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From: Oleksandr Tyshchenko <olekstysh@gmail.com>
To: xen-devel@lists.xenproject.org, x86@kernel.org,
	linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org,
	linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Cc: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com>,
	Oleksandr Tyshchenko <oleksandr_tyshchenko@epam.com>,
	Stefano Stabellini <sstabellini@kernel.org>,
	Russell King <linux@armlinux.org.uk>,
	Boris Ostrovsky <boris.ostrovsky@oracle.com>,
	Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>,
	Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>, Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>,
	Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>,
	"H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>, Julien Grall <julien@xen.org>,
	"Michael S. Tsirkin" <mst@redhat.com>,
	Christoph Hellwig <hch@infradead.org>
Subject: [PATCH V3 4/8] xen/virtio: Enable restricted memory access using Xen grant mappings
Date: Tue, 31 May 2022 00:00:13 +0300	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <1653944417-17168-5-git-send-email-olekstysh@gmail.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <1653944417-17168-1-git-send-email-olekstysh@gmail.com>

From: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com>

In order to support virtio in Xen guests add a config option XEN_VIRTIO
enabling the user to specify whether in all Xen guests virtio should
be able to access memory via Xen grant mappings only on the host side.

Also set PLATFORM_VIRTIO_RESTRICTED_MEM_ACCESS feature from the guest
initialization code on Arm and x86 if CONFIG_XEN_VIRTIO is enabled.

Signed-off-by: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Oleksandr Tyshchenko <oleksandr_tyshchenko@epam.com>
Reviewed-by: Stefano Stabellini <sstabellini@kernel.org>
---
Changes V1 -> V2:
   - new patch, split required changes from commit:
    "[PATCH V1 3/6] xen/virtio: Add option to restrict memory access under Xen"
   - rework according to new platform_has() infrastructure

Changes V2 -> V3:
   - add Stefano's R-b
---
 arch/arm/xen/enlighten.c     |  2 ++
 arch/x86/xen/enlighten_hvm.c |  2 ++
 arch/x86/xen/enlighten_pv.c  |  2 ++
 drivers/xen/Kconfig          | 11 +++++++++++
 include/xen/xen.h            |  8 ++++++++
 5 files changed, 25 insertions(+)

diff --git a/arch/arm/xen/enlighten.c b/arch/arm/xen/enlighten.c
index 07eb69f..1f9c3ba 100644
--- a/arch/arm/xen/enlighten.c
+++ b/arch/arm/xen/enlighten.c
@@ -443,6 +443,8 @@ static int __init xen_guest_init(void)
 	if (!xen_domain())
 		return 0;
 
+	xen_set_restricted_virtio_memory_access();
+
 	if (!acpi_disabled)
 		xen_acpi_guest_init();
 	else
diff --git a/arch/x86/xen/enlighten_hvm.c b/arch/x86/xen/enlighten_hvm.c
index 517a9d8..8b71b1d 100644
--- a/arch/x86/xen/enlighten_hvm.c
+++ b/arch/x86/xen/enlighten_hvm.c
@@ -195,6 +195,8 @@ static void __init xen_hvm_guest_init(void)
 	if (xen_pv_domain())
 		return;
 
+	xen_set_restricted_virtio_memory_access();
+
 	init_hvm_pv_info();
 
 	reserve_shared_info();
diff --git a/arch/x86/xen/enlighten_pv.c b/arch/x86/xen/enlighten_pv.c
index ca85d14..30d24fe 100644
--- a/arch/x86/xen/enlighten_pv.c
+++ b/arch/x86/xen/enlighten_pv.c
@@ -108,6 +108,8 @@ static DEFINE_PER_CPU(struct tls_descs, shadow_tls_desc);
 
 static void __init xen_pv_init_platform(void)
 {
+	xen_set_restricted_virtio_memory_access();
+
 	populate_extra_pte(fix_to_virt(FIX_PARAVIRT_BOOTMAP));
 
 	set_fixmap(FIX_PARAVIRT_BOOTMAP, xen_start_info->shared_info);
diff --git a/drivers/xen/Kconfig b/drivers/xen/Kconfig
index 313a9127..a7bd8ce 100644
--- a/drivers/xen/Kconfig
+++ b/drivers/xen/Kconfig
@@ -339,4 +339,15 @@ config XEN_GRANT_DMA_OPS
 	bool
 	select DMA_OPS
 
