From: catalin.marinas@arm.com (Catalin Marinas)
To: linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org
Subject: [PATCH v2 1/7] arm64: Factor out PAN enabling/disabling into separate uaccess_* macros
Date: Mon, 12 Sep 2016 15:52:19 +0100 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20160912145219.GC2492@e104818-lin.cambridge.arm.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20160905153828.GA27305@leverpostej>
On Mon, Sep 05, 2016 at 04:38:28PM +0100, Mark Rutland wrote:
> On Fri, Sep 02, 2016 at 04:02:07PM +0100, Catalin Marinas wrote:
> > /*
> > + * User access enabling/disabling.
> > + */
> > +#define uaccess_disable(alt) \
> > +do { \
> > + asm(ALTERNATIVE("nop", SET_PSTATE_PAN(1), alt, \
> > + CONFIG_ARM64_PAN)); \
> > +} while (0)
> > +
> > +#define uaccess_enable(alt) \
> > +do { \
> > + asm(ALTERNATIVE("nop", SET_PSTATE_PAN(0), alt, \
> > + CONFIG_ARM64_PAN)); \
> > +} while (0)
>
> Passing the alternative down is somewhat confusing. e.g. in the futex
> case it looks like we're only doing something when PAN is present,
> whereas we'll manipulate TTBR0 in the absence of PAN.
I agree it's confusing (I got it wrong first time as well and used the
wrong alternative for futex).
> If I've understood correctly, we need this to distinguish regular
> load/store uaccess sequences (eg. the futex code) from potentially
> patched unprivileged load/store sequences (e.g. {get,put}_user) when
> poking PSTATE.PAN.
>
> So perhaps we could ahve something like:
>
> * privileged_uaccess_{enable,disable}()
> Which toggle TTBR0, or PAN (always).
> These would handle cases like the futex/swp code.
>
> * (unprivileged_)uaccess_{enable,disable}()
> Which toggle TTBR0, or PAN (in the absence of UAO).
> These would handle cases like the {get,put}_user sequences.
>
> Though perhaps that is just as confusing. ;)
I find it more confusing. In the non-UAO case, get_user etc. would
normally have to use privileged_uaccess_enable() since ldr is not
replaced with ldtr. Maybe uaccess_enable_for_exclusives() but it doesn't
look any better. I think adding some comments to the code
(uaccess_enable macro) would work better, clarifying what the
alternative is for.
--
Catalin
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2016-09-12 14:52 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 30+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2016-09-02 15:02 [PATCH v2 0/7] arm64: Privileged Access Never using TTBR0_EL1 switching Catalin Marinas
2016-09-02 15:02 ` [PATCH v2 1/7] arm64: Factor out PAN enabling/disabling into separate uaccess_* macros Catalin Marinas
2016-09-05 15:38 ` Mark Rutland
2016-09-12 14:52 ` Catalin Marinas [this message]
2016-09-12 15:09 ` Mark Rutland
2016-09-12 16:26 ` Catalin Marinas
2016-09-02 15:02 ` [PATCH v2 2/7] arm64: Factor out TTBR0_EL1 post-update workaround into a specific asm macro Catalin Marinas
2016-09-05 16:11 ` Mark Rutland
2016-09-02 15:02 ` [PATCH v2 3/7] arm64: Introduce uaccess_{disable, enable} functionality based on TTBR0_EL1 Catalin Marinas
2016-09-05 17:20 ` Mark Rutland
2016-09-06 10:27 ` Catalin Marinas
2016-09-06 10:45 ` Mark Rutland
2016-09-11 13:55 ` [kernel-hardening] " Ard Biesheuvel
2016-09-12 9:32 ` Catalin Marinas
2016-09-09 17:15 ` Catalin Marinas
2016-09-02 15:02 ` [PATCH v2 4/7] arm64: Disable TTBR0_EL1 during normal kernel execution Catalin Marinas
2016-09-06 17:31 ` Mark Rutland
2016-09-02 15:02 ` [PATCH v2 5/7] arm64: Handle faults caused by inadvertent user access with PAN enabled Catalin Marinas
2016-09-02 15:02 ` [PATCH v2 6/7] arm64: xen: Enable user access before a privcmd hvc call Catalin Marinas
2016-09-02 15:02 ` [PATCH v2 7/7] arm64: Enable CONFIG_ARM64_TTBR0_PAN Catalin Marinas
2016-09-02 15:47 ` Mark Rutland
2016-09-07 23:20 ` [PATCH v2 0/7] arm64: Privileged Access Never using TTBR0_EL1 switching Kees Cook
2016-09-08 12:51 ` Catalin Marinas
2016-09-08 15:50 ` Kees Cook
2016-09-09 16:31 ` Mark Rutland
2016-09-09 18:24 ` Kees Cook
2016-09-09 23:40 ` [kernel-hardening] " David Brown
2016-09-10 9:51 ` Catalin Marinas
2016-09-10 10:56 ` Ard Biesheuvel
2016-09-11 12:16 ` Catalin Marinas
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