From: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
To: Greg KH <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Cc: "kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com"
<kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com>,
linux-arch <linux-arch@vger.kernel.org>,
LKML <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>,
"linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org"
<linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org>,
"x86@kernel.org" <x86@kernel.org>,
Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>,
Mathias Krause <minipli@googlemail.com>,
Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Subject: Re: [PATCH 2/2] arm: apply more __ro_after_init
Date: Fri, 3 Jun 2016 14:26:54 -0700 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <CAGXu5jJr2UzsdkSv2ogkoBEx2iFNY7N4QpvX5sLzM+Vb97a=zg@mail.gmail.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20160603185106.GB17076@kroah.com>
On Fri, Jun 3, 2016 at 11:51 AM, Greg KH <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> wrote:
> On Fri, Jun 03, 2016 at 11:40:24AM -0700, Kees Cook wrote:
>> Guided by grsecurity's analogous __read_only markings in arch/arm,
>> this applies several uses of __ro_after_init to structures that are
>> only updated during __init.
>>
>> Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
>> ---
>> arch/arm/kernel/cpuidle.c | 2 +-
>> arch/arm/kernel/setup.c | 10 +++++-----
>> arch/arm/kernel/smp.c | 2 +-
>> arch/arm/lib/delay.c | 2 +-
>> arch/arm/mm/mmu.c | 9 ++-------
>> arch/x86/mm/ioremap.c | 3 +--
>
> I don't think this x86 file is an arm-specific one :)
Hah, whooops. :)
> That minor nit aside, these patches are a great step forward, are you
> going to take them and work to push them upstream, or do you want/need
> others to do this?
I'll collect more like these and carry a tree for -next and push them for v4.8.
-Kees
--
Kees Cook
Chrome OS & Brillo Security
WARNING: multiple messages have this Message-ID (diff)
From: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
To: Greg KH <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Cc: "kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com"
<kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com>,
linux-arch <linux-arch@vger.kernel.org>,
LKML <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>,
"linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org"
<linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org>,
"x86@kernel.org" <x86@kernel.org>,
Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>,
Mathias Krause <minipli@googlemail.com>,
Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Subject: Re: [kernel-hardening] [PATCH 2/2] arm: apply more __ro_after_init
Date: Fri, 3 Jun 2016 14:26:54 -0700 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <CAGXu5jJr2UzsdkSv2ogkoBEx2iFNY7N4QpvX5sLzM+Vb97a=zg@mail.gmail.com> (raw)
Message-ID: <20160603212654.SffXfMvC2mfz3uZ_fjCHPEvUPtBQZTDhQSBockGz3ZU@z> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20160603185106.GB17076@kroah.com>
On Fri, Jun 3, 2016 at 11:51 AM, Greg KH <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> wrote:
> On Fri, Jun 03, 2016 at 11:40:24AM -0700, Kees Cook wrote:
>> Guided by grsecurity's analogous __read_only markings in arch/arm,
>> this applies several uses of __ro_after_init to structures that are
>> only updated during __init.
>>
>> Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
>> ---
>> arch/arm/kernel/cpuidle.c | 2 +-
>> arch/arm/kernel/setup.c | 10 +++++-----
>> arch/arm/kernel/smp.c | 2 +-
>> arch/arm/lib/delay.c | 2 +-
>> arch/arm/mm/mmu.c | 9 ++-------
>> arch/x86/mm/ioremap.c | 3 +--
>
> I don't think this x86 file is an arm-specific one :)
Hah, whooops. :)
> That minor nit aside, these patches are a great step forward, are you
> going to take them and work to push them upstream, or do you want/need
> others to do this?
I'll collect more like these and carry a tree for -next and push them for v4.8.
-Kees
--
Kees Cook
Chrome OS & Brillo Security
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2016-06-03 21:26 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 38+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2016-06-03 18:40 [PATCH 0/2] expand use of __ro_after_init Kees Cook
2016-06-03 18:40 ` Kees Cook
2016-06-03 18:40 ` [PATCH 1/2] x86: apply more __ro_after_init and const Kees Cook
2016-06-03 18:40 ` Kees Cook
2016-06-03 18:40 ` [PATCH 2/2] arm: apply more __ro_after_init Kees Cook
2016-06-03 18:40 ` Kees Cook
2016-06-03 18:51 ` [kernel-hardening] " Greg KH
2016-06-03 21:26 ` Kees Cook [this message]
2016-06-03 21:26 ` Kees Cook
2016-06-03 21:54 ` Greg KH
2016-06-03 21:54 ` Greg KH
2016-06-03 22:01 ` Kees Cook
2016-06-03 22:01 ` Kees Cook
2016-08-10 9:43 ` Russell King - ARM Linux
2016-08-10 9:43 ` Russell King - ARM Linux
2016-08-10 10:00 ` Arnd Bergmann
2016-08-10 10:00 ` Arnd Bergmann
2016-08-10 10:12 ` Russell King - ARM Linux
2016-08-10 10:12 ` Russell King - ARM Linux
2016-08-10 19:31 ` Arnd Bergmann
2016-08-10 19:31 ` Arnd Bergmann
2016-08-10 23:02 ` Russell King - ARM Linux
2016-08-11 16:02 ` Arnd Bergmann
2016-08-11 16:02 ` Arnd Bergmann
2016-08-12 11:34 ` Daniel Thompson
2016-08-12 11:34 ` Daniel Thompson
2016-08-10 17:06 ` Daniel Micay
2016-08-10 17:06 ` [kernel-hardening] " Daniel Micay
2016-08-10 18:32 ` Kees Cook
2016-08-10 18:32 ` Kees Cook
2016-08-10 19:41 ` Arnd Bergmann
2016-08-10 19:41 ` Arnd Bergmann
2016-08-10 21:40 ` Kees Cook
2016-08-10 23:06 ` Russell King - ARM Linux
2016-08-11 15:54 ` Arnd Bergmann
2016-08-11 15:54 ` Arnd Bergmann
2016-08-11 22:16 ` Kees Cook
2016-08-12 16:24 ` Russell King - ARM Linux
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