From mboxrd@z Thu Jan  1 00:00:00 1970
From: smueller@chronox.de (Stephan Mueller)
Date: Tue, 18 Oct 2016 16:24:22 +0200
Subject: [PATCH] crypto: sun4i-ss: support the Security System PRNG
In-Reply-To: <1476794067-28563-1-git-send-email-clabbe.montjoie@gmail.com>
References: <1476794067-28563-1-git-send-email-clabbe.montjoie@gmail.com>
Message-ID: <1722218.eZlGktOxfL@tauon.atsec.com>
To: linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org
List-Id: linux-arm-kernel.lists.infradead.org

Am Dienstag, 18. Oktober 2016, 14:34:27 CEST schrieb Corentin Labbe:

Hi Corentin,

> diff --git a/drivers/crypto/sunxi-ss/sun4i-ss-hwrng.c
> b/drivers/crypto/sunxi-ss/sun4i-ss-hwrng.c new file mode 100644
> index 0000000..95fadb7
> --- /dev/null
> +++ b/drivers/crypto/sunxi-ss/sun4i-ss-hwrng.c
> @@ -0,0 +1,70 @@
> +#include "sun4i-ss.h"
> +
> +static int sun4i_ss_hwrng_init(struct hwrng *hwrng)
> +{
> +	struct sun4i_ss_ctx *ss;
> +
> +	ss = container_of(hwrng, struct sun4i_ss_ctx, hwrng);
> +	get_random_bytes(ss->seed, SS_SEED_LEN);

Is it wise to call get_random_bytes once in the init function and never 
thereafter?

This init function may be called during boot time of the kernel at which the 
input_pool may not yet have received sufficient amounts of entropy.

What about registering a callback with add_random_ready_callback and seed 
again when sufficient entropy was collected?


Ciao
Stephan