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* [PATCH v5] arm: Support for the PXN CPU feature on ARMv7
@ 2014-11-28 15:44 Jungseung Lee
  2014-11-28 17:27 ` Catalin Marinas
  0 siblings, 1 reply; 3+ messages in thread
From: Jungseung Lee @ 2014-11-28 15:44 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: linux-arm-kernel

Modern ARMv7-A/R cores optionally implement below new
hardware feature:

- PXN:
Privileged execute-never(PXN) is a security feature. PXN bit
determines whether the processor can execute software from
the region. This is effective solution against ret2usr attack.
On an implementation that does not include the LPAE, PXN is
optionally supported.

This patch set PXN bit on user page table for preventing
user code execution with privilege mode.

Reviewed-by: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Jungseung Lee <js07.lee@gmail.com>
---
 arch/arm/include/asm/pgalloc.h              | 10 +++++++++-
 arch/arm/include/asm/pgtable-2level-hwdef.h |  2 ++
 arch/arm/include/asm/pgtable-3level-hwdef.h |  1 +
 arch/arm/mm/mmu.c                           | 18 +++++++++++++++++-
 4 files changed, 29 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)

diff --git a/arch/arm/include/asm/pgalloc.h b/arch/arm/include/asm/pgalloc.h
index 78a7793..19cfab5 100644
--- a/arch/arm/include/asm/pgalloc.h
+++ b/arch/arm/include/asm/pgalloc.h
@@ -157,7 +157,15 @@ pmd_populate_kernel(struct mm_struct *mm, pmd_t *pmdp, pte_t *ptep)
 static inline void
 pmd_populate(struct mm_struct *mm, pmd_t *pmdp, pgtable_t ptep)
 {
-	__pmd_populate(pmdp, page_to_phys(ptep), _PAGE_USER_TABLE);
+	extern pmdval_t user_pmd_table;
+	pmdval_t prot;
+
+	if (__LINUX_ARM_ARCH__ >= 6 && !IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_ARM_LPAE))
+		prot = user_pmd_table;
+	else
+		prot = _PAGE_USER_TABLE;
+
+	__pmd_populate(pmdp, page_to_phys(ptep), prot);
 }
 #define pmd_pgtable(pmd) pmd_page(pmd)
 
diff --git a/arch/arm/include/asm/pgtable-2level-hwdef.h b/arch/arm/include/asm/pgtable-2level-hwdef.h
index 5cfba15..5e68278 100644
--- a/arch/arm/include/asm/pgtable-2level-hwdef.h
+++ b/arch/arm/include/asm/pgtable-2level-hwdef.h
@@ -20,12 +20,14 @@
 #define PMD_TYPE_FAULT		(_AT(pmdval_t, 0) << 0)
 #define PMD_TYPE_TABLE		(_AT(pmdval_t, 1) << 0)
 #define PMD_TYPE_SECT		(_AT(pmdval_t, 2) << 0)
+#define PMD_PXNTABLE		(_AT(pmdval_t, 1) << 2)     /* v7 */
 #define PMD_BIT4		(_AT(pmdval_t, 1) << 4)
 #define PMD_DOMAIN(x)		(_AT(pmdval_t, (x)) << 5)
 #define PMD_PROTECTION		(_AT(pmdval_t, 1) << 9)		/* v5 */
 /*
  *   - section
  */
+#define PMD_SECT_PXN    (_AT(pmdval_t, 1) << 0)     /* v7 */
 #define PMD_SECT_BUFFERABLE	(_AT(pmdval_t, 1) << 2)
 #define PMD_SECT_CACHEABLE	(_AT(pmdval_t, 1) << 3)
 #define PMD_SECT_XN		(_AT(pmdval_t, 1) << 4)		/* v6 */
diff --git a/arch/arm/include/asm/pgtable-3level-hwdef.h b/arch/arm/include/asm/pgtable-3level-hwdef.h
index 9fd61c7..f8f1cff 100644
--- a/arch/arm/include/asm/pgtable-3level-hwdef.h
+++ b/arch/arm/include/asm/pgtable-3level-hwdef.h
@@ -76,6 +76,7 @@
 #define PTE_EXT_SHARED		(_AT(pteval_t, 3) << 8)		/* SH[1:0], inner shareable */
 #define PTE_EXT_AF		(_AT(pteval_t, 1) << 10)	/* Access Flag */
 #define PTE_EXT_NG		(_AT(pteval_t, 1) << 11)	/* nG */
+#define PTE_EXT_PXN		(_AT(pteval_t, 1) << 53)	/* PXN */
 #define PTE_EXT_XN		(_AT(pteval_t, 1) << 54)	/* XN */
 
 /*
diff --git a/arch/arm/mm/mmu.c b/arch/arm/mm/mmu.c
index 9f98cec..1dd0dd5 100644
--- a/arch/arm/mm/mmu.c
+++ b/arch/arm/mm/mmu.c
@@ -52,6 +52,8 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(empty_zero_page);
  */
 pmd_t *top_pmd;
 