+config XEN_VIRTIO
+	bool "Xen virtio support"
+	depends on VIRTIO
+	select XEN_GRANT_DMA_OPS
+	help
+	  Enable virtio support for running as Xen guest. Depending on the
+	  guest type this will require special support on the backend side
+	  (qemu or kernel, depending on the virtio device types used).
+
+	  If in doubt, say n.
+
 endmenu
diff --git a/include/xen/xen.h b/include/xen/xen.h
index a99bab8..0780a81 100644
--- a/include/xen/xen.h
+++ b/include/xen/xen.h
@@ -52,6 +52,14 @@ bool xen_biovec_phys_mergeable(const struct bio_vec *vec1,
 extern u64 xen_saved_max_mem_size;
 #endif
 
+#include <linux/platform-feature.h>
+
+static inline void xen_set_restricted_virtio_memory_access(void)
+{
+	if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_XEN_VIRTIO) && xen_domain())
+		platform_set(PLATFORM_VIRTIO_RESTRICTED_MEM_ACCESS);
+}
+
 #ifdef CONFIG_XEN_UNPOPULATED_ALLOC
 int xen_alloc_unpopulated_pages(unsigned int nr_pages, struct page **pages);
 void xen_free_unpopulated_pages(unsigned int nr_pages, struct page **pages);
-- 
2.7.4


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  parent reply	other threads:[~2022-05-30 21:02 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 18+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2022-05-30 21:00 [PATCH V3 0/8] virtio: Solution to restrict memory access under Xen using xen-grant DMA-mapping layer Oleksandr Tyshchenko
2022-05-30 21:00 ` [PATCH V3 1/8] arm/xen: Introduce xen_setup_dma_ops() Oleksandr Tyshchenko
2022-05-30 21:00 ` [PATCH V3 2/8] xen/grants: support allocating consecutive grants Oleksandr Tyshchenko
2022-05-30 21:00 ` [PATCH V3 3/8] xen/grant-dma-ops: Add option to restrict memory access under Xen Oleksandr Tyshchenko
2022-06-01  0:19   ` Stefano Stabellini
2022-05-30 21:00 ` Oleksandr Tyshchenko [this message]
2022-06-02 12:49   ` [PATCH V3 4/8] xen/virtio: Enable restricted memory access using Xen grant mappings Oleksandr
2022-06-02 19:09     ` Boris Ostrovsky
2022-05-30 21:00 ` [PATCH V3 5/8] dt-bindings: Add xen,grant-dma IOMMU description for xen-grant DMA ops Oleksandr Tyshchenko
2022-05-31 11:52   ` Krzysztof Kozlowski
2022-05-31 17:09     ` Oleksandr
2022-06-01  0:34   ` Stefano Stabellini
2022-06-01 13:32     ` Oleksandr
2022-05-30 21:00 ` [PATCH V3 6/8] xen/grant-dma-iommu: Introduce stub IOMMU driver Oleksandr Tyshchenko
2022-06-01  0:38   ` Stefano Stabellini
2022-05-30 21:00 ` [PATCH V3 7/8] xen/grant-dma-ops: Retrieve the ID of backend's domain for DT devices Oleksandr Tyshchenko
2022-06-01  0:53   ` Stefano Stabellini
2022-05-30 21:00 ` [PATCH V3 8/8] arm/xen: Assign xen-grant DMA ops for xen-grant DMA devices Oleksandr Tyshchenko

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