From: <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
To: andre.przywara@arm.com, ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org,
catalin.marinas@arm.com, gregkh@linuxfoundation.org,
jeremy.linton@arm.com, linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org,
stefan.wahren@i2se.com, will.deacon@arm.com
Cc: stable-commits@vger.kernel.org
Subject: Patch "arm64: Always enable ssb vulnerability detection" has been added to the 4.19-stable tree
Date: Wed, 09 Oct 2019 10:04:02 +0200 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <15706082422218@kroah.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20191008153930.15386-10-ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>
This is a note to let you know that I've just added the patch titled
arm64: Always enable ssb vulnerability detection
to the 4.19-stable tree which can be found at:
http://www.kernel.org/git/?p=linux/kernel/git/stable/stable-queue.git;a=summary
The filename of the patch is:
arm64-always-enable-ssb-vulnerability-detection.patch
and it can be found in the queue-4.19 subdirectory.
If you, or anyone else, feels it should not be added to the stable tree,
please let <stable@vger.kernel.org> know about it.
From foo@baz Wed 09 Oct 2019 10:02:11 AM CEST
From: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>
Date: Tue, 8 Oct 2019 17:39:23 +0200
Subject: arm64: Always enable ssb vulnerability detection
To: linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org, Jeremy Linton <jeremy.linton@arm.com>, Andre Przywara <andre.przywara@arm.com>, Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>, Stefan Wahren <stefan.wahren@i2se.com>, Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>, Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>
Message-ID: <20191008153930.15386-10-ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>
From: Jeremy Linton <jeremy.linton@arm.com>
[ Upstream commit d42281b6e49510f078ace15a8ea10f71e6262581 ]
Ensure we are always able to detect whether or not the CPU is affected
by SSB, so that we can later advertise this to userspace.
Signed-off-by: Jeremy Linton <jeremy.linton@arm.com>
Reviewed-by: Andre Przywara <andre.przywara@arm.com>
Reviewed-by: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
Tested-by: Stefan Wahren <stefan.wahren@i2se.com>
[will: Use IS_ENABLED instead of #ifdef]
Signed-off-by: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
arch/arm64/include/asm/cpufeature.h | 4 ----
arch/arm64/kernel/cpu_errata.c | 9 +++++----
2 files changed, 5 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-)
--- a/arch/arm64/include/asm/cpufeature.h
+++ b/arch/arm64/include/asm/cpufeature.h
@@ -525,11 +525,7 @@ static inline int arm64_get_ssbd_state(v
#endif
}
-#ifdef CONFIG_ARM64_SSBD
void arm64_set_ssbd_mitigation(bool state);
-#else
-static inline void arm64_set_ssbd_mitigation(bool state) {}
-#endif
#endif /* __ASSEMBLY__ */
--- a/arch/arm64/kernel/cpu_errata.c
+++ b/arch/arm64/kernel/cpu_errata.c
@@ -239,7 +239,6 @@ enable_smccc_arch_workaround_1(const str
}
#endif /* CONFIG_HARDEN_BRANCH_PREDICTOR */
-#ifdef CONFIG_ARM64_SSBD
DEFINE_PER_CPU_READ_MOSTLY(u64, arm64_ssbd_callback_required);
int ssbd_state __read_mostly = ARM64_SSBD_KERNEL;
@@ -312,6 +311,11 @@ void __init arm64_enable_wa2_handling(st
void arm64_set_ssbd_mitigation(bool state)
{
+ if (!IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_ARM64_SSBD)) {
+ pr_info_once("SSBD disabled by kernel configuration\n");
+ return;
+ }
+
if (this_cpu_has_cap(ARM64_SSBS)) {
if (state)
asm volatile(SET_PSTATE_SSBS(0));
@@ -431,7 +435,6 @@ out_printmsg:
return required;
}
-#endif /* CONFIG_ARM64_SSBD */
#ifdef CONFIG_ARM64_ERRATUM_1463225
DEFINE_PER_CPU(int, __in_cortex_a76_erratum_1463225_wa);
@@ -710,14 +713,12 @@ const struct arm64_cpu_capabilities arm6
ERRATA_MIDR_RANGE_LIST(arm64_harden_el2_vectors),
},
#endif
-#ifdef CONFIG_ARM64_SSBD
{
.desc = "Speculative Store Bypass Disable",
.capability = ARM64_SSBD,
.type = ARM64_CPUCAP_LOCAL_CPU_ERRATUM,
.matches = has_ssbd_mitigation,
},
-#endif
#ifdef CONFIG_ARM64_ERRATUM_1463225
{
.desc = "ARM erratum 1463225",
Patches currently in stable-queue which might be from ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org are
queue-4.19/arm64-add-sysfs-vulnerability-show-for-meltdown.patch
queue-4.19/arm64-force-ssbs-on-context-switch.patch
queue-4.19/arm64-enable-generic-cpu-vulnerabilites-support.patch
queue-4.19/arm64-provide-a-command-line-to-disable-spectre_v2-mitigation.patch
queue-4.19/arm64-always-enable-spectre-v2-vulnerability-detection.patch
queue-4.19/arm64-docs-document-ssbs-hwcap.patch
queue-4.19/arm64-add-sysfs-vulnerability-show-for-spectre-v1.patch
queue-4.19/arm64-add-sysfs-vulnerability-show-for-speculative-store-bypass.patch
