[PATCH v4 1/4] ARM: Remove the domain switching on ARMv6k/v7 CPUs

[catalin.marinas@arm.com (Catalin Marinas)]

On Tue, 2010-06-22 at 13:47 +0100, Anton Vorontsov wrote:
> On Mon, Jun 21, 2010 at 03:46:26PM +0100, Catalin Marinas wrote:
> > This patch removes the domain switching functionality via the set_fs and
> > __switch_to functions on cores that have a TLS register.
> >
> > Currently, the ioremap and vmalloc areas share the same level 1 page
> > tables and therefore have the same domain (DOMAIN_KERNEL). When the
> > kernel domain is modified from Client to Manager (via the __set_fs or in
> > the __switch_to function), the XN (eXecute Never) bit is overridden and
> > newer CPUs can speculatively prefetch the ioremap'ed memory.
> >
> > Linux performs the kernel domain switching to allow user-specific
> > functions (copy_to/from_user, get/put_user etc.) to access kernel
> > memory. In order for these functions to work with the kernel domain set
> > to Client, the patch modifies the LDRT/STRT and related instructions to
> > the LDR/STR ones.
> >
> > The user pages access rights are also modified for kernel read-only
> > access rather than read/write so that the copy-on-write mechanism still
> > works. CPU_USE_DOMAINS gets disabled only if HAS_TLS_REG is defined
> > since writing the TLS value to the high vectors page isn't possible.
> >
> > The user addresses passed to the kernel are checked by the access_ok()
> > function so that they do not point to the kernel space.
> >
> > Signed-off-by: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
> 
> I tested this on ARMv6K (ARM11 MPcore) and ARMv7 (Cortex-A9), and
> didn't notice any issues. This is also needed for robust mutextes
> support... so, if that helps,
> 
> Tested-by: Anton Vorontsov <cbouatmailru@gmail.com>

Thanks.

-- 
Catalin