From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 From: keescook@chromium.org (Kees Cook) Date: Thu, 9 Jun 2016 14:02:04 -0700 Subject: [PATCH 14/14] um/ptrace: run seccomp after ptrace In-Reply-To: <1465506124-21866-1-git-send-email-keescook@chromium.org> References: <1465506124-21866-1-git-send-email-keescook@chromium.org> Message-ID: <1465506124-21866-15-git-send-email-keescook@chromium.org> To: linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org List-Id: linux-arm-kernel.lists.infradead.org Close the hole where ptrace can change a syscall out from under seccomp. Signed-off-by: Kees Cook Cc: Jeff Dike Cc: Richard Weinberger Cc: user-mode-linux-devel at lists.sourceforge.net --- arch/um/kernel/skas/syscall.c | 9 ++++----- 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-) diff --git a/arch/um/kernel/skas/syscall.c b/arch/um/kernel/skas/syscall.c index 9c5570f0f397..ef4b8f949b51 100644 --- a/arch/um/kernel/skas/syscall.c +++ b/arch/um/kernel/skas/syscall.c @@ -20,12 +20,12 @@ void handle_syscall(struct uml_pt_regs *r) UPT_SYSCALL_NR(r) = PT_SYSCALL_NR(r->gp); PT_REGS_SET_SYSCALL_RETURN(regs, -ENOSYS); - /* Do the secure computing check first; failures should be fast. */ - if (secure_computing(NULL) == -1) + if (syscall_trace_enter(regs)) return; - if (syscall_trace_enter(regs)) - goto out; + /* Do the seccomp check after ptrace; failures should be fast. */ + if (secure_computing(NULL) == -1) + return; /* Update the syscall number after orig_ax has potentially been updated * with ptrace. @@ -37,6 +37,5 @@ void handle_syscall(struct uml_pt_regs *r) PT_REGS_SET_SYSCALL_RETURN(regs, EXECUTE_SYSCALL(syscall, regs)); -out: syscall_trace_leave(regs); } -- 2.7.4