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From: oleg@redhat.com (Oleg Nesterov)
To: linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org
Subject: [PATCH v7 3/9] seccomp: introduce writer locking
Date: Tue, 24 Jun 2014 20:30:24 +0200	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20140624183024.GA1258@redhat.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <1403560693-21809-4-git-send-email-keescook@chromium.org>

I am puzzled by the usage of smp_load_acquire(),

On 06/23, Kees Cook wrote:
>
>  static u32 seccomp_run_filters(int syscall)
>  {
> -	struct seccomp_filter *f;
> +	struct seccomp_filter *f = smp_load_acquire(&current->seccomp.filter);
>  	struct seccomp_data sd;
>  	u32 ret = SECCOMP_RET_ALLOW;
>  
>  	/* Ensure unexpected behavior doesn't result in failing open. */
> -	if (WARN_ON(current->seccomp.filter == NULL))
> +	if (WARN_ON(f == NULL))
>  		return SECCOMP_RET_KILL;
>  
>  	populate_seccomp_data(&sd);
> @@ -186,9 +186,8 @@ static u32 seccomp_run_filters(int syscall)
>  	 * All filters in the list are evaluated and the lowest BPF return
>  	 * value always takes priority (ignoring the DATA).
>  	 */
> -	for (f = current->seccomp.filter; f; f = f->prev) {
> +	for (; f; f = smp_load_acquire(&f->prev)) {
>  		u32 cur_ret = SK_RUN_FILTER(f->prog, (void *)&sd);
> -
>  		if ((cur_ret & SECCOMP_RET_ACTION) < (ret & SECCOMP_RET_ACTION))
>  			ret = cur_ret;

OK, in this case the 1st one is probably fine, altgough it is not
clear to me why it is better than read_barrier_depends().

But why do we need a 2nd one inside the loop? And if we actually need
it (I don't think so) then why it is safe to use f->prog without
load_acquire ?

>  void get_seccomp_filter(struct task_struct *tsk)
>  {
> -	struct seccomp_filter *orig = tsk->seccomp.filter;
> +	struct seccomp_filter *orig = smp_load_acquire(&tsk->seccomp.filter);
>  	if (!orig)
>  		return;

This one looks unneeded.

First of all, afaics atomic_inc() should work correctly without any barriers,
otherwise it is buggy. But even this doesn't matter.

With this changes get_seccomp_filter() must be called under ->siglock, it can't
race with add-filter and thus tsk->seccomp.filter should be stable.

>  	/* Reference count is bounded by the number of total processes. */
> @@ -361,7 +364,7 @@ void put_seccomp_filter(struct task_struct *tsk)
>  	/* Clean up single-reference branches iteratively. */
>  	while (orig && atomic_dec_and_test(&orig->usage)) {
>  		struct seccomp_filter *freeme = orig;
> -		orig = orig->prev;
> +		orig = smp_load_acquire(&orig->prev);
>  		seccomp_filter_free(freeme);
>  	}

This one looks unneeded too. And note that this patch does not add
smp_load_acquire() to read tsk->seccomp.filter.

atomic_dec_and_test() adds mb(), we do not need more barriers to access
->prev ?

Oleg.

  parent reply	other threads:[~2014-06-24 18:30 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 36+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2014-06-23 21:58 [PATCH v7 0/9] seccomp: add thread sync ability Kees Cook
2014-06-23 21:58 ` [PATCH v7 1/9] seccomp: create internal mode-setting function Kees Cook
2014-06-23 21:58 ` [PATCH v7 2/9] seccomp: split filter prep from check and apply Kees Cook
2014-06-26 12:37   ` David Drysdale
2014-06-27 18:45     ` Kees Cook
2014-06-23 21:58 ` [PATCH v7 3/9] seccomp: introduce writer locking Kees Cook
2014-06-24 16:52   ` Oleg Nesterov
2014-06-24 18:02     ` Kees Cook
2014-06-24 18:35       ` Oleg Nesterov
2014-06-24 20:26         ` Kees Cook
2014-06-24 18:30   ` Oleg Nesterov [this message]
2014-06-24 19:46     ` Kees Cook
2014-06-23 21:58 ` [PATCH v7 4/9] seccomp: move no_new_privs into seccomp Kees Cook
2014-06-24 19:18   ` Oleg Nesterov
2014-06-24 19:20     ` Andy Lutomirski
2014-06-24 19:30       ` Oleg Nesterov
2014-06-24 19:34         ` Andy Lutomirski
2014-06-24 19:50           ` Kees Cook
2014-06-24 19:51             ` Andy Lutomirski
2014-06-23 21:58 ` [PATCH v7 5/9] seccomp: split mode set routines Kees Cook
2014-06-23 21:58 ` [PATCH v7 6/9] seccomp: add "seccomp" syscall Kees Cook
2014-06-23 21:58 ` [PATCH v7 7/9] seccomp: implement SECCOMP_FILTER_FLAG_TSYNC Kees Cook
2014-06-24 17:08   ` Oleg Nesterov
2014-06-24 18:19     ` Kees Cook
2014-06-24 17:27   ` Oleg Nesterov
2014-06-24 18:05     ` Kees Cook
2014-06-24 18:37       ` Oleg Nesterov
2014-06-24 19:08         ` Kees Cook
2014-06-23 21:58 ` [PATCH v7 8/9] ARM: add seccomp syscall Kees Cook
2014-06-23 21:58 ` [PATCH v7 9/9] MIPS: " Kees Cook
2014-06-23 22:01 ` [PATCH v7 1/1] man-pages: seccomp.2: document syscall Kees Cook
2014-06-24 10:23   ` Michael Kerrisk (man-pages)
2014-06-24 16:43     ` Kees Cook
2014-06-24 17:48   ` [PATCH v7.1 " Kees Cook
2014-06-24 18:06   ` [PATCH v7 " Andy Lutomirski
2014-06-24 19:18     ` Kees Cook

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