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From: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
To: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, stable@vger.kernel.org
Cc: akpm@linux-foundation.org, Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>,
	Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>,
	Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com>,
	Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>,
	linux-arch@vger.kernel.org, David Woodhouse <dwmw2@infradead.org>,
	Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>,
	Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>,
	Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>, Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>,
	Arjan van de Ven <arjan@linux.intel.com>,
	Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>,
	Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>,
	Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Subject: [PATCH 3.16 69/76] nospec: Kill array_index_nospec_mask_check()
Date: Mon, 12 Mar 2018 03:06:12 +0000	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <lsq.1520823972.229464947@decadent.org.uk> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <lsq.1520823971.5976735@decadent.org.uk>

3.16.56-rc1 review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com>

commit 1d91c1d2c80cb70e2e553845e278b87a960c04da upstream.

There are multiple problems with the dynamic sanity checking in
array_index_nospec_mask_check():

* It causes unnecessary overhead in the 32-bit case since integer sized
  @index values will no longer cause the check to be compiled away like
  in the 64-bit case.

* In the 32-bit case it may trigger with user controllable input when
  the expectation is that should only trigger during development of new
  kernel enabling.

* The macro reuses the input parameter in multiple locations which is
  broken if someone passes an expression like 'index++' to
  array_index_nospec().

Reported-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Cc: Arjan van de Ven <arjan@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>
Cc: David Woodhouse <dwmw2@infradead.org>
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
Cc: linux-arch@vger.kernel.org
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/151881604278.17395.6605847763178076520.stgit@dwillia2-desk3.amr.corp.intel.com
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
---
 include/linux/nospec.h | 22 +---------------------
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 21 deletions(-)

--- a/include/linux/nospec.h
+++ b/include/linux/nospec.h
@@ -30,26 +30,6 @@ static inline unsigned long array_index_
 #endif
 
 /*
- * Warn developers about inappropriate array_index_nospec() usage.
- *
- * Even if the CPU speculates past the WARN_ONCE branch, the
- * sign bit of @index is taken into account when generating the
- * mask.
- *
- * This warning is compiled out when the compiler can infer that
- * @index and @size are less than LONG_MAX.
- */
-#define array_index_mask_nospec_check(index, size)				\
-({										\
-	if (WARN_ONCE(index > LONG_MAX || size > LONG_MAX,			\
-	    "array_index_nospec() limited to range of [0, LONG_MAX]\n"))	\
-		_mask = 0;							\
-	else									\
-		_mask = array_index_mask_nospec(index, size);			\
-	_mask;									\
-})
-
-/*
  * array_index_nospec - sanitize an array index after a bounds check
  *
  * For a code sequence like:
@@ -67,7 +47,7 @@ static inline unsigned long array_index_
 ({									\
 	typeof(index) _i = (index);					\
 	typeof(size) _s = (size);					\
-	unsigned long _mask = array_index_mask_nospec_check(_i, _s);	\
+	unsigned long _mask = array_index_mask_nospec(_i, _s);		\
 									\
 	BUILD_BUG_ON(sizeof(_i) > sizeof(long));			\
 	BUILD_BUG_ON(sizeof(_s) > sizeof(long));			\

  parent reply	other threads:[~2018-03-12  3:06 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 32+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
     [not found] <lsq.1520823971.5976735@decadent.org.uk>
2018-03-12  3:06 ` [PATCH 3.16 57/76] vfs, fdtable: Prevent bounds-check bypass via speculative execution Ben Hutchings
2018-03-12  3:06   ` Ben Hutchings
2018-03-12  3:06 ` Ben Hutchings [this message]
2018-03-12  3:06   ` [PATCH 3.16 69/76] nospec: Kill array_index_nospec_mask_check() Ben Hutchings
2018-03-12  3:06 ` [PATCH 3.16 56/76] x86/syscall: Sanitize syscall table de-references under speculation Ben Hutchings
2018-03-12  3:06   ` Ben Hutchings
2018-03-12  7:32   ` Jiri Slaby
2018-03-12  7:32     ` Jiri Slaby
2018-03-19  0:59     ` Ben Hutchings
2018-03-19  0:59       ` Ben Hutchings
2018-03-12  3:06 ` [PATCH 3.16 51/76] Documentation: Document array_index_nospec Ben Hutchings
2018-03-12  3:06   ` Ben Hutchings
2018-03-12  3:06 ` [PATCH 3.16 73/76] x86: Introduce __uaccess_begin_nospec() and uaccess_try_nospec Ben Hutchings
2018-03-12  3:06   ` Ben Hutchings
2018-03-12  3:06 ` [PATCH 3.16 53/76] x86: Implement array_index_mask_nospec Ben Hutchings
2018-03-12  3:06   ` Ben Hutchings
2018-03-12  3:06 ` [PATCH 3.16 58/76] nl80211: Sanitize array index in parse_txq_params Ben Hutchings
2018-03-12  3:06   ` Ben Hutchings
2018-03-12  3:06 ` [PATCH 3.16 52/76] array_index_nospec: Sanitize speculative array de-references Ben Hutchings
2018-03-12  3:06   ` Ben Hutchings
2018-03-12  3:06 ` [PATCH 3.16 55/76] x86/get_user: Use pointer masking to limit speculation Ben Hutchings
2018-03-12  3:06   ` Ben Hutchings
2018-03-12  3:06 ` [PATCH 3.16 59/76] x86/spectre: Report get_user mitigation for spectre_v1 Ben Hutchings
2018-03-12  3:06   ` Ben Hutchings
2018-03-12  3:06 ` [PATCH 3.16 54/76] x86: Introduce barrier_nospec Ben Hutchings
2018-03-12  3:06   ` Ben Hutchings
2018-03-12  3:06 ` [PATCH 3.16 75/76] x86/uaccess: Use __uaccess_begin_nospec() and uaccess_try_nospec Ben Hutchings
2018-03-12  3:06   ` Ben Hutchings
2018-03-12  3:06 ` [PATCH 3.16 70/76] nospec: Include <asm/barrier.h> dependency Ben Hutchings
2018-03-12  3:06   ` Ben Hutchings
2018-03-12  3:06 ` [PATCH 3.16 74/76] x86/usercopy: Replace open coded stac/clac with __uaccess_{begin, end} Ben Hutchings
2018-03-12  3:06   ` Ben Hutchings

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