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From: "Edgecombe, Rick P" <rick.p.edgecombe@intel.com>
To: "bp@alien8.de" <bp@alien8.de>
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Subject: Re: [PATCH v4 16/39] x86/mm: Check Shadow Stack page fault errors
Date: Thu, 5 Jan 2023 01:29:13 +0000	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <c96c5f7d651729e414e0a9aac3adeaa2544a3d04.camel@intel.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <Y7WN5WxENBrhkJXU@zn.tnic>

On Wed, 2023-01-04 at 15:32 +0100, Borislav Petkov wrote:
> On Fri, Dec 02, 2022 at 04:35:43PM -0800, Rick Edgecombe wrote:
> > From: Yu-cheng Yu <yu-cheng.yu@intel.com>
> > 
> > The CPU performs "shadow stack accesses" when it expects to
> > encounter
> > shadow stack mappings. These accesses can be implicit (via CALL/RET
> > instructions) or explicit (instructions like WRSS).
> > 
> > Shadow stacks accesses to shadow-stack mappings can see faults in
> > normal,
> > valid operation just like regular accesses to regular mappings.
> > Shadow
> > stacks need some of the same features like delayed allocation, swap
> > and
> > copy-on-write. The kernel needs to use faults to implement those
> > features.
> > 
> > The architecture has concepts of both shadow stack reads and shadow
> > stack
> > writes. Any shadow stack access to non-shadow stack memory will
> > generate
> > a fault with the shadow stack error code bit set.
> 
> You lost me here: by "shadow stack access to non-shadow stack memory"
> you mean
> the explicit one using WRU*SS?

Shadow stack accesses can be WR*SS, shadow stack pushes/pops from
call/ret or incssp. Basically the instructions that intend to read or
write to a shadow stack.

> 
> > This means that, unlike normal write protection, the fault handler
> > needs
> > to create a type of memory that can be written to (with
> > instructions that
> > generate shadow stack writes), even to fulfill a read access. So in
> > the
> > case of COW memory, the COW needs to take place even with a shadow
> > stack
> > read.
> 
> I guess I'm missing an example here: are we talking here about a user
> process
> getting its shadow stack pages allocated and them being COW first and
> on the
> first shstk operation, it would generate that fault?

So if you have a shadow stack, then fork() so the shadow stack PTEs
become read-only. Then you RET and the shadow stack get's popped to
compare it to the normal stack value. In this case it only needs to
read the shadow stack, but it does this with a "shadow stack read",
which will fault if memory is not shadow stack. So the fault is a read
fault, but it needs to make the PTE shadow stack in order to resolve
it. So it needs to trigger COW, otherwise the shared page would be
changeable from userspace. Make sense? I guess I can add an example if
you think it would help.

> 
> > @@ -1331,6 +1345,30 @@ void do_user_addr_fault(struct pt_regs
> > *regs,
> >  
> >  	perf_sw_event(PERF_COUNT_SW_PAGE_FAULTS, 1, regs, address);
> >  
> > +	/*
> > +	 * When a page becomes COW it changes from a shadow stack
> > permissioned
> 
> Unknown word [permissioned] in comment.

I can change it.

> 
> > +	 * page (Write=0,Dirty=1) to (Write=0,Dirty=0,CoW=1), which is
> > simply
> > +	 * read-only to the CPU. When shadow stack is enabled, a RET
> > would
> > +	 * normally pop the shadow stack by reading it with a "shadow
> > stack
> > +	 * read" access. However, in the COW case the shadow stack
> > memory does
> > +	 * not have shadow stack permissions, it is read-only. So it
> > will
> > +	 * generate a fault.
> > +	 *
> > +	 * For conventionally writable pages, a read can be serviced
> > with a
> > +	 * read only PTE, and COW would not have to happen. But for
> > shadow
> > +	 * stack, there isn't the concept of read-only shadow stack
> > memory.
> > +	 * If it is shadow stack permissioned, it can be modified via
> > CALL and
> 
> Ditto.
> 
> > +	 * RET instructions. So COW needs to happen before any memory
> > can be
> > +	 * mapped with shadow stack permissions.
> > +	 *
> > +	 * Shadow stack accesses (read or write) need to be serviced
> > with
> > +	 * shadow stack permissioned memory, so in the case of a shadow
> > stack
> 
> Is this some new formulation I haven't heard about yet?
> 
> "Permissioned <something>"?

