From: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
To: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, stable@vger.kernel.org
Cc: akpm@linux-foundation.org, linux-arch@vger.kernel.org,
gregkh@linuxfoundation.org,
Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com>,
alan@linux.intel.com, Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>,
torvalds@linux-foundation.org, Jiri Slaby <jslaby@suse.cz>,
kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com
Subject: [PATCH 3.16 59/76] x86/spectre: Report get_user mitigation for spectre_v1
Date: Mon, 12 Mar 2018 03:06:12 +0000 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <lsq.1520823972.995550615@decadent.org.uk> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <lsq.1520823971.5976735@decadent.org.uk>
3.16.56-rc1 review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com>
commit edfbae53dab8348fca778531be9f4855d2ca0360 upstream.
Reflect the presence of get_user(), __get_user(), and 'syscall' protections
in sysfs. The expectation is that new and better tooling will allow the
kernel to grow more usages of array_index_nospec(), for now, only claim
mitigation for __user pointer de-references.
Reported-by: Jiri Slaby <jslaby@suse.cz>
Signed-off-by: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: linux-arch@vger.kernel.org
Cc: kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com
Cc: gregkh@linuxfoundation.org
Cc: torvalds@linux-foundation.org
Cc: alan@linux.intel.com
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/151727420158.33451.11658324346540434635.stgit@dwillia2-desk3.amr.corp.intel.com
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
---
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c | 2 +-
1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
@@ -353,7 +353,7 @@ ssize_t cpu_show_spectre_v1(struct devic
{
if (!boot_cpu_has_bug(X86_BUG_SPECTRE_V1))
return sprintf(buf, "Not affected\n");
- return sprintf(buf, "Vulnerable\n");
+ return sprintf(buf, "Mitigation: __user pointer sanitization\n");
}
ssize_t cpu_show_spectre_v2(struct device *dev,
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2018-03-12 3:06 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 32+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
[not found] <lsq.1520823971.5976735@decadent.org.uk>
2018-03-12 3:06 ` [PATCH 3.16 74/76] x86/usercopy: Replace open coded stac/clac with __uaccess_{begin, end} Ben Hutchings
2018-03-12 3:06 ` Ben Hutchings
2018-03-12 3:06 ` Ben Hutchings [this message]
2018-03-12 3:06 ` [PATCH 3.16 59/76] x86/spectre: Report get_user mitigation for spectre_v1 Ben Hutchings
2018-03-12 3:06 ` [PATCH 3.16 54/76] x86: Introduce barrier_nospec Ben Hutchings
2018-03-12 3:06 ` Ben Hutchings
2018-03-12 3:06 ` [PATCH 3.16 70/76] nospec: Include <asm/barrier.h> dependency Ben Hutchings
2018-03-12 3:06 ` Ben Hutchings
2018-03-12 3:06 ` [PATCH 3.16 75/76] x86/uaccess: Use __uaccess_begin_nospec() and uaccess_try_nospec Ben Hutchings
2018-03-12 3:06 ` Ben Hutchings
2018-03-12 3:06 ` [PATCH 3.16 53/76] x86: Implement array_index_mask_nospec Ben Hutchings
2018-03-12 3:06 ` Ben Hutchings
2018-03-12 3:06 ` [PATCH 3.16 58/76] nl80211: Sanitize array index in parse_txq_params Ben Hutchings
2018-03-12 3:06 ` Ben Hutchings
2018-03-12 3:06 ` [PATCH 3.16 52/76] array_index_nospec: Sanitize speculative array de-references Ben Hutchings
2018-03-12 3:06 ` Ben Hutchings
2018-03-12 3:06 ` [PATCH 3.16 55/76] x86/get_user: Use pointer masking to limit speculation Ben Hutchings
2018-03-12 3:06 ` Ben Hutchings
2018-03-12 3:06 ` [PATCH 3.16 69/76] nospec: Kill array_index_nospec_mask_check() Ben Hutchings
2018-03-12 3:06 ` Ben Hutchings
2018-03-12 3:06 ` [PATCH 3.16 57/76] vfs, fdtable: Prevent bounds-check bypass via speculative execution Ben Hutchings
2018-03-12 3:06 ` Ben Hutchings
2018-03-12 3:06 ` [PATCH 3.16 73/76] x86: Introduce __uaccess_begin_nospec() and uaccess_try_nospec Ben Hutchings
2018-03-12 3:06 ` Ben Hutchings
2018-03-12 3:06 ` [PATCH 3.16 51/76] Documentation: Document array_index_nospec Ben Hutchings
2018-03-12 3:06 ` Ben Hutchings
2018-03-12 3:06 ` [PATCH 3.16 56/76] x86/syscall: Sanitize syscall table de-references under speculation Ben Hutchings
2018-03-12 3:06 ` Ben Hutchings
2018-03-12 7:32 ` Jiri Slaby
2018-03-12 7:32 ` Jiri Slaby
2018-03-19 0:59 ` Ben Hutchings
2018-03-19 0:59 ` Ben Hutchings
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