From: will.deacon@arm.com (Will Deacon)
To: linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org
Subject: [kernel-hardening] [PATCH 0/7] arm64: Privileged Access Never using TTBR0_EL1 switching
Date: Mon, 15 Aug 2016 11:37:21 +0100 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20160815103721.GF13262@arm.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <CAKv+Gu_8d7Vf+TzQnqaofNj62L-=qkht4av-6mCYZoWkucz8RA@mail.gmail.com>
On Mon, Aug 15, 2016 at 12:31:29PM +0200, Ard Biesheuvel wrote:
> On 15 August 2016 at 12:30, Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com> wrote:
> > On Mon, Aug 15, 2016 at 12:21:00PM +0200, Ard Biesheuvel wrote:
> >> As to Will's point, I suppose there is a window where a speculative
> >> TLB fill could occur, so I suppose that means updating TTBR0_EL1.ASID
> >> first, then TCR_EL1.EPD0, and finally perform the TLBI ASIDE1 on the
> >> reserved ASID.
> >
> > But then what do you gain from the reserved ASID?
> >
>
> To prevent TLB hits against the ASID of the current (disabled)
> userland translation
Right, but if the sequence you described ensures that, then why not just
set TCR_EL1.EPD0 and do TLBI ASIDE1 on the current ASID?
I don't see the difference between a TLB entry formed from a speculative
fill using the reserved ASID and one formed using a non-reserved ASID --
the page table is the same.
Will
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2016-08-15 10:37 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 37+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2016-08-12 15:27 [PATCH 0/7] arm64: Privileged Access Never using TTBR0_EL1 switching Catalin Marinas
2016-08-12 15:27 ` [PATCH 1/7] arm64: Factor out PAN enabling/disabling into separate uaccess_* macros Catalin Marinas
2016-08-12 15:27 ` [PATCH 2/7] arm64: Factor out TTBR0_EL1 setting into a specific asm macro Catalin Marinas
2016-08-12 15:27 ` [PATCH 3/7] arm64: Introduce uaccess_{disable, enable} functionality based on TTBR0_EL1 Catalin Marinas
2016-08-12 15:27 ` [PATCH 4/7] arm64: Disable TTBR0_EL1 during normal kernel execution Catalin Marinas
2016-08-15 11:18 ` Mark Rutland
2016-08-15 16:39 ` Catalin Marinas
2016-08-12 15:27 ` [PATCH 5/7] arm64: Handle faults caused by inadvertent user access with PAN enabled Catalin Marinas
2016-08-12 15:27 ` [PATCH 6/7] arm64: xen: Enable user access before a privcmd hvc call Catalin Marinas
2016-08-15 9:58 ` Julien Grall
2016-08-15 18:00 ` Stefano Stabellini
2016-08-12 15:27 ` [PATCH 7/7] arm64: Enable CONFIG_ARM64_TTBR0_PAN Catalin Marinas
2016-08-12 18:04 ` [PATCH 0/7] arm64: Privileged Access Never using TTBR0_EL1 switching Kees Cook
2016-08-12 18:22 ` Catalin Marinas
2016-08-13 9:13 ` [kernel-hardening] " Ard Biesheuvel
2016-08-15 9:48 ` Catalin Marinas
2016-08-15 9:58 ` Mark Rutland
2016-08-15 10:02 ` Ard Biesheuvel
2016-08-15 10:06 ` Mark Rutland
2016-08-15 10:10 ` Will Deacon
2016-08-15 10:15 ` Mark Rutland
2016-08-15 10:21 ` Will Deacon
2016-08-15 10:21 ` Ard Biesheuvel
2016-08-15 10:30 ` Will Deacon
2016-08-15 10:31 ` Ard Biesheuvel
2016-08-15 10:37 ` Will Deacon [this message]
2016-08-15 10:43 ` Ard Biesheuvel
2016-08-15 10:52 ` Catalin Marinas
2016-08-15 10:56 ` Ard Biesheuvel
2016-08-15 11:02 ` Will Deacon
2016-08-15 16:13 ` Catalin Marinas
2016-08-15 19:04 ` Ard Biesheuvel
2016-08-15 11:00 ` Will Deacon
2016-08-15 10:30 ` Mark Rutland
2016-08-15 10:08 ` Will Deacon
2016-08-26 15:39 ` David Brown
2016-08-26 17:24 ` Catalin Marinas
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