+pmdval_t user_pmd_table = _PAGE_USER_TABLE;
+
 #define CPOLICY_UNCACHED	0
 #define CPOLICY_BUFFERED	1
 #define CPOLICY_WRITETHROUGH	2
@@ -528,14 +530,23 @@ static void __init build_mem_type_table(void)
 	hyp_device_pgprot = mem_types[MT_DEVICE].prot_pte;
 	s2_device_pgprot = mem_types[MT_DEVICE].prot_pte_s2;
 
+#ifndef CONFIG_ARM_LPAE
 	/*
 	 * We don't use domains on ARMv6 (since this causes problems with
 	 * v6/v7 kernels), so we must use a separate memory type for user
 	 * r/o, kernel r/w to map the vectors page.
 	 */
-#ifndef CONFIG_ARM_LPAE
 	if (cpu_arch == CPU_ARCH_ARMv6)
 		vecs_pgprot |= L_PTE_MT_VECTORS;
+
+	/*
+	 * Check is it with support for the PXN bit
+	 * in the Short-descriptor translation table format descriptors.
+	 */
+	if (cpu_arch == CPU_ARCH_ARMv7 &&
+		(read_cpuid_ext(CPUID_EXT_MMFR0) & 0xF) == 4) {
+		user_pmd_table |= PMD_PXNTABLE;
+	}
 #endif
 
 	/*
@@ -605,6 +616,11 @@ static void __init build_mem_type_table(void)
 	}
 	kern_pgprot |= PTE_EXT_AF;
 	vecs_pgprot |= PTE_EXT_AF;
+
+	/*
+	 * Set PXN for user mappings
+	 */
+	user_pgprot |= PTE_EXT_PXN;
 #endif
 
 	for (i = 0; i < 16; i++) {
-- 
1.9.1

^ permalink raw reply related	[flat|nested] 3+ messages in thread

* [PATCH v5] arm: Support for the PXN CPU feature on ARMv7
  2014-11-28 15:44 [PATCH v5] arm: Support for the PXN CPU feature on ARMv7 Jungseung Lee
@ 2014-11-28 17:27 ` Catalin Marinas
  2014-11-29  9:36   ` Jungseung Lee
  0 siblings, 1 reply; 3+ messages in thread
From: Catalin Marinas @ 2014-11-28 17:27 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: linux-arm-kernel

On Fri, Nov 28, 2014 at 03:44:51PM +0000, Jungseung Lee wrote:
> Modern ARMv7-A/R cores optionally implement below new
> hardware feature:
> 
> - PXN:
> Privileged execute-never(PXN) is a security feature. PXN bit
> determines whether the processor can execute software from
> the region. This is effective solution against ret2usr attack.
> On an implementation that does not include the LPAE, PXN is
> optionally supported.
> 
> This patch set PXN bit on user page table for preventing
> user code execution with privilege mode.
> 
> Reviewed-by: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
> Signed-off-by: Jungseung Lee <js07.lee@gmail.com>

The patch looks fine to me. Unless there are other objections, you can
send it to Russell's patch system:

http://www.arm.linux.org.uk/developer/patches/

-- 
Catalin

^ permalink raw reply	[flat|nested] 3+ messages in thread

* [PATCH v5] arm: Support for the PXN CPU feature on ARMv7
  2014-11-28 17:27 ` Catalin Marinas
@ 2014-11-29  9:36   ` Jungseung Lee
  0 siblings, 0 replies; 3+ messages in thread
From: Jungseung Lee @ 2014-11-29  9:36 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: linux-arm-kernel

2014-11-29 2:27 GMT+09:00 Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>:
> On Fri, Nov 28, 2014 at 03:44:51PM +0000, Jungseung Lee wrote:
>> Modern ARMv7-A/R cores optionally implement below new
>> hardware feature:
>>
>> - PXN:
>> Privileged execute-never(PXN) is a security feature. PXN bit
>> determines whether the processor can execute software from
>> the region. This is effective solution against ret2usr attack.
>> On an implementation that does not include the LPAE, PXN is
>> optionally supported.
>>
>> This patch set PXN bit on user page table for preventing
>> user code execution with privilege mode.
>>
>> Reviewed-by: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
>> Signed-off-by: Jungseung Lee <js07.lee@gmail.com>
>
> The patch looks fine to me. Unless there are other objections, you can
> send it to Russell's patch system:
>
> http://www.arm.linux.org.uk/developer/patches/
I sent patch file to the system.
Thanks for your kind  help.

^ permalink raw reply	[flat|nested] 3+ messages in thread

end of thread, other threads:[~2014-11-29  9:36 UTC | newest]

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2014-11-28 15:44 [PATCH v5] arm: Support for the PXN CPU feature on ARMv7 Jungseung Lee
2014-11-28 17:27 ` Catalin Marinas
2014-11-29  9:36   ` Jungseung Lee

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