queue-4.19/kvm-arm64-set-sctlr_el2.dssbs-if-ssbd-is-forcefully-disabled-and-vhe.patch
queue-4.19/arm64-always-enable-ssb-vulnerability-detection.patch
queue-4.19/arm64-advertise-mitigation-of-spectre-v2-or-lack-thereof.patch
queue-4.19/arm64-ssbs-don-t-treat-cpus-with-ssbs-as-unaffected-by-ssb.patch
queue-4.19/crypto-skcipher-unmap-pages-after-an-external-error.patch
queue-4.19/arm64-cpufeature-detect-ssbs-and-advertise-to-userspace.patch
queue-4.19/arm64-ssbd-add-support-for-pstate.ssbs-rather-than-trapping-to-el3.patch
queue-4.19/arm64-fix-ssbs-sanitization.patch
queue-4.19/arm64-add-sysfs-vulnerability-show-for-spectre-v2.patch
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next prev parent reply other threads:[~2019-10-09 8:06 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 34+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2019-10-08 15:39 [PATCH for-stable-v4.19 00/16] arm64 spec mitigation backports Ard Biesheuvel
2019-10-08 15:39 ` [PATCH for-stable-v4.19 01/16] arm64: cpufeature: Detect SSBS and advertise to userspace Ard Biesheuvel
2019-10-08 15:39 ` [PATCH for-stable-v4.19 02/16] arm64: ssbd: Add support for PSTATE.SSBS rather than trapping to EL3 Ard Biesheuvel
2019-10-09 8:04 ` Patch "arm64: ssbd: Add support for PSTATE.SSBS rather than trapping to EL3" has been added to the 4.19-stable tree gregkh
2019-10-08 15:39 ` [PATCH for-stable-v4.19 03/16] KVM: arm64: Set SCTLR_EL2.DSSBS if SSBD is forcefully disabled and !vhe Ard Biesheuvel
2019-10-09 8:04 ` Patch "KVM: arm64: Set SCTLR_EL2.DSSBS if SSBD is forcefully disabled and !vhe" has been added to the 4.19-stable tree gregkh
2019-10-08 15:39 ` [PATCH for-stable-v4.19 04/16] arm64: docs: Document SSBS HWCAP Ard Biesheuvel
2019-10-09 8:04 ` Patch "arm64: docs: Document SSBS HWCAP" has been added to the 4.19-stable tree gregkh
2019-10-08 15:39 ` [PATCH for-stable-v4.19 05/16] arm64: fix SSBS sanitization Ard Biesheuvel
2019-10-09 8:04 ` Patch "arm64: fix SSBS sanitization" has been added to the 4.19-stable tree gregkh
2019-10-08 15:39 ` [PATCH for-stable-v4.19 06/16] arm64: Add sysfs vulnerability show for spectre-v1 Ard Biesheuvel
2019-10-09 8:04 ` Patch "arm64: Add sysfs vulnerability show for spectre-v1" has been added to the 4.19-stable tree gregkh
2019-10-08 15:39 ` [PATCH for-stable-v4.19 07/16] arm64: add sysfs vulnerability show for meltdown Ard Biesheuvel
2019-10-09 8:04 ` Patch "arm64: add sysfs vulnerability show for meltdown" has been added to the 4.19-stable tree gregkh
2019-10-08 15:39 ` [PATCH for-stable-v4.19 08/16] arm64: enable generic CPU vulnerabilites support Ard Biesheuvel
2019-10-09 8:04 ` Patch "arm64: enable generic CPU vulnerabilites support" has been added to the 4.19-stable tree gregkh
2019-10-08 15:39 ` [PATCH for-stable-v4.19 09/16] arm64: Always enable ssb vulnerability detection Ard Biesheuvel
2019-10-09 8:04 ` gregkh [this message]
2019-10-08 15:39 ` [PATCH for-stable-v4.19 10/16] arm64: Provide a command line to disable spectre_v2 mitigation Ard Biesheuvel
2019-10-09 8:04 ` Patch "arm64: Provide a command line to disable spectre_v2 mitigation" has been added to the 4.19-stable tree gregkh
2019-10-08 15:39 ` [PATCH for-stable-v4.19 11/16] arm64: Advertise mitigation of Spectre-v2, or lack thereof Ard Biesheuvel
2019-10-09 8:04 ` Patch "arm64: Advertise mitigation of Spectre-v2, or lack thereof" has been added to the 4.19-stable tree gregkh
2019-10-08 15:39 ` [PATCH for-stable-v4.19 12/16] arm64: Always enable spectre-v2 vulnerability detection Ard Biesheuvel
2019-10-09 8:04 ` Patch "arm64: Always enable spectre-v2 vulnerability detection" has been added to the 4.19-stable tree gregkh
2019-10-08 15:39 ` [PATCH for-stable-v4.19 13/16] arm64: add sysfs vulnerability show for spectre-v2 Ard Biesheuvel
2019-10-09 8:04 ` Patch "arm64: add sysfs vulnerability show for spectre-v2" has been added to the 4.19-stable tree gregkh
2019-10-08 15:39 ` [PATCH for-stable-v4.19 14/16] arm64: add sysfs vulnerability show for speculative store bypass Ard Biesheuvel
2019-10-09 8:04 ` Patch "arm64: add sysfs vulnerability show for speculative store bypass" has been added to the 4.19-stable tree gregkh
2019-10-08 15:39 ` [PATCH for-stable-v4.19 15/16] arm64: ssbs: Don't treat CPUs with SSBS as unaffected by SSB Ard Biesheuvel
2019-10-09 8:04 ` Patch "arm64: ssbs: Don't treat CPUs with SSBS as unaffected by SSB" has been added to the 4.19-stable tree gregkh
2019-10-08 15:39 ` [PATCH for-stable-v4.19 16/16] arm64: Force SSBS on context switch Ard Biesheuvel
2019-10-09 8:04 ` Patch "arm64: Force SSBS on context switch" has been added to the 4.19-stable tree gregkh
2019-10-09 8:04 ` [PATCH for-stable-v4.19 00/16] arm64 spec mitigation backports Greg KH
2019-10-09 8:17 ` Ard Biesheuvel
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