It looks like it's not an official dictionary word, but I've seen it
from time to time:
https://en.wiktionary.org/wiki/permissioned

> 
> > +	 * read access, treat it as a WRITE fault so both COW will
> > happen and
> > +	 * the write fault path will tickle maybe_mkwrite() and map the
> > memory
> > +	 * shadow stack.
> > +	 */
> > +	if (error_code & X86_PF_SHSTK)
> > +		flags |= FAULT_FLAG_WRITE;
> >  	if (error_code & X86_PF_WRITE)
> >  		flags |= FAULT_FLAG_WRITE;
> >  	if (error_code & X86_PF_INSTR)
> > -- 
> > 2.17.1
> > 
> 
> 

  reply	other threads:[~2023-01-05  1:29 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 107+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2022-12-03  0:35 [PATCH v4 00/39] Shadow stacks for userspace Rick Edgecombe
2022-12-03  0:35 ` [PATCH v4 01/39] Documentation/x86: Add CET shadow stack description Rick Edgecombe
2022-12-03  2:20   ` Kees Cook
2022-12-03  8:58   ` Bagas Sanjaya
2022-12-05 21:20     ` Edgecombe, Rick P
2022-12-03  0:35 ` [PATCH v4 02/39] x86/shstk: Add Kconfig option for Shadow Stack Rick Edgecombe
2022-12-03  2:20   ` Kees Cook
2022-12-03  0:35 ` [PATCH v4 03/39] x86/cpufeatures: Add CPU feature flags for shadow stacks Rick Edgecombe
2022-12-03  2:22   ` Kees Cook
2022-12-07 11:00   ` Borislav Petkov
2022-12-07 22:35     ` Edgecombe, Rick P
2022-12-08 11:10       ` Borislav Petkov
2022-12-03  0:35 ` [PATCH v4 04/39] x86/cpufeatures: Enable CET CR4 bit for shadow stack Rick Edgecombe
2022-12-03  2:23   ` Kees Cook
2022-12-07 12:49   ` Borislav Petkov
2022-12-07 18:35     ` Edgecombe, Rick P
2022-12-03  0:35 ` [PATCH v4 05/39] x86/fpu/xstate: Introduce CET MSR and XSAVES supervisor states Rick Edgecombe
2022-12-03  2:24   ` Kees Cook
2022-12-20 11:32   ` Borislav Petkov
2022-12-21  0:45     ` Edgecombe, Rick P
2022-12-03  0:35 ` [PATCH v4 06/39] x86/fpu: Add helper for modifying xstate Rick Edgecombe
2022-12-03  2:25   ` Kees Cook
2022-12-20 12:04   ` Borislav Petkov
2022-12-21  0:03     ` Edgecombe, Rick P
2022-12-21 10:31       ` Borislav Petkov
2022-12-03  0:35 ` [PATCH v4 07/39] x86: Add user control-protection fault handler Rick Edgecombe
2022-12-03  2:28   ` Kees Cook
2022-12-20 16:19   ` Borislav Petkov
2022-12-21  0:37     ` Edgecombe, Rick P
2022-12-21 10:41       ` Borislav Petkov
2022-12-21 21:42         ` Edgecombe, Rick P
2023-01-04 12:50           ` Borislav Petkov
2022-12-20 21:21   ` Borislav Petkov
2022-12-21  0:38     ` Edgecombe, Rick P
2022-12-03  0:35 ` [PATCH v4 08/39] x86/mm: Remove _PAGE_DIRTY from kernel RO pages Rick Edgecombe
2022-12-03  2:29   ` Kees Cook
2022-12-20 19:11   ` Borislav Petkov
2022-12-03  0:35 ` [PATCH v4 09/39] x86/mm: Move pmd_write(), pud_write() up in the file Rick Edgecombe
2022-12-03  0:35 ` [PATCH v4 10/39] x86/mm: Introduce _PAGE_COW Rick Edgecombe
2022-12-03  2:31   ` Kees Cook
2022-12-20 21:29   ` Borislav Petkov
2022-12-21  0:45     ` Edgecombe, Rick P
2022-12-03  0:35 ` [PATCH v4 11/39] x86/mm: Update pte_modify for _PAGE_COW Rick Edgecombe
2022-12-03  2:31   ` Kees Cook
2022-12-27 11:42   ` Borislav Petkov
2022-12-27 23:31     ` Edgecombe, Rick P
2023-01-04 13:25       ` Borislav Petkov
2023-01-05  1:06         ` Edgecombe, Rick P
2022-12-03  0:35 ` [PATCH v4 12/39] x86/mm: Update ptep_set_wrprotect() and pmdp_set_wrprotect() for transition from _PAGE_DIRTY to _PAGE_COW Rick Edgecombe
2022-12-03  2:32   ` Kees Cook
2022-12-27 13:26   ` Borislav Petkov
2022-12-27 22:26     ` Edgecombe, Rick P
2023-01-04 13:28       ` Borislav Petkov
