From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 From: will.deacon@arm.com (Will Deacon) Date: Fri, 15 Jan 2016 13:42:07 +0000 Subject: [PATCH v2] kernel: add kcov code coverage In-Reply-To: References: <1452689318-107172-1-git-send-email-dvyukov@google.com> Message-ID: <20160115134207.GH2131@arm.com> To: linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org List-Id: linux-arm-kernel.lists.infradead.org On Fri, Jan 15, 2016 at 04:05:55PM +0300, Andrey Ryabinin wrote: > 2016-01-14 17:30 GMT+03:00 Dmitry Vyukov : > > On Thu, Jan 14, 2016 at 11:50 AM, Andrey Ryabinin > > wrote: > >> 2016-01-13 15:48 GMT+03:00 Dmitry Vyukov : > >>> diff --git a/kernel/kcov/kcov.c b/kernel/kcov/kcov.c > >>> +/* Entry point from instrumented code. > >>> + * This is called once per basic-block/edge. > >>> + */ > >>> +void __sanitizer_cov_trace_pc(void) > >>> +{ > >>> + struct task_struct *t; > >>> + enum kcov_mode mode; > >>> + > >>> + t = current; > >>> + /* We are interested in code coverage as a function of a syscall inputs, > >>> + * so we ignore code executed in interrupts. > >>> + */ > >>> + if (!t || in_interrupt()) > >>> + return; > >>> + mode = READ_ONCE(t->kcov_mode); > >>> + if (mode == kcov_mode_trace) { > >>> + u32 *area; > >>> + u32 pos; > >>> + > >>> + /* There is some code that runs in interrupts but for which > >>> + * in_interrupt() returns false (e.g. preempt_schedule_irq()). > >>> + * READ_ONCE()/barrier() effectively provides load-acquire wrt > >>> + * interrupts, there are paired barrier()/WRITE_ONCE() in > >>> + * kcov_ioctl_locked(). > >>> + */ > >>> + barrier(); > >>> + area = t->kcov_area; > >>> + /* The first u32 is number of subsequent PCs. */ > >>> + pos = READ_ONCE(area[0]) + 1; > >>> + if (likely(pos < t->kcov_size)) { > >>> + area[pos] = (u32)_RET_IP_; > >>> + WRITE_ONCE(area[0], pos); > >> > >> Note that this works only for cache-coherent architectures. > >> For incoherent arches you'll need to flush_dcache_page() somewhere. > >> Perhaps it could be done on exit to userspace, since flushing here is > >> certainly an overkill. > > > > I can say that I understand the problem. Does it have to do with the > > fact that the buffer is shared between kernel and user-space? > > Current code is OK from the plain multi-threading side, as user must > > not read buffer concurrently with writing (that would not yield > > anything useful). > > It's not about SMP. > This problem is about virtually indexed aliasing D-caches and could be > observed on uniprocessor system. > You have 3 virtual addresses (user-space, linear mapping and vmalloc) > mapped to the same physical page. > With aliasing cache it's possible to have multiple cache-lines > representing the same physical page. > So the kernel might not see the update made by userspace and vise > versa because kernel/userspace use different virtual addresses. > > And btw, flush_dcache_page() would be a wrong choice, since kcov_area > is a vmalloc address, not a linear address. > So we need something that flushes vmalloc addresses. > > Alternatively we could simply mlock that memory and talk to user space > via get/put_user(). No flush will be required. > And we will avoid another potential problem - lack of vmalloc address > space on 32-bits. > > > We could add an ioctl that does the flush. But I would prefer if it is > > done when we port kcov to such an arch. Does arm64 require the flush? > > > > I think, it doesn't. AFAIK arm64 has non-aliasing D-cache. > > arm64/include/asm/cacheflush.h says: > Please note that the implementation assumes non-aliasing VIPT D-cache > > However, I wonder why it implements flush_dcache_page(). Per my > understanding it is not need for non-aliasing caches. > And Documentation/cachetlb.txt agrees with me: > void flush_dcache_page(struct page *page) > If D-cache aliasing is not an issue, this routine may > simply be defined as a nop on that architecture. > > Catalin, Will, could you please shed light on this? It's only there to keep the I-cache and D-cache in sync for executable pages. That is, flush_dcache_page sets a flah (PG_dcache_clean) in the page flags, which is checked and cleared when we install an executable user pte. Will