[PATCH v2] arm64/efi: don't pad between EFI_MEMORY_RUNTIME regions

Mark Rutland
2015-09-10T14:04:19Z

> >> diff --git a/arch/arm64/kernel/efi.c b/arch/arm64/kernel/efi.c
> >> index e8ca6eaedd02..13671a9cf016 100644
> >> --- a/arch/arm64/kernel/efi.c
> >> +++ b/arch/arm64/kernel/efi.c
> >> @@ -258,7 +258,8 @@ static bool __init efi_virtmap_init(void)
> >> */
> >> if (!is_normal_ram(md))
> >> prot = __pgprot(PROT_DEVICE_nGnRE);
> >> - else if (md->type == EFI_RUNTIME_SERVICES_CODE)
> >> + else if (md->type == EFI_RUNTIME_SERVICES_CODE ||
> >> + !PAGE_ALIGNED(md->phys_addr))
> >> prot = PAGE_KERNEL_EXEC;
> >
> > This looks coarser than necessary. For memory organised like:
> >
> > 0x00000000 - 0x0000F000 (60KiB) : EFI_RUNTIME_SERVICES_CODE
> > 0x0000F000 - 0x00020000 (68KiB) : EFI_RUNTIME_SERVICES_DATA
> >
> > We should be able to make the last 64K non-executable, but with this all
> > 128K is executable, unless I've missed something?
> >
>
> In theory, yes. But considering that
>
> a) this only affects 64 KB pages kernels, and
> b) this patch is intended for -stable
>
> I chose to keep it simple and ignore this, and just relax the
> permissions for any region that is not aligned to 64 KB.
>
> Since these regions are only mapped during Runtime Services calls, the
> window for abuse is not that large.

Ok, that does sound reasonable.

> > Maybe we could do a two-step pass, first mapping the data as
> > not-executable, then mapping any code pages executable (overriding any
> > overlapping portions, but only for the overlapping parts).
> >
>
> Let me have a go at that.

Cheers!

> >> else
> >> prot = PAGE_KERNEL;
> >> diff --git a/drivers/firmware/efi/libstub/arm-stub.c b/drivers/firmware/efi/libstub/arm-stub.c
> >> index e29560e6b40b..cb4e9c4de952 100644
> >> --- a/drivers/firmware/efi/libstub/arm-stub.c
> >> +++ b/drivers/firmware/efi/libstub/arm-stub.c
> >> @@ -13,6 +13,7 @@
> >> */
> >>
> >> #include <linux/efi.h>
> >> +#include <linux/sort.h>
> >
> > Sort isn't an inline in this header. I thought it wasn't safe to call
> > arbitary kernel functions from the stub?
> >
>
> We call string functions, cache maintenance functions, libfdt
> functions etc etc so it seems not everyone got the memo :-)
>
> I agree that treating vmlinux both as a static library and as a
> payload from the stub's pov is a bit sloppy, and I do remember
> discussing this, but for the life of me, I can't remember the exact
> issue, other than the use of adrp/add and adrp/ldr pairs, which we
> fixed by setting the PE/COFF section alignment to 4 KB.

I only had a vague recollection that there was a problem, which I
thought was more to do with potential use of absolute kernel virtual
addresses, which would be incorrect in the context of an EFI
application.

Digging a bit, the stub code itself is safe due to commit
f4f75ad5741fe033 ("efi: efistub: Convert into static library"), but that
isn't necessarily true of anything it calls (libfdt uses callbacks in
several places). I think the cache functions we call are all raw asm
which is position-oblivious.

We do seem to be ok so far, however. Maybe we just need to keep an eye
out.

Thanks,
Mark.