2022-12-03  0:35 ` [PATCH v4 13/39] x86/mm: Start actually marking _PAGE_COW Rick Edgecombe
2022-12-03  2:33   ` Kees Cook
2022-12-03  0:35 ` [PATCH v4 14/39] mm: Move VM_UFFD_MINOR_BIT from 37 to 38 Rick Edgecombe
2022-12-03  0:35 ` [PATCH v4 15/39] mm: Introduce VM_SHADOW_STACK for shadow stack memory Rick Edgecombe
2022-12-03  2:34   ` Kees Cook
2022-12-03  0:35 ` [PATCH v4 16/39] x86/mm: Check Shadow Stack page fault errors Rick Edgecombe
2023-01-04 14:32   ` Borislav Petkov
2023-01-05  1:29     ` Edgecombe, Rick P [this message]
2022-12-03  0:35 ` [PATCH v4 17/39] x86/mm: Update maybe_mkwrite() for shadow stack Rick Edgecombe
2022-12-03  2:34   ` Kees Cook
2022-12-03  0:35 ` [PATCH v4 18/39] mm: Fixup places that call pte_mkwrite() directly Rick Edgecombe
2022-12-03  2:37   ` Kees Cook
2022-12-03  0:35 ` [PATCH v4 19/39] mm: Add guard pages around a shadow stack Rick Edgecombe
2022-12-03  0:35 ` [PATCH v4 20/39] mm/mmap: Add shadow stack pages to memory accounting Rick Edgecombe
2022-12-03  2:38   ` Kees Cook
2022-12-03  0:35 ` [PATCH v4 21/39] mm/mprotect: Exclude shadow stack from preserve_write Rick Edgecombe
2022-12-03  2:38   ` Kees Cook
2022-12-03  0:35 ` [PATCH v4 22/39] mm: Re-introduce vm_flags to do_mmap() Rick Edgecombe
2022-12-03  0:35 ` [PATCH v4 23/39] mm: Don't allow write GUPs to shadow stack memory Rick Edgecombe
2022-12-03  2:39   ` Kees Cook
2022-12-03  0:35 ` [PATCH v4 24/39] mm: Warn on shadow stack memory in wrong vma Rick Edgecombe
2022-12-03  2:40   ` Kees Cook
2022-12-03  0:35 ` [PATCH v4 25/39] x86: Introduce userspace API for shadow stack Rick Edgecombe
2022-12-03  2:42   ` Kees Cook
2022-12-03  0:35 ` [PATCH v4 26/39] x86/shstk: Add user-mode shadow stack support Rick Edgecombe
2022-12-03  2:43   ` Kees Cook
2022-12-03  0:35 ` [PATCH v4 27/39] x86/shstk: Handle thread shadow stack Rick Edgecombe
2022-12-03  2:44   ` Kees Cook
2022-12-03  0:35 ` [PATCH v4 28/39] x86/shstk: Introduce routines modifying shstk Rick Edgecombe
2022-12-03  2:45   ` Kees Cook
2022-12-03  0:35 ` [PATCH v4 29/39] x86/shstk: Handle signals for shadow stack Rick Edgecombe
2022-12-03  2:46   ` Kees Cook
2022-12-03  0:35 ` [PATCH v4 30/39] x86/shstk: Introduce map_shadow_stack syscall Rick Edgecombe
2022-12-03  2:51   ` Kees Cook
2022-12-05 22:19     ` Edgecombe, Rick P
2022-12-03  0:35 ` [PATCH v4 31/39] x86/shstk: Support wrss for userspace Rick Edgecombe
2022-12-03  2:52   ` Kees Cook
2022-12-03  0:35 ` [PATCH v4 32/39] x86: Expose thread features in /proc/$PID/status Rick Edgecombe
2022-12-03  2:52   ` Kees Cook
2022-12-03  0:36 ` [PATCH v4 33/39] x86: Prevent 32 bit operations for 64 bit shstk tasks Rick Edgecombe
2022-12-03 22:49   ` Andy Lutomirski
2022-12-04 20:51     ` Edgecombe, Rick P
2022-12-15  0:25       ` Edgecombe, Rick P
2022-12-03  0:36 ` [PATCH v4 34/39] x86/shstk: Wire in shadow stack interface Rick Edgecombe
2022-12-03  0:36 ` [PATCH v4 35/39] selftests/x86: Add shadow stack test Rick Edgecombe
2022-12-03  0:36 ` [PATCH v4 36/39] x86/fpu: Add helper for initing features Rick Edgecombe
2022-12-03  0:36 ` [PATCH v4 37/39] x86: Add PTRACE interface for shadow stack Rick Edgecombe
2022-12-03  2:55   ` Kees Cook
2022-12-09 17:04   ` Mike Rapoport
2022-12-09 17:08     ` Edgecombe, Rick P
2022-12-03  0:36 ` [PATCH v4 38/39] x86/shstk: Add ARCH_SHSTK_UNLOCK Rick Edgecombe
2022-12-03  2:56   ` Kees Cook
2022-12-03  0:36 ` [PATCH v4 39/39] x86/shstk: Add ARCH_SHSTK_STATUS Rick Edgecombe
2022-12-03  2:57   ` Kees Cook

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