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From: catalin.marinas@arm.com (Catalin Marinas)
To: linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org
Subject: [PATCH v3 6/7] arm64: xen: Enable user access before a privcmd hvc call
Date: Tue, 13 Sep 2016 18:46:36 +0100	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <1473788797-10879-7-git-send-email-catalin.marinas@arm.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <1473788797-10879-1-git-send-email-catalin.marinas@arm.com>

Privcmd calls are issued by the userspace. The kernel needs to enable
access to TTBR0_EL1 as the hypervisor would issue stage 1 translations
to user memory via AT instructions. Since AT instructions are not
affected by the PAN bit (ARMv8.1), we only need the explicit
uaccess_enable/disable if the TTBR0 PAN option is enabled.

Reviewed-by: Julien Grall <julien.grall@arm.com>
Acked-by: Stefano Stabellini <sstabellini@kernel.org>
Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
Cc: James Morse <james.morse@arm.com>
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
---
 arch/arm64/xen/hypercall.S | 19 +++++++++++++++++++
 1 file changed, 19 insertions(+)

diff --git a/arch/arm64/xen/hypercall.S b/arch/arm64/xen/hypercall.S
index 329c8027b0a9..a23b2e8f2647 100644
--- a/arch/arm64/xen/hypercall.S
+++ b/arch/arm64/xen/hypercall.S
@@ -49,6 +49,7 @@
 
 #include <linux/linkage.h>
 #include <asm/assembler.h>
+#include <asm/uaccess.h>
 #include <xen/interface/xen.h>
 
 
@@ -91,6 +92,24 @@ ENTRY(privcmd_call)
 	mov x2, x3
 	mov x3, x4
 	mov x4, x5
+#ifdef CONFIG_ARM64_SW_TTBR0_PAN
+	/*
+	 * Privcmd calls are issued by the userspace. The kernel needs to
+	 * enable access to TTBR0_EL1 as the hypervisor would issue stage 1
+	 * translations to user memory via AT instructions. Since AT
+	 * instructions are not affected by the PAN bit (ARMv8.1), we only
+	 * need the explicit uaccess_enable/disable if the TTBR0 PAN emulation
+	 * is enabled (it implies that hardware UAO and PAN disabled).
+	 */
+	uaccess_enable_not_uao x6, x7
+#endif
 	hvc XEN_IMM
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_ARM64_SW_TTBR0_PAN
+	/*
+	 * Disable userspace access from kernel once the hyp call completed.
+	 */
+	uaccess_disable_not_uao x6
+#endif
 	ret
 ENDPROC(privcmd_call);

  parent reply	other threads:[~2016-09-13 17:46 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 32+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2016-09-13 17:46 [PATCH v3 0/7] arm64: Privileged Access Never using TTBR0_EL1 switching Catalin Marinas
2016-09-13 17:46 ` [PATCH v3 1/7] arm64: Factor out PAN enabling/disabling into separate uaccess_* macros Catalin Marinas
2016-09-15 15:10   ` Mark Rutland
2016-09-13 17:46 ` [PATCH v3 2/7] arm64: Factor out TTBR0_EL1 post-update workaround into a specific asm macro Catalin Marinas
2016-09-15 15:19   ` Mark Rutland
2016-09-13 17:46 ` [PATCH v3 3/7] arm64: Introduce uaccess_{disable, enable} functionality based on TTBR0_EL1 Catalin Marinas
2016-09-13 20:45   ` [PATCH v3 3/7] arm64: Introduce uaccess_{disable,enable} " Kees Cook
2016-09-14  8:52     ` Mark Rutland
2016-09-14 16:27       ` [kernel-hardening] " Kees Cook
2016-09-13 17:46 ` [PATCH v3 4/7] arm64: Disable TTBR0_EL1 during normal kernel execution Catalin Marinas
2016-09-14 16:45   ` Will Deacon
2016-09-13 17:46 ` [PATCH v3 5/7] arm64: Handle faults caused by inadvertent user access with PAN enabled Catalin Marinas
2016-09-16 11:33   ` Mark Rutland
2016-09-16 15:55     ` Catalin Marinas
2016-09-13 17:46 ` Catalin Marinas [this message]
2016-09-13 17:46 ` [PATCH v3 7/7] arm64: Enable CONFIG_ARM64_SW_TTBR0_PAN Catalin Marinas
2016-09-14 10:13 ` [PATCH v3 0/7] arm64: Privileged Access Never using TTBR0_EL1 switching Ard Biesheuvel
2016-09-14 10:27   ` Mark Rutland
2016-09-14 10:30     ` Ard Biesheuvel
2016-09-14 10:36       ` Mark Rutland
2016-09-14 10:48         ` Mark Rutland
2016-09-14 20:54 ` [kernel-hardening] " David Brown
2016-09-15  9:52   ` Catalin Marinas
2016-09-15 16:20 ` Mark Rutland
2016-09-15 16:41   ` Mark Rutland
2016-09-29 22:44   ` [kernel-hardening] " Sami Tolvanen
2016-09-30 18:42     ` Kees Cook
2016-10-27 14:54       ` Catalin Marinas
2016-10-27 21:23         ` Kees Cook
2016-10-14 21:44 ` Kees Cook
2016-10-15 14:35   ` Catalin Marinas
2016-10-16  2:04     ` Kees Cook

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