Rename tasksize_32bit/64bit to task_size_32bit/64bit
` [PATCH 5/8] x86/mpx: Do not allow MPX if we have mappings above 47-bit
` [PATCH 6/8] x86/mm: Prepare to expose larger address space to userspace
` [PATCH 7/8] x86/mm: Allow userspace have mapping above 47-bit
` [PATCH 8/8] x86: Enable 5-level paging support
(unknown),
2017-07-17 1:20 UTC
[RFC v6 00/62] powerpc: Memory Protection Keys
2017-07-16 3:57 UTC (122+ messages)
` [RFC v6 01/62] powerpc: Free up four 64K PTE bits in 4K backed HPTE pages
` [RFC v6 02/62] powerpc: Free up four 64K PTE bits in 64K "
` [RFC v6 03/62] powerpc: introduce pte_set_hash_slot() helper
` [RFC v6 04/62] powerpc: introduce pte_get_hash_gslot() helper
` [RFC v6 05/62] powerpc: capture the PTE format changes in the dump pte report
` [RFC v6 06/62] powerpc: use helper functions in __hash_page_64K() for 64K PTE
` [RFC v6 07/62] powerpc: use helper functions in __hash_page_huge() "
` [RFC v6 08/62] powerpc: use helper functions in __hash_page_4K() "
` [RFC v6 09/62] powerpc: use helper functions in __hash_page_4K() for 4K PTE
` [RFC v6 10/62] powerpc: use helper functions in flush_hash_page()
` [RFC v6 11/62] powerpc: initial pkey plumbing
` [RFC v6 12/62] mm: introduce an additional vma bit for powerpc pkey
` [RFC v6 13/62] powerpc: track allocation status of all pkeys
` [RFC v6 14/62] powerpc: helper function to read,write AMR,IAMR,UAMOR registers
` [RFC v6 15/62] powerpc: helper functions to initialize AMR, IAMR and UMOR registers
` [RFC v6 16/62] powerpc: cleaup AMR,iAMR when a key is allocated or freed
` [RFC v6 17/62] powerpc: implementation for arch_set_user_pkey_access()
` [RFC v6 18/62] powerpc: sys_pkey_alloc() and sys_pkey_free() system calls
` [RFC v6 19/62] powerpc: ability to create execute-disabled pkeys
` [RFC v6 20/62] powerpc: store and restore the pkey state across context switches
` [RFC v6 21/62] powerpc: introduce execute-only pkey
` [RFC v6 22/62] powerpc: ability to associate pkey to a vma
` [RFC v6 23/62] powerpc: implementation for arch_override_mprotect_pkey()
` [RFC v6 24/62] powerpc: map vma key-protection bits to pte key bits
` [RFC v6 25/62] powerpc: sys_pkey_mprotect() system call
` [RFC v6 26/62] powerpc: Program HPTE key protection bits
` [RFC v6 27/62] powerpc: helper to validate key-access permissions of a pte
` [RFC v6 28/62] powerpc: check key protection for user page access
` [RFC v6 29/62] powerpc: Macro the mask used for checking DSI exception
` [RFC v6 30/62] powerpc: implementation for arch_vma_access_permitted()
` [RFC v6 31/62] powerpc: Handle exceptions caused by pkey violation
` [RFC v6 32/62] powerpc: capture AMR register content on "
` [RFC v6 33/62] powerpc: introduce get_pte_pkey() helper
` [RFC v6 34/62] powerpc: capture the violated protection key on fault
` [RFC v6 35/62] powerpc: Deliver SEGV signal on pkey violation
` [RFC v6 36/62] mm: introduce arch_pkeys_enabled()
` [RFC v6 37/62] x86: implementation for arch_pkeys_enabled()
` [RFC v6 38/62] powerpc: "
` [RFC v6 39/62] mm: display pkey in smaps if arch_pkeys_enabled() is true
` [RFC v6 40/62] x86: delete arch_show_smap()
` [RFC v6 41/62] selftest/x86: Move protecton key selftest to arch neutral directory
` [RFC v6 42/62] selftest/vm: rename all references to pkru to a generic name
` [RFC v6 43/62] selftest/vm: move generic definitions to header file
` [RFC v6 44/62] selftest/vm: typecast the pkey register
` [RFC v6 45/62] selftest/vm: generics function to handle shadow key register
` [RFC v6 46/62] selftest/vm: fix the wrong assert in pkey_disable_set()
` [RFC v6 47/62] selftest/vm: fixed bugs in pkey_disable_clear()
` [RFC v6 48/62] selftest/vm: clear the bits in shadow reg when a pkey is freed
` [RFC v6 49/62] selftest/vm: fix alloc_random_pkey() to make it really random
` [RFC v6 50/62] selftest/vm: introduce two arch independent abstraction
` [RFC v6 51/62] selftest/vm: pkey register should match shadow pkey
` [RFC v6 52/62] selftest/vm: generic cleanup
` [RFC v6 53/62] selftest/vm: powerpc implementation for generic abstraction
` [RFC v6 54/62] selftest/vm: fix an assertion in test_pkey_alloc_exhaust()
` [RFC v6 55/62] selftest/vm: associate key on a mapped page and detect access violation
` [RFC v6 56/62] selftest/vm: detect no key violation on a freed key
` [RFC v6 57/62] selftest/vm: associate key on a mapped page and detect write violation
` [RFC v6 58/62] selftest/vm: detect no write key-violation on a freed key
` [RFC v6 59/62] selftest/vm: detect write violation on a mapped access-denied-key page
` [RFC v6 60/62] selftest/vm: sub-page allocator
` [RFC v6 61/62] Documentation/x86: Move protecton key documentation to arch neutral directory
` [RFC v6 62/62] Documentation/vm: PowerPC specific updates to memory protection keys
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