From: bsingharora@gmail.com (Balbir Singh)
To: linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org
Subject: [PATCH v2 02/11] mm: Hardened usercopy
Date: Fri, 15 Jul 2016 11:41:51 +1000 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20160715014151.GA13944@balbir.ozlabs.ibm.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <1468544658.30053.26.camel@redhat.com>
On Thu, Jul 14, 2016 at 09:04:18PM -0400, Rik van Riel wrote:
> On Fri, 2016-07-15 at 09:20 +1000, Balbir Singh wrote:
>
> > > ==
> > > + ???((unsigned long)end & (unsigned
> > > long)PAGE_MASK)))
> > > + return NULL;
> > > +
> > > + /* Allow if start and end are inside the same compound
> > > page. */
> > > + endpage = virt_to_head_page(end);
> > > + if (likely(endpage == page))
> > > + return NULL;
> > > +
> > > + /* Allow special areas, device memory, and sometimes
> > > kernel data. */
> > > + if (PageReserved(page) && PageReserved(endpage))
> > > + return NULL;
> >
> > If we came here, it's likely that endpage > page, do we need to check
> > that only the first and last pages are reserved? What about the ones
> > in
> > the middle?
>
> I think this will be so rare, we can get away with just
> checking the beginning and the end.
>
But do we want to leave a hole where an aware user space
can try a longer copy_* to avoid this check? If it is unlikely
should we just bite the bullet and do the check for the entire
range?
Balbir Singh.
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2016-07-15 1:41 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 31+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2016-07-13 21:55 [PATCH v2 0/11] mm: Hardened usercopy Kees Cook
2016-07-13 21:55 ` [PATCH v2 01/11] mm: Implement stack frame object validation Kees Cook
2016-07-13 22:01 ` Andy Lutomirski
2016-07-13 22:04 ` Kees Cook
2016-07-14 5:48 ` Josh Poimboeuf
2016-07-14 18:10 ` Kees Cook
2016-07-14 19:23 ` Josh Poimboeuf
2016-07-14 21:38 ` Kees Cook
2016-07-13 21:55 ` [PATCH v2 02/11] mm: Hardened usercopy Kees Cook
2016-07-14 23:20 ` Balbir Singh
2016-07-15 1:04 ` Rik van Riel
2016-07-15 1:41 ` Balbir Singh [this message]
2016-07-15 4:05 ` Kees Cook
2016-07-15 4:53 ` Kees Cook
2016-07-15 12:55 ` Balbir Singh
2016-07-15 4:25 ` Kees Cook
2016-07-15 19:00 ` [kernel-hardening] " Daniel Micay
2016-07-15 19:14 ` Kees Cook
2016-07-15 19:19 ` Daniel Micay
2016-07-15 19:23 ` Kees Cook
2016-07-13 21:55 ` [PATCH v2 03/11] x86/uaccess: Enable hardened usercopy Kees Cook
2016-07-13 21:55 ` [PATCH v2 04/11] ARM: uaccess: " Kees Cook
2016-07-13 21:55 ` [PATCH v2 05/11] arm64/uaccess: " Kees Cook
2016-07-13 21:55 ` [PATCH v2 06/11] ia64/uaccess: " Kees Cook
2016-07-13 21:56 ` [PATCH v2 07/11] powerpc/uaccess: " Kees Cook
2016-07-13 21:56 ` [PATCH v2 08/11] sparc/uaccess: " Kees Cook
2016-07-13 21:56 ` [PATCH v2 09/11] s390/uaccess: " Kees Cook
2016-07-13 21:56 ` [PATCH v2 10/11] mm: SLAB hardened usercopy support Kees Cook
2016-07-13 21:56 ` [PATCH v2 11/11] mm: SLUB " Kees Cook
2016-07-15 2:05 ` Balbir Singh
2016-07-15 4:29 ` Kees Cook
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