From: keescook@chromium.org (Kees Cook)
To: linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org
Subject: [PATCH v11 10/11] seccomp: allow mode setting across threads
Date: Wed, 16 Jul 2014 14:50:41 -0700 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <1405547442-26641-11-git-send-email-keescook@chromium.org> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <1405547442-26641-1-git-send-email-keescook@chromium.org>
This changes the mode setting helper to allow threads to change the
seccomp mode from another thread. We must maintain barriers to keep
TIF_SECCOMP synchronized with the rest of the seccomp state.
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
---
kernel/seccomp.c | 36 +++++++++++++++++++++++++-----------
1 file changed, 25 insertions(+), 11 deletions(-)
diff --git a/kernel/seccomp.c b/kernel/seccomp.c
index d5543e787e4e..9065d2c79c56 100644
--- a/kernel/seccomp.c
+++ b/kernel/seccomp.c
@@ -173,21 +173,24 @@ static int seccomp_check_filter(struct sock_filter *filter, unsigned int flen)
*/
static u32 seccomp_run_filters(int syscall)
{
- struct seccomp_filter *f;
+ struct seccomp_filter *f = ACCESS_ONCE(current->seccomp.filter);
struct seccomp_data sd;
u32 ret = SECCOMP_RET_ALLOW;
/* Ensure unexpected behavior doesn't result in failing open. */
- if (WARN_ON(current->seccomp.filter == NULL))
+ if (unlikely(WARN_ON(f == NULL)))
return SECCOMP_RET_KILL;
+ /* Make sure cross-thread synced filter points somewhere sane. */
+ smp_read_barrier_depends();
+
populate_seccomp_data(&sd);
/*
* All filters in the list are evaluated and the lowest BPF return
* value always takes priority (ignoring the DATA).
*/
- for (f = current->seccomp.filter; f; f = f->prev) {
+ for (; f; f = f->prev) {
u32 cur_ret = SK_RUN_FILTER(f->prog, (void *)&sd);
if ((cur_ret & SECCOMP_RET_ACTION) < (ret & SECCOMP_RET_ACTION))
@@ -207,12 +210,18 @@ static inline bool seccomp_may_assign_mode(unsigned long seccomp_mode)
return true;
}
-static inline void seccomp_assign_mode(unsigned long seccomp_mode)
+static inline void seccomp_assign_mode(struct task_struct *task,
+ unsigned long seccomp_mode)
{
- BUG_ON(!spin_is_locked(¤t->sighand->siglock));
+ BUG_ON(!spin_is_locked(&task->sighand->siglock));
- current->seccomp.mode = seccomp_mode;
- set_tsk_thread_flag(current, TIF_SECCOMP);
+ task->seccomp.mode = seccomp_mode;
+ /*
+ * Make sure TIF_SECCOMP cannot be set before the mode (and
+ * filter) is set.
+ */
+ smp_mb__before_atomic();
+ set_tsk_thread_flag(task, TIF_SECCOMP);
}
#ifdef CONFIG_SECCOMP_FILTER
@@ -435,12 +444,17 @@ static int mode1_syscalls_32[] = {
int __secure_computing(int this_syscall)
{
- int mode = current->seccomp.mode;
int exit_sig = 0;
int *syscall;
u32 ret;
- switch (mode) {
+ /*
+ * Make sure that any changes to mode from another thread have
+ * been seen after TIF_SECCOMP was seen.
+ */
+ rmb();
+
+ switch (current->seccomp.mode) {
case SECCOMP_MODE_STRICT:
syscall = mode1_syscalls;
#ifdef CONFIG_COMPAT
@@ -545,7 +559,7 @@ static long seccomp_set_mode_strict(void)
#ifdef TIF_NOTSC
disable_TSC();
#endif
- seccomp_assign_mode(seccomp_mode);
+ seccomp_assign_mode(current, seccomp_mode);
ret = 0;
out:
@@ -595,7 +609,7 @@ static long seccomp_set_mode_filter(unsigned int flags,
/* Do not free the successfully attached filter. */
prepared = NULL;
- seccomp_assign_mode(seccomp_mode);
+ seccomp_assign_mode(current, seccomp_mode);
out:
spin_unlock_irq(¤t->sighand->siglock);
seccomp_filter_free(prepared);
--
1.7.9.5
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2014-07-16 21:50 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 15+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2014-07-16 21:50 [PATCH v11 0/11] seccomp: add thread sync ability Kees Cook
2014-07-16 21:50 ` [PATCH v11 01/11] seccomp: create internal mode-setting function Kees Cook
2014-07-16 21:50 ` [PATCH v11 02/11] seccomp: extract check/assign mode helpers Kees Cook
2014-07-16 21:50 ` [PATCH v11 03/11] seccomp: split mode setting routines Kees Cook
2014-07-16 21:50 ` [PATCH v11 04/11] seccomp: add "seccomp" syscall Kees Cook
2014-07-16 21:50 ` [PATCH v11 05/11] ARM: add seccomp syscall Kees Cook
2014-07-16 21:50 ` [PATCH v11 06/11] MIPS: " Kees Cook
2014-07-16 21:50 ` [PATCH v11 07/11] sched: move no_new_privs into new atomic flags Kees Cook
2014-07-16 21:50 ` [PATCH v11 08/11] seccomp: split filter prep from check and apply Kees Cook
2014-07-16 21:50 ` [PATCH v11 09/11] seccomp: introduce writer locking Kees Cook
2014-07-16 21:50 ` Kees Cook [this message]
2014-07-16 21:50 ` [PATCH v11 11/11] seccomp: implement SECCOMP_FILTER_FLAG_TSYNC Kees Cook
2014-07-17 15:04 ` David Drysdale
2014-07-17 15:45 ` Kees Cook
2014-07-17 17:52 ` Kees Cook
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