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From: Jiri Slaby <jslaby@suse.cz>
To: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com>, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Cc: linux-arch@vger.kernel.org, kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com,
	gregkh@linuxfoundation.org, x86@kernel.org,
	Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>, Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>,
	"H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>,
	tglx@linutronix.de, torvalds@linux-foundation.org,
	akpm@linux-foundation.org, alan@linux.intel.com
Subject: Re: [PATCH v4 07/10] x86: narrow out of bounds syscalls to sys_read under speculation
Date: Wed, 24 Jan 2018 15:40:40 +0100	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <f858abdb-f142-7157-c785-ca9eca919de1@suse.cz> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <151632014097.21271.16980532033566583357.stgit@dwillia2-desk3.amr.corp.intel.com>

On 01/19/2018, 01:02 AM, Dan Williams wrote:
> The syscall table base is a user controlled function pointer in kernel
> space. Like, 'get_user, use 'MASK_NOSPEC' to prevent any out of bounds
> speculation. While retpoline prevents speculating into the user
> controlled target it does not stop the pointer de-reference, the concern
> is leaking memory relative to the syscall table base.
> 
> Reported-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
> Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>
> Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>
> Cc: x86@kernel.org
> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
> Signed-off-by: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com>
> ---
>  arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S   |    2 ++
>  arch/x86/include/asm/smap.h |    9 ++++++++-
>  2 files changed, 10 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
> 
> diff --git a/arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S b/arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S
> index 4f8e1d35a97c..2320017077d4 100644
> --- a/arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S
> +++ b/arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S
> @@ -35,6 +35,7 @@
>  #include <asm/asm.h>
>  #include <asm/smap.h>
>  #include <asm/pgtable_types.h>
> +#include <asm/smap.h>

This is already included 2 lines above

thanks,
-- 
js
suse labs

  reply	other threads:[~2018-01-24 14:40 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 62+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2018-01-19  0:01 [PATCH v4 00/10] prevent bounds-check bypass via speculative execution Dan Williams
2018-01-19  0:01 ` Dan Williams
2018-01-19  0:01 ` [PATCH v4 01/10] Documentation: document array_ptr Dan Williams
2018-01-19  0:01 ` [PATCH v4 02/10] asm/nospec, array_ptr: sanitize speculative array de-references Dan Williams
2018-01-19  0:01   ` Dan Williams
2018-01-19 10:20   ` [kernel-hardening] " Jann Horn
2018-01-19 17:48     ` Adam Sampson
2018-01-19 17:48       ` Adam Sampson
2018-01-19 18:12       ` Dan Williams
2018-01-19 18:18         ` Will Deacon
2018-01-19 18:18           ` [kernel-hardening] " Will Deacon
2018-01-19 18:26           ` Dan Williams
2018-01-19 18:18     ` Linus Torvalds
2018-01-19 18:18       ` [kernel-hardening] " Linus Torvalds
2018-01-19 20:55       ` Dan Williams
2018-01-25  7:09   ` Cyril Novikov
2018-01-25  7:09     ` Cyril Novikov
2018-01-25 22:37     ` Dan Williams
2018-01-25 22:37       ` Dan Williams
2018-01-19  0:01 ` [PATCH v4 03/10] x86: implement array_ptr_mask() Dan Williams
2018-01-19  0:01 ` [PATCH v4 04/10] x86: introduce __uaccess_begin_nospec and ifence Dan Williams
2018-01-19  0:02 ` [PATCH v4 05/10] x86, __get_user: use __uaccess_begin_nospec Dan Williams
2018-01-19  0:02   ` Dan Williams
2018-01-19  0:02 ` [PATCH v4 06/10] x86, get_user: use pointer masking to limit speculation Dan Williams
2018-01-19  0:02 ` [PATCH v4 07/10] x86: narrow out of bounds syscalls to sys_read under speculation Dan Williams
2018-01-24 14:40   ` Jiri Slaby [this message]
2018-02-06 19:29   ` Luis Henriques
2018-02-06 19:48     ` Dan Williams
2018-02-06 19:48       ` Dan Williams
2018-02-06 20:26       ` Linus Torvalds
2018-02-06 20:26         ` Linus Torvalds
2018-02-06 20:37         ` Dan Williams
2018-02-06 20:42           ` Linus Torvalds
2018-02-06 20:42             ` Linus Torvalds
2018-02-06 20:43             ` Linus Torvalds
2018-02-06 20:43               ` Linus Torvalds
2018-02-06 20:49             ` Andy Lutomirski
2018-02-06 20:49               ` Andy Lutomirski
2018-02-06 20:58               ` Linus Torvalds
2018-02-06 20:58                 ` Linus Torvalds
2018-02-06 21:37                 ` Dan Williams
2018-02-06 22:52                   ` Linus Torvalds
2018-02-06 22:52                     ` Linus Torvalds
2018-02-07  0:33                     ` Dan Williams
2018-02-07  1:23                       ` Linus Torvalds
2018-02-06 22:51       ` Luis Henriques
2018-02-06 22:51         ` Luis Henriques
2018-01-19  0:02 ` [PATCH v4 08/10] vfs, fdtable: prevent bounds-check bypass via speculative execution Dan Williams
2018-01-19  0:02   ` Dan Williams
2018-01-19  0:02 ` [PATCH v4 09/10] kvm, x86: fix spectre-v1 mitigation Dan Williams
2018-01-19  0:02   ` Dan Williams
2018-01-19  8:42   ` Paolo Bonzini
2018-01-19  8:42     ` Paolo Bonzini
     [not found] ` <151632009605.21271.11304291057104672116.stgit-p8uTFz9XbKj2zm6wflaqv1nYeNYlB/vhral2JQCrhuEAvxtiuMwx3w@public.gmane.org>
2018-01-19  0:02   ` [PATCH v4 10/10] nl80211: sanitize array index in parse_txq_params Dan Williams
2018-01-19  0:02     ` Dan Williams
2018-01-21 10:37     ` Johannes Berg
2018-01-20  6:58 ` [PATCH v4 00/10] prevent bounds-check bypass via speculative execution Dan Williams
2018-01-20  6:58   ` Dan Williams
2018-01-20 16:56   ` Alexei Starovoitov
2018-01-20 16:56     ` Alexei Starovoitov
2018-01-20 17:07     ` Alexei Starovoitov
2018-01-20 17:07       ` Alexei Starovoitov

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