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From: will.deacon@arm.com (Will Deacon)
To: linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org
Subject: [kernel-hardening] [PATCH 0/7] arm64: Privileged Access Never using TTBR0_EL1 switching
Date: Mon, 15 Aug 2016 11:30:01 +0100	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20160815103000.GE13262@arm.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <CAKv+Gu-nrAvdqy9Yb=vP1RysWY+gZqHdiMv6fdDKN4-gBPivDA@mail.gmail.com>

On Mon, Aug 15, 2016 at 12:21:00PM +0200, Ard Biesheuvel wrote:
> On 15 August 2016 at 12:06, Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com> wrote:
> > On Mon, Aug 15, 2016 at 12:02:33PM +0200, Ard Biesheuvel wrote:
> >> On 15 August 2016 at 11:58, Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com> wrote:
> >> > On Mon, Aug 15, 2016 at 10:48:42AM +0100, Catalin Marinas wrote:
> >> >> On Sat, Aug 13, 2016 at 11:13:58AM +0200, Ard Biesheuvel wrote:
> >> >> > On 12 August 2016 at 17:27, Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com> wrote:
> >> >> > > This is the first (public) attempt at emulating PAN by disabling
> >> >> > > TTBR0_EL1 accesses on arm64.
> >> >> >
> >> >> > I take it using TCR_EL1.EPD0 is too expensive?
> >> >>
> >> >> It would require full TLB invalidation on entering/exiting the kernel
> >> >> and again for any user access. That's because the architecture allows
> >> >> this bit to be cached in the TLB so without TLBI we wouldn't have any
> >> >> guarantee that the actual PAN was toggled. I'm not sure it's even clear
> >> >> whether a TLBI by ASID or a local one would suffice (likely OK for the
> >> >> latter).
> >> >
> >> > It's worth noting that even ignoring the TLB-caching of TCR_EL1.EPD0, the
> >> > control only affects the behaviour on a TLB miss. Thus to use EPD0 we'd at
> >> > least need TLB invalidation by ASID to remove previously-allocated entries from
> >> > TLBs.
> >>
> >> ... or update the ASID to the reserved ASID in TTBR0_EL1, but leave
> >> the actual TTBR address alone.
> >>
> >> This would remove the need for a zero page, and for recording the
> >> original TTBR address in a per-cpu variable.
> >
> > That's a good point, and a better approach.
> >
> > Unfortunately, we're still left with the issue that TCR_EL1.* can be cached in
> > a TLB, as Catalin pointed out. Which at minimum would require a TLBI ASIDE1,
> > and may require something stronger, given the precise rules for TLB-cached
> > fields isn't clear.
> >
> 
> So how exactly would EPDn = 1 be cached in a TLB, given that the bit
> specifically means that TTBRn_ELn is ignored on a TLB *miss*. Doesn't
> that mean 'not covered by a TLB entry'? Or does it mean 'not covered
> by a TLB entry describing a valid translation'?
> 
> I guess it indeed makes sense to get this clarified ...

We'll put Rutland on the case.

> As to Will's point, I suppose there is a window where a speculative
> TLB fill could occur, so I suppose that means updating TTBR0_EL1.ASID
> first, then TCR_EL1.EPD0, and finally perform the TLBI ASIDE1 on the
> reserved ASID.

But then what do you gain from the reserved ASID?

Will

  reply	other threads:[~2016-08-15 10:30 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 37+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2016-08-12 15:27 [PATCH 0/7] arm64: Privileged Access Never using TTBR0_EL1 switching Catalin Marinas
2016-08-12 15:27 ` [PATCH 1/7] arm64: Factor out PAN enabling/disabling into separate uaccess_* macros Catalin Marinas
2016-08-12 15:27 ` [PATCH 2/7] arm64: Factor out TTBR0_EL1 setting into a specific asm macro Catalin Marinas
2016-08-12 15:27 ` [PATCH 3/7] arm64: Introduce uaccess_{disable, enable} functionality based on TTBR0_EL1 Catalin Marinas
2016-08-12 15:27 ` [PATCH 4/7] arm64: Disable TTBR0_EL1 during normal kernel execution Catalin Marinas
2016-08-15 11:18   ` Mark Rutland
2016-08-15 16:39     ` Catalin Marinas
2016-08-12 15:27 ` [PATCH 5/7] arm64: Handle faults caused by inadvertent user access with PAN enabled Catalin Marinas
2016-08-12 15:27 ` [PATCH 6/7] arm64: xen: Enable user access before a privcmd hvc call Catalin Marinas
2016-08-15  9:58   ` Julien Grall
2016-08-15 18:00     ` Stefano Stabellini
2016-08-12 15:27 ` [PATCH 7/7] arm64: Enable CONFIG_ARM64_TTBR0_PAN Catalin Marinas
2016-08-12 18:04 ` [PATCH 0/7] arm64: Privileged Access Never using TTBR0_EL1 switching Kees Cook
2016-08-12 18:22   ` Catalin Marinas
2016-08-13  9:13 ` [kernel-hardening] " Ard Biesheuvel
2016-08-15  9:48   ` Catalin Marinas
2016-08-15  9:58     ` Mark Rutland
2016-08-15 10:02       ` Ard Biesheuvel
2016-08-15 10:06         ` Mark Rutland
2016-08-15 10:10           ` Will Deacon
2016-08-15 10:15             ` Mark Rutland
2016-08-15 10:21               ` Will Deacon
2016-08-15 10:21           ` Ard Biesheuvel
2016-08-15 10:30             ` Will Deacon [this message]
2016-08-15 10:31               ` Ard Biesheuvel
2016-08-15 10:37                 ` Will Deacon
2016-08-15 10:43                   ` Ard Biesheuvel
2016-08-15 10:52                     ` Catalin Marinas
2016-08-15 10:56                       ` Ard Biesheuvel
2016-08-15 11:02                         ` Will Deacon
2016-08-15 16:13                         ` Catalin Marinas
2016-08-15 19:04                           ` Ard Biesheuvel
2016-08-15 11:00                     ` Will Deacon
2016-08-15 10:30             ` Mark Rutland
2016-08-15 10:08         ` Will Deacon
2016-08-26 15:39 ` David Brown
2016-08-26 17:24   ` Catalin Marinas

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