Re: [PATCH 00/35] Shadow stacks for userspace

H.J. Lu
2022-02-05T20:21:52Z

On Sat, Feb 5, 2022 at 12:15 PM Edgecombe, Rick P
<rick.p.edgecombe@intel.com> wrote:
>
> On Sat, 2022-02-05 at 05:29 -0800, H.J. Lu wrote:
> > On Sat, Feb 5, 2022 at 5:27 AM David Laight <David.Laight@aculab.com>
> > wrote:
> > >
> > > From: Edgecombe, Rick P
> > > > Sent: 04 February 2022 01:08
> > > > Hi Thomas,
> > > >
> > > > Thanks for feedback on the plan.
> > > >
> > > > On Thu, 2022-02-03 at 22:07 +0100, Thomas Gleixner wrote:
> > > > > > Until now, the enabling effort was trying to support both
> > > > > > Shadow
> > > > > > Stack and IBT.
> > > > > > This history will focus on a few areas of the shadow stack
> > > > > > development history
> > > > > > that I thought stood out.
> > > > > >
> > > > > > Signals
> > > > > > -------
> > > > > > Originally signals placed the location of the shadow
> > > > > > stack
> > > > > > restore
> > > > > > token inside the saved state on the stack. This was
> > > > > > problematic from a
> > > > > > past ABI promises perspective. So the restore location
> > > > > > was
> > > > > > instead just
> > > > > > assumed from the shadow stack pointer. This works
> > > > > > because in
> > > > > > normal
> > > > > > allowed cases of calling sigreturn, the shadow stack
> > > > > > pointer
> > > > > > should be
> > > > > > right at the restore token at that time. There is no
> > > > > > alternate shadow
> > > > > > stack support. If an alt shadow stack is added later
> > > > > > we
> > > > > > would
> > > > > > need to
> > > > >
> > > > > So how is that going to work? altstack is not an esoteric
> > > > > corner
> > > > > case.
> > > >
> > > > My understanding is that the main usages for the signal stack
> > > > were
> > > > handling stack overflows and corruption. Since the shadow stack
> > > > only
> > > > contains return addresses rather than large stack allocations,
> > > > and is
> > > > not generally writable or pivotable, I thought there was a good
> > > > possibility an alt shadow stack would not end up being especially
> > > > useful. Does it seem like reasonable guesswork?
> > >
> > > The other 'problem' is that it is valid to longjump out of a signal
> > > handler.
> > > These days you have to use siglongjmp() not longjmp() but it is
> > > still used.
> > >
> > > It is probably also valid to use siglongjmp() to jump from a nested
> > > signal handler into the outer handler.
> > > Given both signal handlers can have their own stack, there can be
> > > three
> > > stacks involved.
>
> So the scenario is?
>
> 1. Handle signal 1
> 2. sigsetjmp()
> 3. signalstack()
> 4. Handle signal 2 on alt stack
> 5. siglongjmp()
>
> I'll check that it is covered by the tests, but I think it should work
> in this series that has no alt shadow stack. I have only done a high
> level overview of how the shadow stack stuff, that doesn't involve the
> kernel, works in glibc. Sounds like I'll need to do a deeper dive.
>
> > >
> > > I think the shadow stack pointer has to be in ucontext - which also
> > > means the application can change it before returning from a signal.
>
> Yes we might need to change it to support alt shadow stacks. Can you
> elaborate why you think it has to be in ucontext? I was thinking of
> looking at three options for storing the ssp:
> - Stored in the shadow stack like a token using WRUSS from the kernel.
> - Stored on the kernel side using a hashmap that maps ucontext or
> sigframe userspace address to ssp (this is of course similar to
> storing in ucontext, except that the user can’t change the ssp).
> - Stored writable in userspace in ucontext.
>
> But in this version, without alt shadow stacks, the shadow stack
> pointer is not stored in ucontext. This causes the limitation that
> userspace can only call sigreturn when it has returned back to a point
> where there is a restore token on the shadow stack (which was placed
> there by the kernel). This doesn’t mean it can’t switch to a different
> shadow stack or handle a nested signal, but it limits the possibility
> for calling sigreturn with a totally different sigframe (like CRIU and
> SROP attacks do). It should hopefully be a helpful, protective
> limitation for most apps and I'm hoping CRIU can be fixed without
> removing it.
>
> I am not aware of other limitations to signals (besides normal shadow
> stack enforcement), but I could be missing it. And people's skepticism
> is making me want to go back over it with more scrutiny.
>
> > > In much the same way as all the segment registers can be changed
> > > leading to all the nasty bugs when the final 'return to user' code
> > > traps in kernel when loading invalid segment registers or executing
> > > iret.
>
> I don't think this is as difficult to avoid because userspace ssp has
> its own register that should not be accessed at that point, but I have
> not given this aspect enough analysis. Thanks for bringing it up.
>
> > >
> > > Hmmm... do shadow stacks mean that longjmp() has to be a system
> > > call?
> >
> > No. setjmp/longjmp save and restore shadow stack pointer.
> >
>
> It sounds like it would help to write up in a lot more detail exactly
> how all the signal and specialer stack manipulation scenarios work in
> glibc.
>

setjmp/longjmp work on the same sigjmp_buf. Shadow stack pointer
is saved and restored, just like any other callee-saved registers.

--
H.J.