Patch "arm64: Always enable spectre-v2 vulnerability detection" has been added to the 4.19-stable tree

[<gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>]

This is a note to let you know that I've just added the patch titled

    arm64: Always enable spectre-v2 vulnerability detection

to the 4.19-stable tree which can be found at:
    http://www.kernel.org/git/?p=linux/kernel/git/stable/stable-queue.git;a=summary

The filename of the patch is:
     arm64-always-enable-spectre-v2-vulnerability-detection.patch
and it can be found in the queue-4.19 subdirectory.

If you, or anyone else, feels it should not be added to the stable tree,
please let <stable@vger.kernel.org> know about it.


From foo@baz Wed 09 Oct 2019 10:02:11 AM CEST
From: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>
Date: Tue,  8 Oct 2019 17:39:26 +0200
Subject: arm64: Always enable spectre-v2 vulnerability detection
To: linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org, Jeremy Linton <jeremy.linton@arm.com>, Andre Przywara <andre.przywara@arm.com>, Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>, Stefan Wahren <stefan.wahren@i2se.com>, Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>, Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>
Message-ID: <20191008153930.15386-13-ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>

From: Jeremy Linton <jeremy.linton@arm.com>

[ Upstream commit 8c1e3d2bb44cbb998cb28ff9a18f105fee7f1eb3 ]

Ensure we are always able to detect whether or not the CPU is affected
by Spectre-v2, so that we can later advertise this to userspace.

Signed-off-by: Jeremy Linton <jeremy.linton@arm.com>
Reviewed-by: Andre Przywara <andre.przywara@arm.com>
Reviewed-by: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
Tested-by: Stefan Wahren <stefan.wahren@i2se.com>
Signed-off-by: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
 arch/arm64/kernel/cpu_errata.c |   15 ++++++++-------
 1 file changed, 8 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-)

--- a/arch/arm64/kernel/cpu_errata.c
+++ b/arch/arm64/kernel/cpu_errata.c
@@ -87,7 +87,6 @@ cpu_enable_trap_ctr_access(const struct
 
 atomic_t arm64_el2_vector_last_slot = ATOMIC_INIT(-1);
 
-#ifdef CONFIG_HARDEN_BRANCH_PREDICTOR
 #include <asm/mmu_context.h>
 #include <asm/cacheflush.h>
 
@@ -225,11 +224,11 @@ static int detect_harden_bp_fw(void)
 	    ((midr & MIDR_CPU_MODEL_MASK) == MIDR_QCOM_FALKOR_V1))
 		cb = qcom_link_stack_sanitization;
 
-	install_bp_hardening_cb(cb, smccc_start, smccc_end);
+	if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_HARDEN_BRANCH_PREDICTOR))
+		install_bp_hardening_cb(cb, smccc_start, smccc_end);
 
 	return 1;
 }
-#endif	/* CONFIG_HARDEN_BRANCH_PREDICTOR */
 
 DEFINE_PER_CPU_READ_MOSTLY(u64, arm64_ssbd_callback_required);
 
@@ -513,7 +512,6 @@ multi_entry_cap_cpu_enable(const struct
 			caps->cpu_enable(caps);
 }
 
-#ifdef CONFIG_HARDEN_BRANCH_PREDICTOR
 /*
  * List of CPUs that do not need any Spectre-v2 mitigation at all.
  */
@@ -545,6 +543,12 @@ check_branch_predictor(const struct arm6
 	if (!need_wa)
 		return false;
 
+	if (!IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_HARDEN_BRANCH_PREDICTOR)) {
+		pr_warn_once("spectrev2 mitigation disabled by kernel configuration\n");
+		__hardenbp_enab = false;
+		return false;
+	}
+
 	/* forced off */
 	if (__nospectre_v2) {
 		pr_info_once("spectrev2 mitigation disabled by command line option\n");
@@ -556,7 +560,6 @@ check_branch_predictor(const struct arm6
 
 	return (need_wa > 0);
 }
-#endif
 
 #ifdef CONFIG_HARDEN_EL2_VECTORS
 
@@ -715,13 +718,11 @@ const struct arm64_cpu_capabilities arm6
 		ERRATA_MIDR_ALL_VERSIONS(MIDR_CORTEX_A73),
 	},
 #endif
-#ifdef CONFIG_HARDEN_BRANCH_PREDICTOR
 	{
 		.capability = ARM64_HARDEN_BRANCH_PREDICTOR,
 		.type = ARM64_CPUCAP_LOCAL_CPU_ERRATUM,
 		.matches = check_branch_predictor,
 	},
-#endif
 #ifdef CONFIG_HARDEN_EL2_VECTORS
 	{
 		.desc = "EL2 vector hardening",


Patches currently in stable-queue which might be from ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org are

queue-4.19/arm64-add-sysfs-vulnerability-show-for-meltdown.patch
queue-4.19/arm64-force-ssbs-on-context-switch.patch
queue-4.19/arm64-enable-generic-cpu-vulnerabilites-support.patch
queue-4.19/arm64-provide-a-command-line-to-disable-spectre_v2-mitigation.patch
queue-4.19/arm64-always-enable-spectre-v2-vulnerability-detection.patch
queue-4.19/arm64-docs-document-ssbs-hwcap.patch
queue-4.19/arm64-add-sysfs-vulnerability-show-for-spectre-v1.patch
queue-4.19/arm64-add-sysfs-vulnerability-show-for-speculative-store-bypass.patch
queue-4.19/kvm-arm64-set-sctlr_el2.dssbs-if-ssbd-is-forcefully-disabled-and-vhe.patch
queue-4.19/arm64-always-enable-ssb-vulnerability-detection.patch
queue-4.19/arm64-advertise-mitigation-of-spectre-v2-or-lack-thereof.patch
queue-4.19/arm64-ssbs-don-t-treat-cpus-with-ssbs-as-unaffected-by-ssb.patch
queue-4.19/crypto-skcipher-unmap-pages-after-an-external-error.patch
queue-4.19/arm64-cpufeature-detect-ssbs-and-advertise-to-userspace.patch
queue-4.19/arm64-ssbd-add-support-for-pstate.ssbs-rather-than-trapping-to-el3.patch
queue-4.19/arm64-fix-ssbs-sanitization.patch
queue-4.19/arm64-add-sysfs-vulnerability-show-for-spectre-v2.patch

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