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From: julien.thierry@arm.com (Julien Thierry)
To: linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org
Subject: [RESEND PATCH 1/8] ARM: uaccess: Prevent speculative use of the current addr_limit
Date: Tue, 28 Aug 2018 10:08:29 +0100	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <1535447316-32187-2-git-send-email-julien.thierry@arm.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <1535447316-32187-1-git-send-email-julien.thierry@arm.com>

A mispredicted conditional call to set_fs could result in the wrong
addr_limit being forwarded under speculation to a subsequent access_ok
check, potentially forming part of a spectre-v1 attack using uaccess
routines.

This patch prevents this forwarding from taking place, but putting heavy
barriers in set_fs after writing the addr_limit.

Porting commit c2f0ad4fc089cff8 ("arm64: uaccess: Prevent speculative use
of the current addr_limit").

Signed-off-by: Julien Thierry <julien.thierry@arm.com>
---
 arch/arm/include/asm/uaccess.h | 8 ++++++++
 1 file changed, 8 insertions(+)

diff --git a/arch/arm/include/asm/uaccess.h b/arch/arm/include/asm/uaccess.h
index 5451e1f..d65ef85 100644
--- a/arch/arm/include/asm/uaccess.h
+++ b/arch/arm/include/asm/uaccess.h
@@ -69,6 +69,14 @@ static inline void uaccess_restore(unsigned int flags)
 static inline void set_fs(mm_segment_t fs)
 {
 	current_thread_info()->addr_limit = fs;
+
+	/*
+	 * Prevent a mispredicted conditional call to set_fs from forwarding
+	 * the wrong address limit to access_ok under speculation.
+	 */
+	dsb(nsh);
+	isb();
+
 	modify_domain(DOMAIN_KERNEL, fs ? DOMAIN_CLIENT : DOMAIN_MANAGER);
 }
 
-- 
1.9.1

  reply	other threads:[~2018-08-28  9:08 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 13+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2018-08-28  9:08 [RESEND PATCH 0/8] ARM: spectre-v1.1 mitigations Julien Thierry
2018-08-28  9:08 ` Julien Thierry [this message]
2018-08-28  9:08 ` [RESEND PATCH 2/8] ARM: spectre-v1.1: force address sanitizing for __put_user*() Julien Thierry
2018-08-28  9:08 ` [RESEND PATCH 3/8] ARM: spectre-v1, v1.1: provide helpers for address sanitization Julien Thierry
2018-09-06 12:48   ` [RESEND PATCH 3/8] ARM: spectre-v1,v1.1: " Russell King - ARM Linux
2018-09-06 14:24     ` Julien Thierry
2018-08-28  9:08 ` [RESEND PATCH 4/8] ARM: spectre-v1.1: harden __copy_to_user Julien Thierry
2018-08-28  9:08 ` [RESEND PATCH 5/8] ARM: signal: copy registers using __copy_to_user() Julien Thierry
2018-09-06 12:49   ` Russell King - ARM Linux
2018-09-06 14:25     ` Julien Thierry
2018-08-28  9:08 ` [RESEND PATCH 6/8] ARM: signal: always use __copy_to_user to save iwmmxt context Julien Thierry
2018-08-28  9:08 ` [RESEND PATCH 7/8] ARM: vfp: use __copy_to_user() when saving VFP state Julien Thierry
2018-08-28  9:08 ` [RESEND PATCH 8/8] ARM: oabi-compat: copy oabi events using __copy_to_user() Julien Thierry

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