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From: Florian Fainelli <florian.fainelli@broadcom.com>
To: Douglas Anderson <dianders@chromium.org>,
	Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>,
	Will Deacon <will@kernel.org>,
	Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>
Cc: Roxana Bradescu <roxabee@google.com>,
	Julius Werner <jwerner@chromium.org>,
	bjorn.andersson@oss.qualcomm.com,
	linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org,
	linux-arm-msm@vger.kernel.org,
	Jeffrey Hugo <quic_jhugo@quicinc.com>,
	Trilok Soni <quic_tsoni@quicinc.com>,
	stable@vger.kernel.org, James Morse <james.morse@arm.com>,
	Kent Overstreet <kent.overstreet@linux.dev>,
	Suren Baghdasaryan <surenb@google.com>,
	linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH v3 1/3] arm64: errata: Assume that unknown CPUs _are_ vulnerable to Spectre BHB
Date: Mon, 6 Jan 2025 14:48:46 -0800	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <18dbd7d1-a46c-4112-a425-320c99f67a8d@broadcom.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20241219125317.v3.1.I2040fa004dafe196243f67ebcc647cbedbb516e6@changeid>

On 12/19/24 12:53, Douglas Anderson wrote:
> The code for detecting CPUs that are vulnerable to Spectre BHB was
> based on a hardcoded list of CPU IDs that were known to be affected.
> Unfortunately, the list mostly only contained the IDs of standard ARM
> cores. The IDs for many cores that are minor variants of the standard
> ARM cores (like many Qualcomm Kyro CPUs) weren't listed. This led the
> code to assume that those variants were not affected.
> 
> Flip the code on its head and instead assume that a core is vulnerable
> if it doesn't have CSV2_3 but is unrecognized as being safe. This
> involves creating a "Spectre BHB safe" list.
> 
> As of right now, the only CPU IDs added to the "Spectre BHB safe" list
> are ARM Cortex A35, A53, A55, A510, and A520. This list was created by
> looking for cores that weren't listed in ARM's list [1] as per review
> feedback on v2 of this patch [2].
> 
> NOTE: this patch will not actually _mitigate_ anyone, it will simply
> cause them to report themselves as vulnerable. If any cores in the
> system are reported as vulnerable but not mitigated then the whole
> system will be reported as vulnerable though the system will attempt
> to mitigate with the information it has about the known cores.
> 
> [1] https://developer.arm.com/Arm%20Security%20Center/Spectre-BHB
> [2] https://lore.kernel.org/r/20241219175128.GA25477@willie-the-truck
> 
> 
> Fixes: 558c303c9734 ("arm64: Mitigate spectre style branch history side channels")
> Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
> Signed-off-by: Douglas Anderson <dianders@chromium.org>
> ---
> 
> Changes in v3:
> - Don't guess the mitigation; just report unknown cores as vulnerable.
> - Restructure the code since is_spectre_bhb_affected() defaults to true
> 
> Changes in v2:
> - New
> 
>   arch/arm64/include/asm/spectre.h |   1 -
>   arch/arm64/kernel/proton-pack.c  | 144 +++++++++++++++++--------------
>   2 files changed, 77 insertions(+), 68 deletions(-)
> 
> diff --git a/arch/arm64/include/asm/spectre.h b/arch/arm64/include/asm/spectre.h
> index 0c4d9045c31f..f1524cdeacf1 100644
> --- a/arch/arm64/include/asm/spectre.h
> +++ b/arch/arm64/include/asm/spectre.h
> @@ -97,7 +97,6 @@ enum mitigation_state arm64_get_meltdown_state(void);
>   
>   enum mitigation_state arm64_get_spectre_bhb_state(void);
>   bool is_spectre_bhb_affected(const struct arm64_cpu_capabilities *entry, int scope);
> -u8 spectre_bhb_loop_affected(int scope);
>   void spectre_bhb_enable_mitigation(const struct arm64_cpu_capabilities *__unused);
>   bool try_emulate_el1_ssbs(struct pt_regs *regs, u32 instr);
>   
> diff --git a/arch/arm64/kernel/proton-pack.c b/arch/arm64/kernel/proton-pack.c
> index da53722f95d4..06e04c9e6480 100644
> --- a/arch/arm64/kernel/proton-pack.c
> +++ b/arch/arm64/kernel/proton-pack.c
> @@ -845,52 +845,68 @@ static unsigned long system_bhb_mitigations;
>    * This must be called with SCOPE_LOCAL_CPU for each type of CPU, before any
>    * SCOPE_SYSTEM call will give the right answer.
>    */
> -u8 spectre_bhb_loop_affected(int scope)
> +static bool is_spectre_bhb_safe(int scope)
> +{
> +	static const struct midr_range spectre_bhb_safe_list[] = {
> +		MIDR_ALL_VERSIONS(MIDR_CORTEX_A35),
> +		MIDR_ALL_VERSIONS(MIDR_CORTEX_A53),

You can add MIDR_ALL_VERSIONS(MIDR_BRAHMA_B53) here as well. Thanks
-- 
Florian



  parent reply	other threads:[~2025-01-06 22:50 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 7+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2024-12-19 20:53 [PATCH v3 0/3] arm64: errata: Rework Spectre BHB mitigations to not assume "safe" Douglas Anderson
2024-12-19 20:53 ` [PATCH v3 1/3] arm64: errata: Assume that unknown CPUs _are_ vulnerable to Spectre BHB Douglas Anderson
2024-12-20 16:33   ` Julius Werner
2025-01-06 22:32   ` Doug Anderson
2025-01-06 22:48   ` Florian Fainelli [this message]
2024-12-19 20:53 ` [PATCH v3 2/3] arm64: cputype: Add MIDR_CORTEX_A76AE Douglas Anderson
2024-12-19 20:53 ` [PATCH v3 3/3] arm64: errata: Add newer ARM cores to the spectre_bhb_loop_affected() lists Douglas Anderson

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