From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 From: Ben Hutchings Subject: [PATCH 3.16 59/76] x86/spectre: Report get_user mitigation for spectre_v1 Date: Mon, 12 Mar 2018 03:06:12 +0000 Message-ID: References: Mime-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="UTF-8" Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit Return-path: Content-Disposition: inline In-Reply-To: Sender: linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org To: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, stable@vger.kernel.org Cc: akpm@linux-foundation.org, linux-arch@vger.kernel.org, gregkh@linuxfoundation.org, Dan Williams , alan@linux.intel.com, Thomas Gleixner , torvalds@linux-foundation.org, Jiri Slaby , kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com List-Id: linux-arch.vger.kernel.org 3.16.56-rc1 review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know. ------------------ From: Dan Williams commit edfbae53dab8348fca778531be9f4855d2ca0360 upstream. Reflect the presence of get_user(), __get_user(), and 'syscall' protections in sysfs. The expectation is that new and better tooling will allow the kernel to grow more usages of array_index_nospec(), for now, only claim mitigation for __user pointer de-references. Reported-by: Jiri Slaby Signed-off-by: Dan Williams Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner Cc: linux-arch@vger.kernel.org Cc: kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com Cc: gregkh@linuxfoundation.org Cc: torvalds@linux-foundation.org Cc: alan@linux.intel.com Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/151727420158.33451.11658324346540434635.stgit@dwillia2-desk3.amr.corp.intel.com Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings --- arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) --- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c @@ -353,7 +353,7 @@ ssize_t cpu_show_spectre_v1(struct devic { if (!boot_cpu_has_bug(X86_BUG_SPECTRE_V1)) return sprintf(buf, "Not affected\n"); - return sprintf(buf, "Vulnerable\n"); + return sprintf(buf, "Mitigation: __user pointer sanitization\n"); } ssize_t cpu_show_spectre_v2(struct device *dev, From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Return-Path: Received: from shadbolt.e.decadent.org.uk ([88.96.1.126]:41604 "EHLO shadbolt.e.decadent.org.uk" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S932806AbeCLDHx (ORCPT ); Sun, 11 Mar 2018 23:07:53 -0400 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="UTF-8" Content-Disposition: inline Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit MIME-Version: 1.0 From: Ben Hutchings Date: Mon, 12 Mar 2018 03:06:12 +0000 Message-ID: Subject: [PATCH 3.16 59/76] x86/spectre: Report get_user mitigation for spectre_v1 In-Reply-To: Sender: linux-arch-owner@vger.kernel.org List-ID: To: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, stable@vger.kernel.org Cc: akpm@linux-foundation.org, linux-arch@vger.kernel.org, gregkh@linuxfoundation.org, Dan Williams , alan@linux.intel.com, Thomas Gleixner , torvalds@linux-foundation.org, Jiri Slaby , kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com Message-ID: <20180312030612.yyKzTnwLME-uMFcp-YLTxxtnvubcfD4u6eUf9ah3lAM@z> 3.16.56-rc1 review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know. ------------------ From: Dan Williams commit edfbae53dab8348fca778531be9f4855d2ca0360 upstream. Reflect the presence of get_user(), __get_user(), and 'syscall' protections in sysfs. The expectation is that new and better tooling will allow the kernel to grow more usages of array_index_nospec(), for now, only claim mitigation for __user pointer de-references. Reported-by: Jiri Slaby Signed-off-by: Dan Williams Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner Cc: linux-arch@vger.kernel.org Cc: kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com Cc: gregkh@linuxfoundation.org Cc: torvalds@linux-foundation.org Cc: alan@linux.intel.com Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/151727420158.33451.11658324346540434635.stgit@dwillia2-desk3.amr.corp.intel.com Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings --- arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) --- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c @@ -353,7 +353,7 @@ ssize_t cpu_show_spectre_v1(struct devic { if (!boot_cpu_has_bug(X86_BUG_SPECTRE_V1)) return sprintf(buf, "Not affected\n"); - return sprintf(buf, "Vulnerable\n"); + return sprintf(buf, "Mitigation: __user pointer sanitization\n"); } ssize_t cpu_show_spectre_v2(struct device *dev,